The normative standing of group agents

Loading...
Thumbnail Image
File version
Author(s)
Briggs, Rachael
Griffith University Author(s)
Primary Supervisor
Other Supervisors
Editor(s)
Date
2012
Size

479830 bytes

File type(s)

application/pdf

Location
License
Abstract

Christian List and Philip Pettit (henceforth LP) argue that groups of people can be agents - beings that believe, desire and act. Their account combines a non-reductive realist view of group attitudes, on which groups literally have attitudes that cannot be analyzed in terms of the attitudes of their members, with methodological individualism, on which good explanations of group-level phenomena should not posit forces above individual attitudes and behaviors. I then discuss the main normative conclusion that LP draw from the claim that group agents exist: that we ought morally to grant legal rights and responsibilities to group agents, but that group rights should be more limited than individual rights. I argue that when it comes to the fitness of group agents to bear legal rights and responsibilities, LP can draw support from nonreductionist views elsewhere, particularly in the philosophy of mind. I raise some objections to LP's views about the value of granting legal rights and responsibilities to group agents.

Journal Title

Episteme

Conference Title
Book Title
Edition
Volume

9

Issue

3

Thesis Type
Degree Program
School
Publisher link
Patent number
Funder(s)
Grant identifier(s)
Rights Statement
Rights Statement

© 2012 Cambridge University Press. The attached file is reproduced here in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. Please refer to the journal's website for access to the definitive, published version.

Item Access Status
Note
Access the data
Related item(s)
Subject

Cognitive and computational psychology

Philosophy

Philosophy not elsewhere classified

Persistent link to this record
Citation
Collections