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dc.contributor.authorCavalcanti, Eric G
dc.date.accessioned2021-05-26T23:30:47Z
dc.date.available2021-05-26T23:30:47Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.issn0015-9018en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10701-021-00417-0en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10072/404702
dc.description.abstractIn a recent no-go theorem [Bong et al., Nature Physics (2020)], we proved that the predictions of unitary quantum mechanics for an extended Wigner’s friend scenario are incompatible with any theory satisfying three metaphysical assumptions, the conjunction of which we call “Local Friendliness”: Absoluteness of Observed Events, Locality and No-Superdeterminism. In this paper (based on an invited talk for the QBism jubilee at the 2019 Växjö conference) I discuss the implications of this theorem for QBism, as seen from the point of view of experimental metaphysics. I argue that the key distinction between QBism and realist interpretations of quantum mechanics is best understood in terms of their adherence to different theories of truth: the pragmatist versus the correspondence theories. I argue that a productive pathway to resolve the measurement problem within a pragmatist view involves taking seriously the perspective of quantum betting agents, even those in what I call a “Wigner bubble”. The notion of reality afforded by QBism, I propose, will correspond to the invariant elements of any theory that has pragmatic value to all rational agents—that is, the elements that are invariant upon changes of agent perspectives. The classical notion of ‘event’ is not among those invariants, even when those events are observed by some agent. Neither are quantum states. Nevertheless, I argue that far from solipsism, a personalist view of quantum states is an expression of its precise opposite: Copernicanism.en_US
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.ispartofpagefrom39en_US
dc.relation.ispartofissue2en_US
dc.relation.ispartofjournalFoundations of Physicsen_US
dc.relation.ispartofvolume51en_US
dc.subject.fieldofresearchMathematical Sciencesen_US
dc.subject.fieldofresearchPhysical Sciencesen_US
dc.subject.fieldofresearchPhilosophy and Religious Studiesen_US
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode01en_US
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode02en_US
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode22en_US
dc.subject.keywordsScience & Technologyen_US
dc.subject.keywordsPhysics, Multidisciplinaryen_US
dc.subject.keywordsPhysicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordsquant-phen_US
dc.titleThe View from a Wigner Bubbleen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dcterms.bibliographicCitationCavalcanti, EG, The View from a Wigner Bubble, Foundations of Physics, 2021, 51 (2), pp. 39en_US
dc.date.updated2021-05-26T05:03:43Z
dc.description.versionAccepted Manuscript (AM)en_US
gro.rights.copyright© 2021 Springer Netherlands. This is an electronic version of an article published in Foundations of Physics, 2021, 51 (2), pp. 39. Foundations of Physics is available online at: http://link.springer.com/ with the open URL of your article.en_US
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gro.griffith.authorCavalcanti, Eric G.


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