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  • Economic and Socio-Political Determinants of de Facto Monetary Institutions and Inflationary Outcomes

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    Author(s)
    Carmignani, Fabrizio
    Colombo, Emilio
    Tirelli, Patrizio
    Griffith University Author(s)
    Carmignani, Fabrizio
    Tirelli, Patrizio
    Year published
    2008
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    Abstract
    In this paper we estimate a model where inflation, a measure of de facto central bank independence and an index of de facto exchange rate regime are simultaneously determined by a set of economic, political and institutional variables. De facto central bank independence is hampered by socio-political turbulence and benefits from the balance of powers between the executive and the parliament. Inflation is explained by de facto central bank independence, by the level and volatility of public expenditure and by the de facto exchange rate regime. Openness (real and financial) affects inflation through the exchange rate regime ...
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    In this paper we estimate a model where inflation, a measure of de facto central bank independence and an index of de facto exchange rate regime are simultaneously determined by a set of economic, political and institutional variables. De facto central bank independence is hampered by socio-political turbulence and benefits from the balance of powers between the executive and the parliament. Inflation is explained by de facto central bank independence, by the level and volatility of public expenditure and by the de facto exchange rate regime. Openness (real and financial) affects inflation through the exchange rate regime channel. Success in controlling inflation, in turn is crucial to sustain central bank independence and exchange rate stability.
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    Journal Title
    The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics
    Volume
    8
    Issue
    1
    DOI
    https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1690.1591
    Copyright Statement
    © 2008 Berkeley Electronic Press. The attached file is reproduced here in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. Please refer to the journal's website for access to the definitive, published version.
    Subject
    Economic theory
    Applied economics
    Macroeconomics (incl. monetary and fiscal theory)
    Econometrics
    Publication URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/10072/47216
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    • Journal articles

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