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  • Agreeing to pay under value disagreement: Reconceptualizing preference transformation in terms of pluralism with evidence from small-group deliberations on climate change

    Author(s)
    Lo, Alex
    Griffith University Author(s)
    Lo, Alex
    Year published
    2013
    Metadata
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    Abstract
    Plural values contribute to multiple arrays of expressed preferences. Conventionally, preference convergence toward consensus among initially disagreeing decision makers is understood in terms of diminishing value differences. A cogent account of consensual decision that respects non-diminishing value plurality is lacking. Instead there is a theoretic expectation for categorical consistency between subjective values and expressed preferences. Valuing agents in social interaction are expected to indicate identical preference orderings only if they hold correspondingly identical categories of values. This expectation ...
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    Plural values contribute to multiple arrays of expressed preferences. Conventionally, preference convergence toward consensus among initially disagreeing decision makers is understood in terms of diminishing value differences. A cogent account of consensual decision that respects non-diminishing value plurality is lacking. Instead there is a theoretic expectation for categorical consistency between subjective values and expressed preferences. Valuing agents in social interaction are expected to indicate identical preference orderings only if they hold correspondingly identical categories of values. This expectation precludesmeaningful conceptualization of preference convergence under divisive normative dispositions. An alternative framework is proposed and illustrated by results froma designed deliberative forumon Australia's climate change policy. Datawere analyzed based on Q methodology. Results showthat small-group deliberations enabled effective communication between distinctive subjective positions and broadened understandings between individuals.While a consensual decision gained progress, no identified value discourse diminished belowa significant degree. Observed changes in values did not run parallel to the converging preferences, suggesting a decline in value-preference consistency. These changes nonetheless are amenable to the principle of value pluralism. An alternative rationality concept is needed to account for this moral ideal within economics.
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    Journal Title
    Ecological Economics
    Volume
    87
    DOI
    https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2012.12.014
    Subject
    Ecological Economics
    Environmental Science and Management
    Applied Economics
    Other Economics
    Publication URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/10072/54271
    Collection
    • Journal articles

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