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dc.contributor.authorLiew, Leongen_US
dc.contributor.editorTakashi Inoguchien_US
dc.date.accessioned2017-04-24T09:12:54Z
dc.date.available2017-04-24T09:12:54Z
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.date.modified2008-07-01T02:54:54Z
dc.identifier.issn14681099en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/S1468109903001002en_AU
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10072/6482
dc.description.abstractAnalysts have generally offered two explanations for China's no-devaluation policy during the Asian financial crisis. The first is China's good economic fundamentals and the renminbi is not fully convertible. The second is China's foreign relations' imperative. China was endeavouring to seek favourable entry conditions into the WTO and improve relations with its Asian neighbours. At the same time it sought to exploit the undercurrent of resentment in Asia towards the role played by the US during the crisis. Policy making in China has become more institutionalized in the post-Deng era, but these explanations ignore the role of China's domestic bureaucratic actors in exchange rate policy making. This paper examines the exchange rate regime preferences of China's key economic ministries and their influences in exchange rate policy making and argues that Party leaders were able to adopt a no-devaluation policy throughout the crisis because China's key economic ministries actively supported or acquiesced to that policy.en_US
dc.description.peerreviewedYesen_US
dc.description.publicationstatusYesen_AU
dc.format.extent168619 bytes
dc.format.extent47539 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.mimetypetext/plain
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.language.isoen_AU
dc.publisherCambridge University Pressen_US
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_US
dc.publisher.urihttp://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=JJPen_AU
dc.relation.ispartofpagefrom61en_US
dc.relation.ispartofpageto76en_US
dc.relation.ispartofedition2003en_US
dc.relation.ispartofissue1en_US
dc.relation.ispartofjournalJapanese Journal of Political Scienceen_US
dc.relation.ispartofvolume4en_US
dc.subject.fieldofresearchcode360102en_US
dc.titleThe role of China's bureaucracy in its no-devaluation policy during the Asian financial crisisen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.type.descriptionC1 - Peer Reviewed (HERDC)en_US
dc.type.codeC - Journal Articlesen_US
gro.facultyGriffith Business School, Department of International Business and Asian Studiesen_US
gro.rights.copyrightCopyright 2003 Cambridge University Press. The attached file is reproduced here in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. Please refer to the journal's website for access to the definitive, published version.en_AU
gro.date.issued2003
gro.hasfulltextFull Text


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