How Super Controllers Prevent Crimes: Learning from Modern Maritime Piracy

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Townsley, Michael
Leclerc, Benoit
Tatham, Peter H
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2016
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Abstract

This study examines how super controllers , actors responsible for creating incentives for controllers (handlers, place managers and guardians), prevent maritime piracy. Using a segmented regression model, we estimate the impact of three major anti-pirate initiatives (increased place management, increased handling and increased guardianship) using nine years of pirate activity data. Increased place management at sea reduced piracy but created tactical displacement, spreading piracy across the Indian Ocean. Establishing and constructing pirate courts and prisons, a form of offender handling, had no ostensible impact on pirate activity. Increased guardianship, in the form of detailed situational crime prevention guidance, triggered a swift and widespread reduction in pirate attacks. The introduction of super controllers and the actions they instigated dramatically altered the context of maritime piracy, making it easier to prevent pirate attacks.

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British Journal of Criminology

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56

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3

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International and comparative law

Criminology

Criminology not elsewhere classified

Legal systems

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