

## **Advanced Strategies in Police Integrity Management**

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## **Advanced Strategies in Police Integrity Management**

### **Tim Prenzler & Louise Porter**

Police violence and corruption are never far from media headlines and present as endemic problems around the world. This chapter reviews innovative prevention-focused strategies developed in response to the limitations of a traditional model of police integrity management. Advanced strategies – which attempt to close off opportunity factors for misconduct and facilitate ethical behaviour – include diagnostics and strategic impact assessments, early intervention systems, drug and alcohol testing, covert tactics, overt surveillance, substantive external oversight, and stepped-up procedures and training. The chapter reviews the available evaluation literature, highlighting contemporary developments and drawing recommendations for best practices.

### **Keywords**

Police misconduct prevention, police integrity management, complaints management, early intervention systems, civilian oversight

### **Background**

Scholars recognise policing as a high-risk occupation for a wide range of misconduct types, including bribery, evidence tampering, discrimination, negligence and excessive force (Punch, 2009). In autocratic countries, police act primarily as protectors of governing elites, suppressing dissent through intimidation, torture and murder. At the same time, accountable and ethical policing remains a challenge in many established democracies. For example, the year 2020 was marked by the world-wide enlargement of the Black Lives Matter movement, with recurring high-intensity protests over police discrimination, brutality and fatal force (Saric, 2020). Pro-democracy and anti-corruption protests in recent years in numerous locations – including Belarus, Myanmar, Hong Kong, Iraq, Russia, Spain and Thailand – have been met by brutal crackdowns by police and the failure of authorities to investigate allegations of mistreatment (e.g., Human Rights Watch, 2021). International surveys frequently put police amongst the top organisations for corruption (e.g., Transparency International, 2019, 2020). Poor management also results in significant harms to police officers (Prenzler, Porter & Alpert, 2013).

These recurring problems stimulated the development of a range of strategies for prevention and redress. For much of its 200-year history, modern policing relied on internal investigations and disciplinary sanctions to control police conduct. Recurring commissions of inquiry and academic research showed how this approach failed to address the pressures, temptations and opportunity factors for misconduct inherent in police work (Walker, 2001). Since the 1960s and 1970s, exposés of corruption, and the failures of many reform programs, have driven a search for more effective strategies. These have included attempts to enhance accountability through dedicated professional standards units and some form of civilian oversight (Punch, 2009; Walker & Archbold, 2014). Additional strategies have focused on improving the selection of officers, for example through psychological screening tests, higher education requirements, and improved racial and ethnic representation. The evidence on the benefits of these approaches has been mixed, with some studies showing beneficial outcomes in regard to integrity indicators (see for example Ba et al., 2021; Brown, 2020; De Angelis, Rosenthal & Buchner, 2016; Drew & Prenzler, 2015, pp. 196-199; Weiss & Inwald, 2018).

Of additional note is the idea of employing more female officers, which has been repeatedly advocated as a way of addressing the association between corruption and the

traditional male dominated, macho culture, of policing (e.g., Wood, 1997). Although male/female differences on ethics surveys have not been large, and despite some conflicting results (see Poteyeva & Sun, 2009, for a meta-analysis), numerous studies have shown significant differences on behavioral indicators of integrity, including much lower rates for female officers in public complaints, use of force measures, fatal force, and litigation (Lonsway et al., 2003; Porter & Prenzler, 2017). However, while including gender equity in a list of integrity management strategies might be considered reasonable, employment equity should be the key motivator.

The following sub-sections discuss seven specific groupings of police integrity management strategies. These have been labelled ‘advanced’ given they have been inventive in the adoption of new, often radical and controversial, techniques; and they have also been proactive in seeking to predict and pre-empt misconduct. The focus is generally on primary prevention, but the approach extends to secondary prevention in terms of early identification of misconduct and prevention of its continuation or escalation. The sub-sections review research on these techniques. Given the large size of the literature – most notably in regard to body worn cameras – the analyses do not adopt an original quantitative meta-analysis nor a strict systematic review. Rather, the chapter highlights key studies and findings, while addressing complexity in the implementation and evaluation of strategies.

