Sovereignty, sanctions, and data sharing under international law
File version
Accepted Manuscript (AM)
Author(s)
Eccleston-Turner, Mark
Switzer, Stephanie
Griffith University Author(s)
Primary Supervisor
Other Supervisors
Editor(s)
Date
Size
File type(s)
Location
License
Abstract
In September 2021, after inaugurating the Berlin-based World Health Organization (WHO) Hub for Pandemic and Epidemic Intelligence, German Health Minister Jens Spahn indicated that sanctions might be an appropriate tool to deal with WHO member states that do not cooperate on data sharing during disease outbreaks. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, director general of the WHO, affirmed this, stating that “exploring the [idea of ] sanctions may be important” in cases where collaboration fails (1). Such comments indicate that the WHO Hub has been designed without much consideration of data sovereignty and “access and benefit sharing” (ABS) debates occurring across multiple United Nations (UN) bodies, including the WHO. Threats of sanctions do little to promote the ideals of equity and solidarity often touted as foundational to global health governance. They entrench the idea that pathogen samples and associated data are “bargaining chips” rather than vital inputs to public health research and pandemic response.
Journal Title
Science
Conference Title
Book Title
Edition
Volume
375
Issue
6582
Thesis Type
Degree Program
School
Publisher link
Patent number
Funder(s)
Grant identifier(s)
Rights Statement
Rights Statement
© The Author(s) 2022. This is the author’s version of the work. It is posted here by permission of the AAAS for personal use, not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in Science on 375 (6582), pp. 724-726, 2022, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abn5400.
Item Access Status
Note
Access the data
Related item(s)
Subject
International and comparative law
Environmental and resources law
Public health
Persistent link to this record
Citation
Rourke, M; Eccleston-Turner, M; Switzer, S, Sovereignty, sanctions, and data sharing under international law, Science, 2022, 375 (6582), pp. 724-726