LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin presented a strong security model for authenticated key agreement, namely the eCK model. They also constructed a protocol, namely the NAXOS protocol, that enjoys a simple security proof in the eCK model. However, the NAXOS protocol uses a random oracle-based technique to combine the long-term secret key and the per session randomness, so-called NAXOS trick, in order to achieve the eCK security definition. For NAXOS trick-based protocols, the leakage of per session randomness modeled in the eCK model is somewhat unnatural, because the eCK model leaks per session randomness, while the output of the NAXOS trick computation remains safe. In this work, we present a standard model eCK -secure protocol construction, eliminating the NAXOS trick. Moreover, our protocol is a generic construction, which can be instantiated with arbitrary suitable cryptographic primitives. Thus, we present a generic eCK -secure, NAXOS-free, standard model key exchange protocol. To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper on generic transformation of a CCA 2 -secure public-key encryption scheme to an eCK -secure key exchange protocol in the standard model.