This dissertation is about state mobilisation as a political survival strategy which has a long history in nondemocratic regimes. It had been deployed by totalitarian regimes to supplant independent organisations such as political parties and labour unions, nurture blind belief in the dictator and his ideology, meet production targets under a centralised economic system, and mobilise people to fight in wars. Yet this description of state mobilisation does not reflect the reality of less repressive, more pluralistic authoritarian regimes in modern times. In these regimes, opposition parties and civil society organisations have been allowed to co-exist with mass organisations; rigid ideology has been relegated or replaced with pragmatic policies; free markets have overtaken central planning as the organising principle of productive activities; and instances of war have become less frequent or less demanding of manpower. In short, totalitarian-style state mobilisation has become less doable and desirable in the context of authoritarian regimes. What explains, then, the persistence of state mobilisation in authoritarian regimes? This dissertation argues that state mobilisation is a survival strategy driven by authoritarian regimes’ threat environment. The type of state mobilisation deployed is shaped by the nature of the threat confronting the regime. Some threats manifest in street protests, military coups, party defection, or opposition challenges in the electoral arena. Some are more latent, taking on a more subtle and mundane form of resistance or activism, either physically or virtually. Once triggered, state mobilisation performs three regime stabilisation functions: legitimation, cooptation, and repression. In performing these functions, state mobilisation can help authoritarian regimes overcome the threat that triggers it in the first place. The success of state mobilisation, however, varies. The argument is developed based on the cases of Cambodia and Malaysia.