• myGriffith
    • Staff portal
    • Contact Us⌄
      • Future student enquiries 1800 677 728
      • Current student enquiries 1800 154 055
      • International enquiries +61 7 3735 6425
      • General enquiries 07 3735 7111
      • Online enquiries
      • Staff phonebook
    View Item 
    •   Home
    • Griffith Research Online
    • Journal articles
    • View Item
    • Home
    • Griffith Research Online
    • Journal articles
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    Browse

  • All of Griffith Research Online
    • Communities & Collections
    • Authors
    • By Issue Date
    • Titles
  • This Collection
    • Authors
    • By Issue Date
    • Titles
  • Statistics

  • Most Popular Items
  • Statistics by Country
  • Most Popular Authors
  • Support

  • Contact us
  • FAQs
  • Admin login

  • Login
  • Does CEO pay dispersion matter in an emerging market? Evidence from China's Listed Firms

    Author(s)
    Hu, Fang
    Pan, Xiaofei
    Tian, Gary
    Griffith University Author(s)
    Hu, Fang
    Year published
    2013
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Abstract
    This paper examines how the institutional features of emerging economies (i.e., government ownership, political connections, and market reform) influence CEO pay-dispersion incentives. Consistent with our expectation, we find that CEO pay dispersion generally provides a tournament incentive in China's emerging market, as it is positively associated with firm performance. In addition, tournament incentives are weaker where firms are controlled by the government and where the CEO is politically connected, but it became stronger after the China's split-share structure reforms. Further, we find that in state controlled firms the ...
    View more >
    This paper examines how the institutional features of emerging economies (i.e., government ownership, political connections, and market reform) influence CEO pay-dispersion incentives. Consistent with our expectation, we find that CEO pay dispersion generally provides a tournament incentive in China's emerging market, as it is positively associated with firm performance. In addition, tournament incentives are weaker where firms are controlled by the government and where the CEO is politically connected, but it became stronger after the China's split-share structure reforms. Further, we find that in state controlled firms the satisfaction gained by meeting multiple economic and social goals largely reduces the effectiveness of tournament incentives, while the managerial agency problems inherent in private firms might mitigate them.
    View less >
    Journal Title
    Pacific-Basin Finance Journal
    Volume
    24
    DOI
    https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2013.07.003
    Subject
    Accounting, auditing and accountability
    Accounting, auditing and accountability not elsewhere classified
    Banking, finance and investment
    Publication URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/10072/58303
    Collection
    • Journal articles

    Footer

    Disclaimer

    • Privacy policy
    • Copyright matters
    • CRICOS Provider - 00233E
    • TEQSA: PRV12076

    Tagline

    • Gold Coast
    • Logan
    • Brisbane - Queensland, Australia
    First Peoples of Australia
    • Aboriginal
    • Torres Strait Islander