This volume is dedicated to the idea of specifically ‘constitutional’ deliberative democracy. What does that adjective add? For some of the contributors, the answer to that question is rather obvious – it is a deliberative event or series of events directed to constitution-making rather than policy-making, deliberation about the rules of collective life rather than specific decisions within it. But that ‘obvious’ answer relies on some prior assumptions about what constitutions are and what deliberative democracy is. If we start with different assumptions, new possibilities emerge. This concluding chapter sets out some of the implications of three understandings of constitutions, and three approaches to deliberative democracy, for constitution-making and research The idea of constitutional deliberative democracy is not new (see Ackerman 1991), although it is certainly not yet a mainstream concern either; as presented here, it is more an application of existing ideas and processes to a less traditional domain than a radical change of approach; and the word ‘turn’ is perhaps overused, as Dryzek (2010: 6) ever-so-gently suggests. But it seems a logical step, given that the systems move in deliberative theory has re-opened room for thinking about how the various parts of democratic systems work together (Bohman 2012); and because there are issues to do with constitutions and constitution-making that deserve more attention, not least because of long-standing but often forgotten arguments between constitutionalists – who, traditionally, want to bracket off the principles of democracy and justice from interference by potentially tyrannical majorities – and proceduralists – who argue either that justice is best secured by democratic means or that what counts as just is, itself, a matter for democratic deliberation. If we move that disagreement to the foreground, constitutional deliberative democracy is far more than an attempt to apply innovative techniques to realms beyond local policy-making.