Systems Thinking 1.0 and Systems Thinking 2.0: Complexity science and a new conception of "cause"

Abstract

Our understanding and investigation of accidents in aviation is dominated by a mechanistic worldview that seeks to find and fix broken parts. Even though "systems thinking" has become quite fashionable over the past two decades, this still often reduces to finding broken parts further away in space and time from the accident. This is Systems Thinking 1.0. In contrast, complexity science, and its new conception of "cause," offers a route to Systems Thinking 2.0. In this, investigators and managers can be made aware of the consequences of path-dependency, open systems, the asymmetry between small inputs and large effects, and the unpredictability of efforts to control or regulate complexity. This paper uses a case study to compare Systems Thinking 1.0 and 2.0 and develop the latter.