## **Advanced Strategies**

### ***Diagnostics and Strategic Impact Assessments***

The first step in effective integrity management is to establish baseline measures of misconduct and integrity using the widest possible range of indicators – given the diverse and often hidden nature of police misconduct. The value of this approach is demonstrated primarily in impact assessments of interventions (Porter, 2016). The more measures there are moving in the right direction, the stronger the evidence there is of beneficial effects from strategies.

Complaints are a rich source of data, involving numerous variables including complainant and officer demographics, allegation types, outcomes, and situational aspects of the events involved (Prenzler & Porter, 2016). Traditional adversarial investigative systems generate very low complaint substantiation rates, usually below 10%. However, corruption inquiries and research support the view that the rate of legitimacy in complaints is much higher, while taking into account the fact that some complaints are vexatious or based on misunderstandings. Consequently, complaints have value as a ‘proxy’ measure of misconduct (Ariel et al., 2017, p. 303). More generally, complaints are a good measure of police-citizen conflicts which might be amenable to prevention – including informal allegations not recorded and investigated as official complaints (Hassell & Archbold, 2010). Surveys of complainants and subject officers also provide lessons about what works in responding to complaints.

Ethical climate surveys provide valuable information about attitudes that are probable influences on behavior (Kutnjak Ivković & Haberfeld, 2019). Variables include perceptions of the seriousness of misconduct scenarios and willingness to report misconduct; as well as influences on perceptions such as assignment, rank, length of service, age and gender. Surveys also usually ask officers about their views on levels of misconduct in their departments and levels of organisational support for integrity. A key finding has been that departmental communication and enforcement of rules strongly influence officers’ attitudes and likely compliance (Klockars et al., 2005). According to the National Institute of Justice in

the United States, ethical climate surveys are a vital tool for police managers to understand and address integrity issues in their departments (Klockars et al., 2005).

A miscellany of other data sources is useful for managing police integrity. Public opinion and experience surveys provide useful indicators (e.g., Campbell, Rice & Ross, 2020; Gilinsky, 2005; McGuire Research Services, 2000; Transparency International, 2019, 2020); as do surveys or interviews with key stakeholders such as arrestees, lawyers and journalists (e.g., Criminal Justice Commission, 2000; Dixon, 2006). Data on vehicle pursuits, accidents, injuries, fatalities and use-of-force in police operations are also illuminating (e.g., Lonsway et al., 2003; Smith et al., 2010). Litigation is an important but neglected area of police integrity assessment (Archbold, 2004; Ross, 2000). The publication of integrity data is fundamental to police accountability and adds significantly to the legitimacy of integrity management systems.

### ***Early Intervention Systems***

Early intervention systems (EISs) were introduced into policing from the 1980s in response to findings that a small number of officers often attracted a disproportionate number of complaints (Walker et al., 2001). Formal complaint investigation systems failed to pick up on these patterns of abuse, contributing to a sense of impunity amongst officers. Computer-based EI systems supported the centralised collation and analysis of complaints, allowing for identification of officers who received allegations above established norms. Managers could then intervene with a range of remedial measures including warnings, reassignment, counselling, support, mentoring and close supervision. More advanced systems adjusted complaint thresholds to suit different work areas and added multiple measures of possible underperformance such as excessive sick leave, use-of-force data, and litigation (Bobb et al., 2009; Lersch et al., 2006).

One study in an un-named police department in the United States found no significant differences in outcomes between an early-intervention group and control group (Worden et al., 2013). However, the study involved a single intervention, in the form of remedial training, and the authors recommended the use of a wider set of diagnostic measures. A variety of studies have shown more promising results. For example, Walker and colleagues (2001) identified a 67% reduction in complaints against targeted officers over one year in Minneapolis and a 62% reduction over one year in New Orleans. Other within-group studies showing large reductions in complaints and other adverse indicators amongst target officers occurred in Victoria (Australia) (Macintyre et al., 2008), Los Angeles (Sheriff's Department) (Bobb et al., 2009) and New Zealand (Briody & Prenzler, 2020). The Victorian system included the profiling of organizational units, and it also identified substantial financial savings from reduced complaints.

