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dc.contributor.authorSharman, Jasonen_US
dc.date.accessioned2017-04-24T12:53:18Z
dc.date.available2017-04-24T12:53:18Z
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.date.modified2012-05-27T22:28:28Z
dc.identifier.issn00208833en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00693.xen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10072/42551
dc.description.abstractHow can we tell whether rules that apply in theory actually do so in practice? Realists argue that the gap between what formal rules proscribe and their effectiveness may be particularly wide at the international level. Furthermore, dominant states may impose costly standards on others that they themselves choose not to implement. To test these propositions, the article assesses the effectiveness of international soft law standards prohibiting anonymous participation in the global financial system by seeking to break these standards. The findings indicate that the prohibition on anonymous corporations is relatively ineffective and is flouted much more in G7 countries than in tax havens. The article contributes to and extends the work of realist scholars in international political economy, both in their skepticism of formal rules and focus on the effects of power. Evidence is drawn from the author's solicitations and purchases of anonymous shell companies from 45 corporate service providers in 22 countries.en_US
dc.description.peerreviewedYesen_US
dc.description.publicationstatusYesen_US
dc.format.extent140343 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherWiley-Blackwell Publishing, Incen_US
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_US
dc.relation.ispartofstudentpublicationNen_US
dc.relation.ispartofpagefrom981en_US
dc.relation.ispartofpageto1001en_US
dc.relation.ispartofissue4en_US
dc.relation.ispartofjournalInternational Studies Quarterlyen_US
dc.relation.ispartofvolume55en_US
dc.rights.retentionYen_US
dc.subject.fieldofresearchInternational Relationsen_US
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode160607en_US
dc.titleTesting the Global Financial Transparency Regimeen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.type.descriptionC1 - Peer Reviewed (HERDC)en_US
dc.type.codeC - Journal Articlesen_US
gro.facultyGriffith Business School, School of Government and International Relationsen_US
gro.rights.copyrightCopyright 2011 International Studies Association. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd. This is the author-manuscript version of this paper. Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. The definitive version is available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/en_US
gro.date.issued2011
gro.hasfulltextFull Text


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