During our daily lives we each experience altered states of perception, when we are not 100% focussed on what we are doing. This is when incidents and accidents can occur due to distraction or inattention. In the realm of safety, these distractions can lead to a loss of lives. In order to mitigate, or eliminate human error due to distractions, we need to understand which distractions are present in the workforce, and how that impacts on the employees during the performance of their duties. The focus of this study is on railway drivers, we are seeking to discover which distractions the drivers are most vulnerable to, in order to improve safety standards within the rail industry. Much research has already been conducted into rail safety, with a particular focus on ‘signal passed at danger’ (SPAD). When a train driver goes through a red light on the track, this is called ‘signal passed at danger’ (SPAD). SPAD’s have been reported to contribute to between 70-90% of all train accidents (Bennet, 2000; Kjellen, 1987; Lowe & Turner, 2005; Ryan, Hutchings, & Lowe, 2010). As a result, many investigations have been conducted into why SPADs occur. In 2004 the methodology used when investigating SPAD incidents was revised to ensure that more through, less biased methods were used (Pasquini, Rizzo, & Save, 2004), and in 2010 the effectiveness of the SPAD investigations was assessed and revised again (Ryan et al., 2010). Investigations have been conducted into human factors elements, such as signalling, maintenance, policies and procedures (Wilson & Norris., 2005), fatigue in relation to performance (Dorrian, Roach, Fletcher, & Dawson., 2007), driver distraction and inattention (Naweed, 2013), driver skills (Naweed, 2014), and modelling to try and predict SPAD occurrences (McLeod, Walker, & Moray, 2005; Hamilton & Clarke, 2005). What appears to have been overlooked, is to investigate if there are any aversive psychological processes at play, prior to a SPAD incident. We will be specifically investigating: Situation Awareness, Absent Minded Slips, and Mind Wandering, in order to discover which perception type leads to SPAD incidents. Aims: The purpose of this study is to investigate which perception type is more prevalent when train drivers fail to stop at a red light. The three types of perception which will be investigated during the study will be Situation Awareness, Absent Minded Slips, and Mind Wandering. Situation awareness is an awareness of the elements contained within your immediate environment, understanding what is important, and what is not to the task at hand (Endsley & Garland, 2000). Situation awareness has three levels; level one is how humans perceive their environment. Level 2 is how humans comprehend the information they perceive, through interpretation, while level 3 represents projection, the ability to predict future events based on the information at hand, and prepare for those event. Absent minded slips are performed in situations where our minds are ‘absent’ from the task in hand, resulting in words and actions which are performed, not in accordance with a plan (Reason, 1990, 2000). There is a failure of a desired objective, due to a slip, or a lapse, in memory. An example of such a lapse is when you go to open the car door, removing your phone, rather than your keys, in order to open the car door. Mind wandering, or task unrelated thought, is when your thoughts do not remain on the task at hand (Schooler et al., 2011). You discover that you are performing actions without being aware of what you are doing. During mind wandering people’s thoughts are preoccupied, and as a result people do not remember what happened in their surrounding environment. Studies have demonstrated that mind wandering tends to occur when vigilance is low, in situations like driving, and when reading (Lagarde et al., 2012; Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013). Method: A survey was designed incorporating the situation awareness, absent minded slips, and mind wandering surveys. The language was amended to reflect the rail industry, with some additional industry specific questions to further investigate differences on the day of the SPAD, when compared to normal operations. Conclusion: In defining why errors occur, we can then look at adapting the working environment, or initiating processes and procedures which may mitigate, or omit these distractions from the work environment. It is only through these investigations that we may be able to highlight, and understand, the antecedents to an incident. Once we know what triggers an error, we can then work to make the rail industry safer, and in turn save human lives.