Reading Austin Rhetorically
MetadataShow full item record
This article reads John L. Austin rhetorically and achieves two things thereby. First, it grasps the tensions subtending Austin's speech-act theory. These tensions arguably stem from Austin's distinct engagements with his brief to consider how saying something is to do something. Second, this article assesses the usefulness of Austin's notion of perlocution to the description of discursive events. I take such description to be a concern of the interpretive humanities in general and of rhetoric in particular. To gauge perlocution's utility, I compare its descriptive purchase with that of illocution, signalling some productive affinities between Austin and the purposive, processual conception of semiosis developed by Charles S. Peirce.
Philosophy and Rhetoric
© 2013 Pennsylvania State University Press. The attached file is reproduced here in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. For information about this journal please refer to the journal’s website or contact the author.
Language, Communication and Culture not elsewhere classified