Network Regulation under electoral competition
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Söderberg, Magnus
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Academics and policymakers generally agree that the service provision from energy infrastructure, such as transmission and distribution networks, should be subject to price or revenue caps and incentives to reduce cost and increase the service quality. From the early 1980s incentive-based regulation has enjoyed wide implementation in electricity network sectors.
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Energy Economics
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© 2023 Elsevier B.V. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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Leroux, A; Söderberg, M, Network Regulation under electoral competition, Energy Economics, 2023, pp. 106614