Deontic closure and conflict in legal reasoning
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Mullins, R
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Madrid, Spain
Abstract
We identify some legal reasoning patterns concerning deontic closure and conflicts in defeasible deontic logics. First, whether the logic allows the derivation of permissions from conflicting norms. Second, whether the logic treats norms as closed under logical implication. We suggest appropriate approaches for legal settings.
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Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications
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322
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© 2019 The authors and IOS Press. This article is published online with Open Access by IOS Press and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License 4.0 (CC BY-NC 4.0).
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Other law and legal studies
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Governatori, G; Mullins, R, Deontic closure and conflict in legal reasoning, Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, 2019, 322, pp. 181-186