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dc.contributor.authorEccleston-Turner, Mark
dc.contributor.authorRourke, Michelle
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-03T05:23:59Z
dc.date.available2021-11-03T05:23:59Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.issn0020-5893
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/s0020589321000294
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10072/409732
dc.description.abstractAccess and benefit sharing (ABS) is a transactional mechanism designed to allow countries to trade access to their sovereign genetic resources for monetary and non-monetary benefits, with the ultimate goal of channelling those benefits into sustainable development and environmental conservation. Arguments about how pathogens are not the sort of genetic resources the world ought to conserve eventually gave way to a recognition that pathogens are indeed sovereign genetic resources under the Convention on Biological Diversity and its Nagoya Protocol, and that the ABS transaction may be an effective way to deliver scarce vaccines to developing nations as benefits received in exchange for shared pathogen samples. This article argues that categorising vaccines as benefits given in exchange for access to pathogen samples creates opposing incentives for providers and users of virus samples and undermines the human right to health because it makes that right a commodity to be bought. The provision of pathogen samples to the global research commons and the fair and equitable distribution of medicines should be two parallel public goods to be pursued as goals in and of themselves. We conclude that the linking of these goals through the ABS transaction should be reassessed.
dc.description.peerreviewedYes
dc.languageen
dc.publisherCambridge University Press (CUP)
dc.relation.ispartofpagefrom825
dc.relation.ispartofpageto858
dc.relation.ispartofissue4
dc.relation.ispartofjournalInternational and Comparative Law Quarterly
dc.relation.ispartofvolume70
dc.subject.fieldofresearchLaw in context
dc.subject.fieldofresearchInternational and comparative law
dc.subject.fieldofresearchPublic health
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode4804
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode4803
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode4206
dc.titleArguments against the inequitable distribution of vaccines using the access and benefit sharing transaction
dc.typeJournal article
dc.type.descriptionC1 - Articles
dcterms.bibliographicCitationEccleston-Turner, M; Rourke, M, Arguments against the inequitable distribution of vaccines using the access and benefit sharing transaction, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2021, 70 (4), pp. 825-858
dcterms.licensehttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.date.updated2021-11-02T10:47:30Z
dc.description.versionVersion of Record (VoR)
gro.rights.copyright© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of British Institute of International and Comparative Law. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
gro.hasfulltextFull Text
gro.griffith.authorRourke, Michelle F.


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