Mock Jury and Juror Responses to Uncharged Acts of Sexual Misconduct: Advances in the Assessment of Unfair Prejudice
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Martschuk, N
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Abstract
Internationally, admissible incriminating evidence of uncharged acts by the accused is presumed unfairly prejudicial, and remains controversial. In an experimental study, 325 jury-eligible citizens were randomly assigned to a simulated trial in which the accused faced two charges. Juries were exposed to no evidence of uncharged acts or prejudicial evidence describing four uncharged sexual acts by the accused reported by the complainant or two independent witnesses. Jury inferences about the accused’s sexual interest in children and his criminal intent were logically related to the source and type of evidence. While ratings of the likelihood of culpability increased with evidence of uncharged acts, juries were reluctant to convict solely on the basis of the complainant’s word. Jury deliberations disclosed that prejudicial evidence did not induce impermissible reasoning or a lower threshold of proof. Multiple convergent measures revealed little danger of unfair prejudice to the accused.
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Zeitschrift fur Psychologie / Journal of Psychology
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228
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3
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Psychology
Cognitive and computational psychology
Applied and developmental psychology
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Goodman-Delahunty, J; Martschuk, N, Mock Jury and Juror Responses to Uncharged Acts of Sexual Misconduct: Advances in the Assessment of Unfair Prejudice, Zeitschrift fur Psychologie / Journal of Psychology, 2020, 228 (3), pp. 199-209