Conceiving Concepts and Conceptions: A Cultural-Historical Approach
Author(s)
Roth, Wolff-Michael
Griffith University Author(s)
Year published
2011
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
A science that does not critically interrogate its theoretical concepts literally does not know what it is doing. The attempt to clarify a widely used concept in psychological research-the concept of concept-therefore constitutes an important effort in clarifying what role it plays in the discursive work of the field. In this commentary, I take a cultural-historical approach to suggest that the clarification of concepts requires both a genuine rupture and a historical study of the movement of a concept. Moreover, our study of concepts has to be reflexive because they are simultaneously objects of inquiry and means by which ...
View more >A science that does not critically interrogate its theoretical concepts literally does not know what it is doing. The attempt to clarify a widely used concept in psychological research-the concept of concept-therefore constitutes an important effort in clarifying what role it plays in the discursive work of the field. In this commentary, I take a cultural-historical approach to suggest that the clarification of concepts requires both a genuine rupture and a historical study of the movement of a concept. Moreover, our study of concepts has to be reflexive because they are simultaneously objects of inquiry and means by which such inquiry unfolds. Rather than doing mere analysis of concept use, I propose a categorical, historical reconstruction of the concepts psychologists use.
View less >
View more >A science that does not critically interrogate its theoretical concepts literally does not know what it is doing. The attempt to clarify a widely used concept in psychological research-the concept of concept-therefore constitutes an important effort in clarifying what role it plays in the discursive work of the field. In this commentary, I take a cultural-historical approach to suggest that the clarification of concepts requires both a genuine rupture and a historical study of the movement of a concept. Moreover, our study of concepts has to be reflexive because they are simultaneously objects of inquiry and means by which such inquiry unfolds. Rather than doing mere analysis of concept use, I propose a categorical, historical reconstruction of the concepts psychologists use.
View less >
Journal Title
Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology
Volume
31
Issue
2
Subject
Psychology not elsewhere classified
Psychology
Cognitive Sciences
Philosophy