Single parameter FPT-algorithms for non-trivial games

Loading...
Thumbnail Image
File version
Author(s)
Estivill-Castro, Vladimir
Parsa, Mahdi
Griffith University Author(s)
Primary Supervisor
Other Supervisors
Editor(s)

Iliopoulos, CS

Smyth, WF

Date
2011
Size

278305 bytes

File type(s)

application/pdf

Location
License
Abstract

We know that k-Uniform Nash is W[2]-Complete when we consider imitation symmetric win-lose games (with k as the parameter) even when we have two players. However, this paper provides positive results regarding Nash equilibria. We show that consideration of sparse games or limitations of the support result in fixed-parameter algorithms with respect to one parameter only for the k-Uniform Nash problem. That is, we show that a sample uniform Nash equilibrium in r-sparse imitation symmetric win-lose games is not as hard because it can be found in FPT time (i.e polynomial in the size of the game, but maybe exponential in r). Moreover, we show that, although NP-Complete, the problem of Best Nash Equilibrium is also x-parameter tractable.

Journal Title

Lecture Notes in Computer science

Conference Title
Book Title
Edition
Volume

6460

Issue
Thesis Type
Degree Program
School
Publisher link
Patent number
Funder(s)
Grant identifier(s)
Rights Statement
Rights Statement

© 2011 Springer Berlin / Heidelberg. This is the author-manuscript version of this paper. Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com

Item Access Status
Note
Access the data
Related item(s)
Subject

Analysis of Algorithms and Complexity

Persistent link to this record
Citation
Collections