The role of election monitors has expanded substantially since the mid-1980s in terms of both the number of contests observed and the diversity of domestic and interna-tional monitoring organizationsii. This is part of the broader phenomenon of ‘moni-torial democracy’ where greater transparency in public affairs is generally thought to deter malpractices, to promote government accountability, and to strengthen trust in the political process. Yet transparency and accountability by themselves, without avenues for redress and reform, may not necessarily prove effective. For example, if cases of political corruption are revealed without punishment for bribe-givers and bribe-takers, this may strengthen public cynicism.The growth of electoral observation raises questions about the impact of this ac-tivities in strengthening electoral integrity. Several experimental and observational studies have looked at the deterrence effect of international observers on incidents of fraud and ballot stuffing in local polling placesiii. Yet less has been established about whether monitors have the capacity to reduce malpractices throughout the electoral cycle, including whether problems and rec-ommendations published in observer reports after each contest influence the subse-quent adoption of electoral reforms. This question is clearly under-researched. The only research that we are aware of, by Judith Kelley, offers an overall assessment of the report. We rely on Kelley’s study as a comparative framework in order to under-stand the different degrees of success among the countries. We, however, go one step further by analyzing every single recommendation from the reportiv.Focusing on the implementation of monitoring report recommendations will shed light on the debate within the international community. On the one hand, there are reasons to believe that recommendations published by monitors may be ex-pected have little impact, for example if any proposed reforms require substantial resources, if they need legislative action, or if there is no further pressure from the international community or domestic stakeholders. Unlike other areas of the moni-tor’s reports, recommendations may also reflect non-standardized procedures. On the other hand, the reports may catalyze reforms, if international monitors advance electoral integrity. To explore this issue, the Electoral Integrity Project has examined reports published by the Organization of American States (OAS) for Electoral Observer Missions con-ducted from 1999-2015 in 25 countries and 71 national elections. From these re-ports, over 1,000 recommendations were identified and content analysed. For each recommendations published in each report, we traced the presence of an electoral reform that matched the content of such recommendation. The implementation rate was estimated as the proportion of recommendations subsequently adopted partial-ly or fully in each country.