Trust is a complex construct that is diffi cult to defi ne and operationalize (Simpson, 2007) because there are so many different ways of conceptualizing and defi ning it. Seppanen et al. (2007) catalogued more than 70 defi nitions. This does not stop social scientists from offering defi nitions; it is just that there are numerous and sometimes confl icting conceptualizations of trust. Consequently, it has remained an elusive term in the social science literature and has often been used in different and not always compatible ways. However, despite such divergences, it is universally accepted that trust is a psychological condition defi ned as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau et al., 1998, p. 395). The psychological dimensions of trust are embedded in the majority of defi nitions put forward by researchers from different social science disciples. For example, Garfi nkel (1963) and Luhmann (1988) considered trust as a general attitude or expectancy about other people and the social systems in which they are embedded. Other researchers suggest that trust is a more complex and multidimensional construct comprising affective and motivational components (Bromiley and Cummings, 1996). However, some social scientists argue that psychological defi nitions of trust are insuffi cient in explaining trust because they are narrowly too cognitive and ignore the emotional and social infl uences on trust decisions (Kramer, 1999). Consequently, these researchers suggest that it is important to conceptualize trust in terms of individuals’ choice behavior in various trust dilemma situations (Miller, 1992). March (1994) argued that an advantage of conceptualizing trust as a choice behavior relates to the fact that decisions become observable behaviors and noted that such a conceptualization of trust fi ts well with existing conceptual frameworks useful for empirical testing and theoretical development.