The voting paradox ... with a single voter? Implications for transitivity in choice under risk
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Blavatskyy, Pavlo
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Abstract
The voting paradox occurs when a democratic society seeking to aggregate individual preferences into a social preference reaches an intransitive ordering. However it is not widely known that the paradox may also manifest for an individual aggregating over attributes of risky objects to form a preference over those objects. When this occurs, the relation 'stochastically greater than' is not always transitive and so transitivity need not hold between those objects. We discuss the impact of other decision paradoxes to address a series of philosophical and economic arguments against intransitive (cyclical) choice, before concluding that intransitive choices can be justified.
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Economics and Philosophy
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© 2019 Cambridge University Press. This is the author-manuscript version of this paper. Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. Please refer to the journal's website for access to the definitive, published version.
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Political theory and political philosophy
Decision theory
Microeconomic theory
Economic theory
Philosophy