This chapter begins by reviewing the multilateral literature on closure, as it provides a context for case data containing five bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations. The multilateral literature on closure or the endgame considers coalition behavior, negotiation complexity, decision-making, leadership, and negotiation deadlines. Endgame activity is identified within coalition behavior, which is con-cerned with strategizing and transactions, balancing power, and the use of resources and roles, including leadership (Dupont 1996). Coalitions often serve to reduce complexity, while complexity is often identified as a challenge to be managed within multilateral negotiations (Zartman 1994; Crump and Zartman 2003). Within the endgame, however, complexity is not only identified as a challenge; it is also considered to be an oppor-tunity. Complexity can help break through the last outstanding issues once a long negotiation moves toward a conclusion, as a complicated and vague situation provides negotiators with flexibility regarding the way the outcome is portrayed to constituents (Winham 1987).