Strategic Assessments: Aid And Bureaucracy In Australia-India Relations 1951-1989

Abstract

India was the largest recipient of Australian aid between 1951 and 1969, but in 1969 there was a marked decrease in this aid. Yet, current literature on the Australia-India bilateral relationship argues that the relations between the two countries were tense due to differences amongst leadership and their fundamentally opposite readings of the Cold War. There is a puzzle here that why, despite the tense bilateral relations, did Australia give so much aid to India up till 1969? Moreover, why was there a decline of aid to India in 1969? While the Australia-India relationship during the Cold War has been studied extensively, their aid relationship, however, has received little attention. This thesis traces Australia’s aid to India between 1951 and 1989 to explore what factors drove Australia’s fluctuating aid to India during this period. By drawing on archival material and interviews, this thesis examines changes in the thought and practice of key Australian decision-makers over time in its aid policy. It focuses on both bureaucratic agency and interests in exploring how bureaucrats perceived the uses of Australian aid and how policy was made within the government. This thesis finds that Australian aid to India can be explained by the Donor Interest Model (DIM) as Australia’s aid to India was driven by its strategic interests during the Cold War. However, it notes a subtle but important shift in within the DIM in this case as Australia’s strategic interests changed over time from strategic altruism to promoting its economic interests. Australia’s aid to India was driven by its strategic interests that were mainly influenced by its relationship with the US. Between 1951 and 1965, making India the largest recipient was a strategic decision by Australia to keep it from falling into the Soviet influence and making India a counterweight to a rising communist China during the Cold War. The aid cut of 1969 was a result of the strategic divergence between Australia and India that had been widening since 1966. This divergence was a result of the souring of Indo-US relations over the Vietnam War as India tilted towards the Soviet Union between 1966 and 1977. Between 1978 and 1989 Australia’s aid to India was driven by its economic and trade interests as Australia’s foreign and economic policies became closely aligned in response to the changing international economic order during this period. This variation of Australia’s aid interests is an addition to the study to Australian strategic foreign policy literature. It emphasizes the role of key senior bureaucrats and diplomats in not just influencing the drivers of Australian aid to India but also the broader bilateral ties during this period. This thesis highlights how well bureaucrats mediate pressures, whether it be political, security, ministerial or even business, in trying to craft a strategic foreign policy approach.