In Miami-Dade, a pioneering system introduced in 1981 was associated with a large and sustained department-wide reduction in excessive force complaints of 84% (Charette, 1993). In New York City, Davis and colleagues (2005) identified reductions in complaints of 54% and 64% over six years in two precincts in the Bronx. In this case, an EIS was supported by additional interventions – primarily a department-wide ‘Courtesy, Professionalism and Respect’ (CPR) policy and an associated ‘verbal judo’ training program. Similarly, studies in Tasmania (Australia) (Porter et al., 2012) and Portland (Oregon) (Prenzler et al., 2016) found a close association between large reductions in public complaints and the introduction of a set of innovations that combined EI systems with strategic complaint analyses, de-escalation training and procedures, and more rigorous investigations and discipline. The Portland study included data on reduced use-of-force and officer-involved shootings, and the strategic approach involved a close working relationship between the police and the oversight agency.

Although the Bronx, Tasmanian and Portland studies lacked matched control groups, the researchers were able to show that similar locations did not experience large downward trends in complaints. The studies also showed there were no reductions in police enforcement activity – as a possible explanation for reduced complaints. The studies in Miami-Dade, the Bronx, Tasmania and Portland showed that the overall reductions in complaints were strongly influenced by large reductions in multiple complaints against individual officers.

### ***Drug and Alcohol Testing***

Drug and alcohol testing has been influenced by adverse findings about abuses amongst officers as well as the wider movement towards quality assurance and duty of care (Mieczkowski & Lersch, 2002). Alcohol testing is usually conducted with breath samples, while drug testing is conducted with urine or hair samples. There appears to be very little in the way of scientific studies or grey literature on the topic in policing. A 2016 investigation by the Victorian Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission (2016) identified a serious problem of illicit drug use amongst officers and strongly recommended a major expansion of the Force's drug testing regime.

The best attested program on the record appears to be in New South Wales. It is not possible to quantify the extent of the problem before drug and alcohol testing was introduced in 1997-98. However, the Wood Commission of Inquiry, which recommended the program, identified a major problem with officers drinking on duty and drunk on duty. There was also a problem of illicit drug use amongst a smaller number of officers and an associated problem of officers involved in the drug trade (Wood, 1997). The recommendation included a range of responses to positive test results, including rehabilitation and counselling – representing the integration of objectives around corruption prevention, workplace health and safety, and employee health. Targeted testing was also introduced in 1998 following all incidents involving death or serious injury.

A 2005 review of the New South Wales random drug testing program found that the Service was testing approximately 500 to 600 officers each year, amounting to 3% to 4% of officers, and that this failed to provide an adequate deterrent to drugs misuse. (Police Integrity Commission, 2005). A minimum rate of 15 tests for every 100 officers per annum was recommended. Recent data show that testing rates have been well above that level in a Force of just over 17,000 officers. In 2017-18, there were 6,335 random drug tests with one positive result, and 6,701 tests in 2018-19 with two positive results (New South Wales Police Service, 2019, pp. 86 & 98). There were also 14 targeted tests with eight positive results and five with one positive result, respectively. In 2017-18 there were 7,878 random alcohol tests with one positive result, and 7,878 in 2018-19 with no positive results. There were also three targeted tests with two positive results, and three with one positive result, respectively. No data were provided on official responses to positive results, but the numbers overall indicate an auditing program that appears to provide deterrence, identification of lapses with opportunities for remediation, and reassurance.

Workplace drug and alcohol testing of officers would appear to be uncontroversial – although research by Doran and colleagues (2017) cautions that drug test results can be affected by contaminated surfaces or officers handling seized drugs. An Australian survey of police managers found that 97% believed targeted testing for drug use was justified, with 77% supporting random drug testing (Prenzler, 2006). Targeted testing for alcohol was supported by 97%, while random alcohol tests were supported by 75%.

