An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Framework for Cyber-threat Information Sharing

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Tosh, Deepak
Sengupta, Shamik
Kamhoua, Charles
Kwiat, Kevin
Martin, Andrew
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2015
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London, UK

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Abstract

The initiative to protect against future cyber crimes requires a collaborative effort from all types of agencies spanning industry, academia, federal institutions, and military agencies. Therefore, a Cybersecurity Information Exchange (CYBEX) framework is required to facilitate breach/patch related information sharing among the participants (firms) to combat cyber attacks. In this paper, we formulate a non-cooperative cybersecurity information sharing game that can guide: (i) the firms (players)1 to independently decide whether to 'participate in CYBEX and share' or not; (ii) the CYBEX framework to utilize the participation cost dynamically as incentive (to attract firms toward self-enforced sharing) and as a charge (to increase revenue). We analyze the game from an evolutionary game-theoretic strategy and determine the conditions under which the players' self-enforced evolutionary stability can be achieved. We present a distributed learning heuristic to attain the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) under various conditions. We also show how CYBEX can wisely vary its pricing for participation to increase sharing as well as its own revenue, eventually evolving toward a win-win situation.

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2015 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC)

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2015-September

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© 2015 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.

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Cybersecurity and privacy not elsewhere classified

Science & Technology

Telecommunications

Cybersecurity

CYBEX

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Tosh, D; Sengupta, S; Kamhoua, C; Kwiat, K; Martin, A, An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Framework for Cyber-threat Information Sharing, 2015 2015 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC), 2015, 2015-September, pp. 7341-7346