The bark is the bite: International organizations and blacklisting
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Abstract
This article argues that public blacklisting by international organizations can be an effective means of bringing about compliance in otherwise recalcitrant states. This contention is examined in light of overlapping campaigns by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and the Financial Action Task Force to pressure targeted states to adopt costly financial reforms. In a constructivist vein, blacklisting is held to be a form of speech act that changed the world by damaging states' reputations among investors, and thus produced pressure to comply through actual or anticipated capital flight. To be removed from blacklists, thereby preventing future economic damage, those targeted have had to comply with stringent regulatory standardsmandated by these international organizations. Evidence is taken from interviews, press accounts, official documents and quantitative data relating to seven affected tax havens as well as Austria and Switzerland.
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Review of International Political Economy
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16
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4
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© 2009 Routledge. This is an electronic version of an article published in Review of International Political Economy Volume 16, Issue 4 October 2009 , pages 573 - 596. Review of International Political Economy is available online at: http://www.informaworld.com with the open URL of your article.
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Applied economics
Policy and administration
Political science
International relations