### ***Covert Tactics***

Many of the modern covert tactics in police integrity management derive from the breakthrough Knapp (1972) Commission of Inquiry in New York City, which adopted tactics normally deployed against organised crime. Covert tactics – including ‘sting’ operations, hidden cameras, undercover officers and ‘spies’ – allowed the Commission to penetrate the wall of secrecy surrounding corruption (Daley, 1978). Similar tactics were equally successful in exposing corruption in the large-scale Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service (Wood, 1997). Targeted integrity tests – involving monitored simulated corruption opportunities set for suspect officers – then became part of the array of anti-corruption strategies in post-inquiry reform periods in New York City, New South Wales and other locations (Prenzler & Ronken, 2001b). A survey in the United States found that 87% of middle and upper-middle police managers supported the use of stings against police in a drugs shakedown scenario and a scenario involving sexual harassment of offenders (Girodo, 1998). Henry (1990) noted that random testing in the NYPD was initially strongly opposed by officers but was later accepted as a necessary evil to protect the police reputation. In New South Wales, an education program was conducted prior to the introduction of targeted tests, emphasising the benefits to honest police. Despite some opposition it became accepted as a standard anti-corruption tool (Newton, 1997; see also Prenzler, 2006).

Evaluations of integrity tests have shown a mixture of outcomes in terms of evidence of corrupt activities, with confirmation usually leading to dismissal and criminal charges – although from a preventive perspective the deterrent effect is uncertain (Prenzler & Ronken, 2001b). In theory, integrity testing programs should be accompanied by a communication strategy to ensure officers develop an expectation that any corruption opportunity they face could be monitored. Rather than a method of simply identifying and removing corrupt officers, random testing has been advocated as a good method of auditing and deterring corruption – similar to the highly successful application of random breath testing to measure and deter drunk driving (Homel, 2002). However, the approach has also been criticized for having a negative effect on morale due to perceived lack of organizational trust (Porter & Prenzler, 2012, p. 229).

More generally, the ability to listen in on telephone conversations has been another anti-crime tool deployed against corrupt police. The Wood (1997) Inquiry reported that electronic surveillance had been the most valuable tool in exposing corruption. The post-Wood Police Integrity Commission (1998) described telecommunications interception as ‘an essential and cost-effective strategy’ (p. 23). Wood also emphasised the need for anti-corruption agencies to keep abreast of technological developments, such as computer-based communications.

The post-Knapp period in New York City is also famous for the engagement of informants out of the academy. Like integrity testing, the system of ‘field associates’, ‘internal informants’ or ‘spies’ was designed to create a culture of ‘functional divisiveness’ (Henry, 1990, p. 51. Quantified impact data are missing in this area. However, Henry (1990) claimed that the use of field associates stopped the initiation of new officers into corruption and ‘shattered the implicit subcultural expectation of trust ... upon which corrupt officers depended’ (p. 50). The use of internal informants – like random integrity testing – does not appear to have been taken up as a standard operating procedure internationally. However, these mechanisms remain available and are likely to have particular utility in reform programs concerned with major corruption problems.

### *Overt Surveillance*

Systematic use of videorecording technology has emerged in recent decades as a major weapon against misconduct. Cameras are a form of ‘strengthened formal surveillance’

(Cornish & Clarke, 2003, p. 90), allowing authorities to observe and record the actions of employees, substantially expanding the ability to detect and therefore deter misconduct (Ariel et al., 2015). Recordings substantially overcome the problem of uncorroborated allegations in traditional police complaints systems. Consequently, it is now standard responsible practice for cameras to be located in police cells, reception desks, car parks and on vehicles (Rosenblatt et al., 2004). Despite this, there appears to be very limited evidence regarding the deterrent effects of these systems.

There is one multi-source study – involving surveys of judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers and police, and analysis of recordings – indicating that compulsory videorecording of all police interviews with suspects substantially reduces coerced confessions, evidence tampering and the fabrication of evidence; while improving transparency and accountability in the police investigation process, increasing the rate of guilty pleas, facilitating more speedy and efficient criminal proceedings, and reducing the number of appeals (Dixon, 2006). This is an underdeveloped area of practice and research but one that should be considered as potentially highly beneficial in many locations (Fair Trials, 2018).

Body worn cameras, on the other hand, have ushered in a well-documented revolution in surveillance of police actions since the pioneering Rialto Police Department experiment of 2012 (Ariel et al., 2015). The experiment involved the random assignment of shifts with cameras and without cameras, with 12 months of pre- and post-intervention use-of-force reports and citizen complaints as the dependent variables. Overall, force reports fell by 63% and complaints fell by 88%. Lesser but large reductions in data in the control shifts complicated the results but were interpreted in terms of a ‘spillover effect’ (p. 527).

