Understanding the Governance of International Organizations

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Yi-Chong, X
Weller, P
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Patrick Weller and Xu Yi-chong

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2015
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The existing theories in international relations are unable to answer and explain these questions adequately. Indeed, theories of, and practices in, the governance of IOs often do not correspond. Most studies on IOs are based on the premise that international organizations were created by sovereign states, through their careful calculation of self-interest and strenuous negotiation, and built on “rational design.” States, therefore, are entitled to and do actually control the actions, behavior, and outcomes of IOs. This assumption has some truth in it as undoubtedly all IOs were created by states through negotiation to facilitate multilateral cooperation in addressing their common concerns and shared problems. The initial negotiations often cover core issues: what mission an IO would have; what structure an IO could operate on; whowould have what control; whowould contribute what to its operations; who would benefit from its activities; and how difficult it should be to change the basic rules and structure.

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The Politics of International Organizations: Views from Insiders

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Political science not elsewhere classified

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