Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorLo, Alex
dc.date.accessioned2017-05-03T16:05:22Z
dc.date.available2017-05-03T16:05:22Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.date.modified2013-11-12T22:57:55Z
dc.identifier.issn09218009
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.ecolecon.2012.12.014
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10072/54271
dc.description.abstractPlural values contribute to multiple arrays of expressed preferences. Conventionally, preference convergence toward consensus among initially disagreeing decision makers is understood in terms of diminishing value differences. A cogent account of consensual decision that respects non-diminishing value plurality is lacking. Instead there is a theoretic expectation for categorical consistency between subjective values and expressed preferences. Valuing agents in social interaction are expected to indicate identical preference orderings only if they hold correspondingly identical categories of values. This expectation precludesmeaningful conceptualization of preference convergence under divisive normative dispositions. An alternative framework is proposed and illustrated by results froma designed deliberative forumon Australia's climate change policy. Datawere analyzed based on Q methodology. Results showthat small-group deliberations enabled effective communication between distinctive subjective positions and broadened understandings between individuals.While a consensual decision gained progress, no identified value discourse diminished belowa significant degree. Observed changes in values did not run parallel to the converging preferences, suggesting a decline in value-preference consistency. These changes nonetheless are amenable to the principle of value pluralism. An alternative rationality concept is needed to account for this moral ideal within economics.
dc.description.peerreviewedYes
dc.description.publicationstatusYes
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.publisher.placeNetherlands
dc.relation.ispartofstudentpublicationN
dc.relation.ispartofpagefrom84
dc.relation.ispartofpageto94
dc.relation.ispartofjournalEcological Economics
dc.relation.ispartofvolume87
dc.rights.retentionY
dc.subject.fieldofresearchApplied economics
dc.subject.fieldofresearchOther economics
dc.subject.fieldofresearchEcological economics
dc.subject.fieldofresearchEcology
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode3801
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode3899
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode389902
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode3103
dc.titleAgreeing to pay under value disagreement: Reconceptualizing preference transformation in terms of pluralism with evidence from small-group deliberations on climate change
dc.typeJournal article
dc.type.descriptionC1 - Articles
dc.type.codeC - Journal Articles
gro.facultyGriffith Sciences, Griffith School of Environment
gro.date.issued2013
gro.hasfulltextNo Full Text
gro.griffith.authorLo, Alex


Files in this item

FilesSizeFormatView

There are no files associated with this item.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

  • Journal articles
    Contains articles published by Griffith authors in scholarly journals.

Show simple item record