Two Faces of Strategic Argumentation in the Law
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Olivieri, Francesco
Rotolo, Antonino
Scannapieco, Simone
Sartor, Giovanni
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Hoekstra, R
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Krakow, Poland
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Abstract
In strategic argumentation players exchange arguments to prove or reject a claim. This paper discusses and reports on research about two basic issues regarding the game-theoretic understanding of strategic argumentation games in the law: whether such games can be reasonably modelled as zero-sum games and as games with complete information.
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Legal Knowledge and Information Systems
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271
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© 2014 IOS Press. This is the author-manuscript version of this paper. Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. Please refer to the publisher website for access to the definitive, published version.
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Subject
Theory of computation
Information systems
Science & Technology
Social Sciences
Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence
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Citation
Governatori, G; Olivieri, F; Rotolo, A; Scannapieco, S; Sartor, G, Two Faces of Strategic Argumentation in the Law, Legal Knowledge and Information Systems, 2014, 271, pp. 81-90