In the 1990s the Australian coal industry was frequently described as being a perpetual case of 'profitless prosperity' referring to the continued investment in low margin mining activities by foreign companies with motives other than profit. In particular, Japanese trading companies were shown to have deployed quasi-integration practices through the use of government investment concessions and subsidies. This strategy was used to create oversupply in the seaborne coal market to depress contract prices at the cost of achieving reasonable profitability levels, which were well below that of other investors and operators in the Australian mining sector. This study shows that the quasi-integration via concessional funding arrangements is no longer a primary strategy employed by Japanese trading companies or the Japanese Government. The analysis finds no evidence of Japanese companies securing coal at below average prices nor is there clear evidence of Japanese trading companies using their implicit information advantage as equity investors to secure coal at favourable prices during contract negotiations. The study also examines the investment behaviour of new entrants in the market and highlights the strategic differences between Japanese companies and other Asian investors, particularly concerning the security of supply.