Given the long-running controversy surrounding CEO remuneration and the role remuneration played in the GFC, we examine two research questions (1) how did CEO remuneration structures change after the GFC, and (2) how did external corporate governance mechanisms influence the changes in CEO remuneration after the GFC? Using the CEO remuneration structures for the top 150 Australian listed companies from 2007 to 2009 this study makes several important contributions. First, it provides a comprehensive analysis of CEO remuneration structures in Australia during the GFC. Second, it is the first (known) study to examine the influence of shareholder activism, including both retail and institutional investors, on changes in CEO remuneration structures during the GFC. Our findings indicate that whilst the percentage of short-term remuneration did not significantly change after the GFC, there appears that a reduction in the proportion of bonuses after the GFC was accompanied by an increase in salaries. The Australian Shareholders’ Association (ASA) and institutional shareholders are associated with a change in remuneration structures, but only where total remuneration levels are higher.