Since then, there have been numerous studies on body-worn cameras with variable experimental conditions and some conflicting results. Studies are complicated in part by the difficulty controlling for changes in citizen conduct vis-à-vis officer conduct, and lack of differentiation between types of complaints. Nonetheless, studies tend towards support for the beneficial effects of cameras on officer conduct – in the direction of greater procedural justice – and emphasize the need for officers to keep their cameras on as often as possible for maximum effect (Gaub & White, 2020; Maskaly et al., 2017; but see Lum et al., 2020, for a less conclusive view). Cameras have also been credited with helping to verify police accounts of events and deter or neutralize false complaints. Of note is a major study by Ariel and colleagues (2017), involving seven locations, with the random allocation of shifts to cameras or no cameras, and with cameras on for the entire shift. The results showed an overall 93% reduction in complaints across the locations from one year before to one year after the introduction of cameras – from an average of 1.20 complaints per officer down to 0.08. There was a lower but non-significant rate of complaints in the experimental groups compared to the control groups. Reductions in the control groups were attributed, again, to a spillover effect given the overall magnitude of the reductions.

### ***Substantive External Oversight***

Independent oversight of complaint processes and integrity issues is widely considered essential to police accountability (Walker, 2001; Walker & Archbold, 2014). As mentioned in the background section of this chapter, oversight agencies have become a common police integrity management tool in many locations. In their 2016 report, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Assessing the Evidence*, De Angelis et al. identified three main types of agencies in the United States, while emphasising the growing convergence of functions. ‘Investigation-focused’ bodies conduct direct investigations of complaints, ‘review-focused’ agencies assess the quality of police internal investigations of complaints, and ‘auditor/monitor-focused’ agencies analyse data on police actions and recommend

improvements to procedures (2016, p. 7). However, even when these agencies independently investigate complaints, they typically have little or no capacity to influence disciplinary outcomes, thereby aggravating the hurt and sense of betrayal experienced by complainants and contributing to officers' sense of impunity (Prenzler & Porter, 2016; Walker, 2001).

One proposed solution for this problem is the adoption of a 'civilian control' model of oversight (Prenzler & Ronken, 2001a; Puddister & McNabb, 2021). At a minimum, the model provides for independent processing of all serious and intermediate complaints, as well as negotiation with complainants about the management of their cases. It also allows for a major role for the external agency in disciplinary forums, with capacity to refer criminal matters to public prosecutors. Research and prevention functions are also key components of the model. Surveys of police have found that officers recognise the importance of independent processing of complaints to ensure impartiality and deflect criticisms of police favouritism (Prenzler, 2016b). Research also shows that the approach attracts strong public support (Prenzler, 2016a). At the same time, best practice in oversight needs to include procedural justice principles in investigations, and agencies also need to address the root causes of misconduct. This will include finding a balance between adversarial and cooperative approaches to solving problems (Porter, 2016).

The Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, established in 2000, has served as the police oversight agency that best fits most criteria for the civilian-control model (Savage, 2013). It appears that its independent approach to processing complaints and its work with the Police Service have been crucial to the success of the police reform project in Northern Ireland and the wider peace process (Topping, 2016). The Ombudsman has attracted much higher levels of satisfaction from complainants and police than is the case with internal police units or review agencies. For example, in the four years up to 2018-19, an average of 54% of complainants agreed that their complaint was managed independently, while 77% 'accept(ed) the final decision' (Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, 2019a, p. 13). An average of 86% of complainants said they were 'treated with respect' and 76% said they were treated 'fairly' (p. 10). An average of 76% of police who experienced the system agreed that the complaint was managed independently and 60% agreed that the system 'makes the police more accountable' (2019b, p. 11). High scores were also recorded for procedural justice criteria, including being treated fairly and with respect.

