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dc.contributor.authorBaker, Andrew
dc.contributor.authorWidmaier, Wesley
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-30T12:32:10Z
dc.date.available2017-06-30T12:32:10Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.date.modified2014-03-26T04:50:59Z
dc.identifier.issn1356-3467
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/13563467.2013.796447
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10072/57285
dc.description.abstractOne consequence of the global financial crisis has been to prompt debate over macroprudential regulation - meant to limit private risk-taking that threatens systemic stability. In this paper, we stress the roots of macroprudential ideas in the Institutionalist economics of Veblen and Galbraith in a way that highlights both unrecognised policy possibilities and underappreciated impediments to policy effectiveness, arguing in particular that regulatory success can breed overconfidence. First, we argue that while Veblen's views anticipated macroprudential arguments, they also obscured tensions between the technocratic acumen of policy 'engineers' and popular legitimacy. Second, we argue that while Galbraith's views similarly shaped the postwar Keynesian policy mix, they also echoed Veblen in underrating the potential for populist resentment of an intellectual 'technostructure'. We conclude that while this analysis can be seen as highlighting an overlooked century of macroprudential debate, it also demonstrates the potential for technocratic overconfidence - which can eventually undermine policy legitimacy and effectiveness.
dc.description.peerreviewedYes
dc.description.publicationstatusYes
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherRoutledge
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdom
dc.relation.ispartofstudentpublicationN
dc.relation.ispartofpagefrom487
dc.relation.ispartofpageto506
dc.relation.ispartofissue4
dc.relation.ispartofjournalNew Political Economy
dc.relation.ispartofvolume19
dc.rights.retentionY
dc.subject.fieldofresearchEconomic theory
dc.subject.fieldofresearchEconomic theory not elsewhere classified
dc.subject.fieldofresearchPolicy and administration
dc.subject.fieldofresearchPolicy and administration not elsewhere classified
dc.subject.fieldofresearchPolitical science
dc.subject.fieldofresearchPolitical science not elsewhere classified
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode3803
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode380399
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode4407
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode440799
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode4408
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode440899
dc.titleThe Institutionalist Roots of Macroprudential Ideas: Veblen and Galbraith on Regulation, Policy Success and Overconfidence
dc.typeJournal article
dc.type.descriptionC1 - Articles
dc.type.codeC - Journal Articles
gro.date.issued2013
gro.hasfulltextNo Full Text
gro.griffith.authorWidmaier, Wesley


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