Remuneration committees, shareholder dissent on CEO pay and the CEO pay-performance link

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Kent, Pamela
Kercher, Kim
Routledge, James
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2016
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We provide evidence on whether the adoption of the full Australian Securities Exchange recommendations for remuneration committee formation and structure are associated with a lower shareholder dissenting vote or a stronger CEO pay–performance link. We find some evidence that a minority‐ and majority‐independent remuneration committee and a committee size of at least the recommended three members are associated with lower shareholder dissent. Companies with an independent committee have a stronger CEO pay–performance link. In addition, a majority‐independent committee strengthens the link between performance and growth in CEO pay.

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Accounting and Finance
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Accounting, Auditing and Accountability not elsewhere classified
Applied Economics
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability
Banking, Finance and Investment
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