Greater independence and rigour in complaints systems are likely to lead to increased numbers of complaints as citizens feel more confident about seeking redress for their grievances (Worrall, 2002). At the same time, complaints should reduce over the long-term as assertive oversight agencies facilitate improvements in police conduct. In that regard, the numbers of complaints against police remain high in Northern Ireland, with 2,522 complaints in 2019-20, although complaints have been trending downwards since 2013-14. Allegations have fallen from 6,501 in 2009/10 to 3,900 in 2019-20 (-40%) (Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, 2020, pp. 8 & 31; Prenzler & Porter, 2016, p. 61). In 2010, the Ombudsman began a more intensive program of collaboration with the Police Service in a 'focused PSNI Complaints Reduction Strategy' (Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, 2013, p. 6). The Ombudsman has reported on a variety of areas where cooperation produced improvements, including in 'search procedures, baton usage, firing of baton rounds, vehicle pursuits, handcuffing, and police responses to hate crimes and child abuse', and in reducing duty failure and incivility allegations (Prenzler & Porter, 2016, pp. 61-62). Of note here is the fact that De Angelis et al. (2016) found the following from a survey of 97 oversight bodies in the United States: 'auditor/monitor agencies were much more likely to report that police or sheriff's agencies implemented their recommendations frequently or very frequently (72 percent) as compared to investigative (42 percent) and review agencies (34 percent)' (p. 11;



see also Vitoroulis, McEllhiney & Perez, 2021). Within this framework, the Northern Ireland Ombudsman represents an ideal combination of investigation and auditor approaches.

### ***Stepped-up Procedures and Training***

The preceding sections referred at times to changes in procedures and training introduced as part of a package of initiatives, often aimed at reducing police reliance on force and reducing harmful effects from police actions. Initiatives in these areas are commonly centred on more respectful communication, de-escalation and restraint; with innovations implemented through modified written procedures and training programs (cf. Wood et al., 2020, on the beneficial effects of procedural justice training). The design of advanced systems can be assisted by legal risk management assessments aimed at reducing police liabilities (Archbold, 2004; Jones & Mathers, 2006). The following section brings together several additional case studies under the generic heading of ‘stepped-up procedures and training’ – where upgraded rules and training innovations have contributed to greater integrity in policing in terms of the enlargement in practice of harm reduction and duty of care principles.

Preventing deaths in police custody, and custody-related operations, is one such area where there are case studies on the record indicating that a mix of enhanced procedures and training can achieve a great deal. For example, a 69% reduction in deaths in police custody in England and Wales over 11 years, from 49 deaths in 1998-99 to 15 in 2008-09, was associated with transport directly to hospital of arrestees showing signs of distress; more thorough assessments and closer monitoring of detainee wellbeing; the introduction of a custody visitor scheme; as well as changes to police cell design, including reduced hanging points (Independent Police Complaints Commission, 2010). In Australia, Porter (2013) concluded from coronial records that many deaths of Indigenous people in police custody/operations since the 1991 Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody were preventable by similar means. Many of these improvements had been recommended by the Royal Commission but not adequately acted upon.

A second example concerns a successful program to reduce fatal police shootings in Victoria, Australia (Prenzler et al., 2013). Project Beacon was introduced to counter a large upsurge in police shootings, with many of the victims suffering mental distress. Fatalities increased from one and two per year to nine in 1994. Diagnostics included a literature review, police surveys and focus groups, and input from officers involved in fatalities. Project Beacon was implemented in the latter part of 1994, centred on training in a ‘safety first’ philosophy for dangerous encounters, with core principles including the application of risk assessments, planning responses, cordoning and containment, negotiation, force avoidance and minimum force (Victoria Police, 1995). Specific training occurred in responding to persons with mental health problems, annual refresher training was provided, and liaison officers were appointed to work with multi-disciplinary Crisis Assessment Teams. Officers were also issued with pepper spray and a Use-of-Force Register was created. Following the roll out of Beacon, fatal shootings fell by 91% from the peak of nine in 1994 to an average of 0.8 per year over eight years from 1996 to 2003. During this period, the rate of fatal shootings by police increased in the seven other jurisdictions in Australia.

One of the most successful cases in this area is that of reduced officer-involved shootings in New York City (Prenzler et al., 2013). The case study appears unique in the literature in terms of the continuity of the data and the sustained reductions in incidents and harms. For example, in the three years 1971 to 1973 police were involved in shootings in which 6,529 rounds were discharged, 484 subjects were injured and 217 killed, and 137 officers were injured and 25 killed (New York City Police Department, 2020, pp. 77-78). From those years there were large reductions to low numbers in the three years 2017 to 2019:

-95% in rounds discharged to 697, -93% to 32 subjects injured, -88% to 26 subjects killed, -96% to six officers injured and -96% to one officer killed (pp. 77-78).

The program in New York, based on analyzing and reducing shooting events, reportedly began in 1969, initially to protect officers. This then expanded to involve situational analyses of all shooting incidents with a focus on lessons for better procedures, improved technologies, and enhanced training to protect all parties. The process was stimulated by court decisions in 1972 that reduced the legal protections for officers engaged in the reckless discharge of their firearms. Guidelines limited justifiable fatal force to situations in which there is a threat of 'imminent serious physical injury or death' to officers or civilians (New York City Police Department, 2020, p. 12). There is also a requirement for investigations of all discharges and disciplinary consequences for breaches of the guidelines. Compulsory refresher training was included for officers who discharge their firearms. A 'rigorous' recruit training program is maintained through bi-annual requalification training (p. 17). Multiple layers of internal oversight include line commanders as well as a Force Investigation Division, Risk Management Bureau, Internal Affairs Bureau and Use of Force Review Board. Innovations have included the roll out of Conducted Electrical Weapons from 2015. A distinctive feature of the program is the highly detailed annual reports, which contribute substantially to transparency and accountability.

## **Implications**

This review of innovative police integrity management strategies has illustrated the importance of a multipronged approach to halt the onset of corrupt practices. If politicians, police leaders and policy makers wonder why there are so many problems with police conduct in their jurisdiction, the most likely explanation is that they are over-reliant on traditional strategies, or a limited set of advanced strategies, which are partially effective at best. Advanced strategies, adopted in combination, should be much more effective, especially when applied within an intelligence-led or problem-oriented framework (De Angelis, 2016, pp. 46-47; Porter, 2016). Underpinning these approaches is the use of data to identify and understand misconduct problems and to evaluate the impacts of strategies.

Historically, a great deal of faith has been invested in new approaches, including early intervention systems and civilian oversight. In many cases these strategies were not fully implemented and consequently they underperformed (Walker & Archbold, 2014). At the same time, there is evidence of positive effects, and these strategies have become part of an established best practice set. Most recently, the large reductions in complaints generated by body-worn cameras in some studies initially suggested that the technology might obviate the need for other integrity strategies (Ariel et al., 2017). However, the need for commitment to a package of integrity management measures has been highlighted by diverse findings regarding the effects of cameras and recent high-profile excessive force cases in the presence of cameras (Mitsakis, 2020).

Many of the strategies considered here challenge traditional police autonomy and entail a significant loss of privacy that threatens police morale. Many also require legislative protections for operatives and attention to due process considerations. At the same time, there is a variety of source material, including from police unions, which shows that many officers support tactics that reduce problems with corrupt colleagues and that help improve police-citizen relations; while police managers see many of the tools as useful in helping them meet their responsibilities (Prenzler, 2016b). There is certainly scope for promoting integrity strategies to police from a self-interested as well as a public interest perspective. Many of the strategies reviewed in this chapter have produced 'win-win' outcomes for frontline officers, police managers and members of the public – in terms of improved safety; a better

operational environment; reduced complaints; a better image; and interventions that can aid officer mental health, physical health and career advancement.

A final issue to note is that of maintenance of successful programs. A feature of many of the case studies in this chapter is that large improvements have been maintained over long periods. Examples include reductions in police-involved shootings in New York City, and reduced citizen complaints in Portland Oregon and Tasmania. It appears that public reporting and multiple forms of oversight contributed to these achievements. However, not all the cases followed this trajectory. Regression occurred in the deaths in custody case in England and Wales (Prenzler et al., 2013). Project Beacon in Victoria, Australia, also saw an upswing in fatal shootings – in this case attributable to a shift in expenditure from training to increased officer numbers (Prenzler et al., 2013). Consequently, managers and oversight agencies need to commit to a continuous improvement philosophy that includes close monitoring of issues and public reporting.

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