

**The navy-coast guard nexus and the nature of Indonesian maritime security governance**

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# Chapter 7: The Navy-coast guard nexus and the nature of Indonesian maritime security governance

Muhamad Arif

Security and safety in Indonesia's waters and maritime jurisdiction has long been a critical interest of not only the world's biggest archipelagic country but also the international community. Choke points and sea lines of communication within Indonesia's jurisdiction have long served as critical veins of global seaborne trade. Moreover, as the world's geoeconomic and geopolitical centre of gravity is shifting from the Western Hemisphere to Asia, the importance of the security of Indonesian waters has become more evident. Uninterrupted flows of goods and services through Indonesian waters are necessary to ensure economic growth in the region. In recent years the Indonesian government, realising the untapped potential of its maritime domain, has stepped up its efforts to manage this abundant maritime resource to support its vision to transform the country into a maritime power amidst increasingly volatile geostrategic circumstances.

For a country that relies heavily on the effective maintenance of order and security of its waters, Indonesian maritime security governance is a tangled mess. A number of analyses argue that Indonesian maritime security governance is characterised by the overlapping roles and authority of its various maritime security-related institutions, sectoral egoism as well as inter-agency competition for resources.<sup>1</sup> There are currently no less than thirteen agencies directly involved with maritime law enforcement in Indonesia's waters and jurisdiction. The establishment of BAKAMLA (*Badan Keamanan Laut*/Maritime Security Agency), which was initially envisioned to assume the role as the leading civilian maritime law enforcement agency, has proven to be unsuccessful as far as the agenda to streamline Indonesian multi-agency maritime security governance is concerned. The Navy (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Laut*/TNI-AL), meanwhile, appears to be reluctant to relinquish its dominance of maritime law enforcement to its civilian counterparts.

This chapter explains why Indonesian maritime security governance is structured as it is. It seeks to understand the determinants that shape Indonesia's response towards maritime security challenges across the spectrum of traditional/military and non-traditional maritime law enforcement missions. This understanding will in turn be helpful as a framework to explain how Indonesia has been trying to balance military and law enforcement roles at sea in the contemporary period as well as to identify the benefit and drawbacks of such an approach.

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<sup>1</sup> See: Dirham Dirhamsyah, "Maritime Law Enforcement and Compliance in Indonesia: Problems and Recommendations," *Maritime Studies*, no. 144 (2005): 1–16; Jun Honna, "Instrumentalizing Pressures, Reinventing Mission: Indonesian Navy Battles for Turf in the Age of Reformasi," *Indonesia*, no. 86 (2008): 63–79; Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto and Siswanto Rusdi, "Maritime Security Agencies in Indonesia: More Not Merrier," RSIS Commentaries (Singapore, 2013); Evan A. Laksmana, "Rebalancing Indonesia's Naval Force: Trends, Nature, and Drivers," in *Naval Modernisation in South-East Asia: Nature, Causes and Consequences*, ed. Geoffrey Till and Jane Chan (New York: Routledge, 2014), 175–203; Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, "Naval Counter-Piracy in Indonesia," in *Piracy in Southeast Asia: Trends, Hot Spots and Responses*, ed. Carolin Liss and Ted Biggs (New York: Routledge, 2017), 97–119; Muhamad Arif and Yandry Kurniawan, "Strategic Culture and Indonesian Maritime Security," *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies* 5, no. 1 (2018): 77–89.

As the following analysis shows, the nature of Indonesian maritime security governance throughout its period of development is typified by the blurred distinction between “defence” or “military” and “security” or “law enforcement” roles. This paradigm is embodied in the persistent attempts by the Navy (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Laut/TNI-AL*) to sustain its dominance in Indonesian maritime security governance. As the *primus inter pares* among various maritime security agencies in Indonesia, the institutional behaviour of TNI-AL to a significant extent also determines the actual structure of Indonesian maritime security governance. Finally, the evolving maritime security governance architecture is also susceptible to the ever-changing domestic political context. Domestic political priorities and leaders’ threat assessments play a significant role in shaping the state’s response towards its maritime security challenges.<sup>2</sup>

After a brief overview of the current approach of Indonesia towards maritime security governance, highlighting the unfamiliarity of Indonesia towards the concept of a coast guard as a single civilian maritime security agency, the chapter will provide a structured historical analysis on the nature and determinants that shape Indonesian maritime security governance. After a brief analysis of Indonesian maritime security governance in the context of the Global Maritime Fulcrum vision under President Jokowi Widodo’s administration, this chapter will conclude with a number of observations with regard to the drawbacks and benefits of Indonesia’s approach to maritime security amidst contemporary maritime security challenges.

### **The Navy and Coast Guard in Indonesian Maritime Security Governance**

It is fair to say that Indonesia has never fully embraced the concept of a coast guard as a dedicated civilian maritime law enforcement institution with a clear delineation of responsibilities vis-à-vis other agencies. This is partly due to the geography of the country. Unlike non-archipelagic states that “only” need to worry about the territorial waters, exclusive economic zones (EEZ), and the adjacent seas, Indonesia also needs to maintain a maritime presence in multiple directions due to the existence of archipelagic waters. The Navy, for instance, while in theory is first and foremost responsible for the protection of EEZ, also needs to monitor the archipelagic sea lanes through which even foreign warships are allowed to pass.

There are currently thirteen institutions responsible for maritime security-related functions. These agencies are BAKAMLA, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, the Ministry of Law

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<sup>2</sup> This line of logic is influenced by the neoclassical realism school of thought in International Relations. The theories are built upon the premise that the actual behaviour of states i.e. foreign and security policy is not a deterministic result of external systemic pressure. The systemic pressure is rather translated through intervening variables at states’ domestic level. These intervening variables include leaders’ threat assessment, identity, interests of domestic actors, and states’ power to mobilise resources. See Gideon Rose, “Review Article: Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” *World Politics*, no. 51 (1998): 144–72; Brian Rathbun, “A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism,” *Security Studies* 17, no. 2 (2008): 294–321; Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, eds., *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell, *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

and Human Rights, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Defence, the Office of Attorney General, the Military (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia/TNI*), the National Police, TNI-AL, and the State Intelligence Agency. The evolution of this structure will be explored in the next section. It is sufficient to note here that synergising capabilities and harmonising the roles and responsibilities of these agencies has been a challenging task for the Indonesian government.

The TNI-AL is primarily responsible for the protection of maritime sovereignty, particularly in the EEZ while the police's Directorate of Marine Police is in charge of law enforcement in territorial seas.<sup>3</sup> However, as will be explained in the next section, the navy's warships also conduct law enforcement operations in Indonesia's territorial and archipelagic waters. The Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries' Directorate General of Marine Resources and Fisheries Surveillance, Ministry of Transportation's Directorate of Sea and Coast Guard, and the Ministry of Finance's Directorate General of Customs are tasked with marine environmental protection, navigational safety, and port security and tax revenue, respectively.<sup>4</sup> The rest of the agencies maintain policy and information coordination without committing patrol assets at sea.<sup>5</sup> In addition to these thirteen agencies, there are a number of agencies dealing indirectly with maritime-related issues including the Ministry of Forestry, the Ministry of Tourism, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, the Ministry of Trade, the National Agency of Search and Rescue, and the National Agency of Border Areas Development.<sup>6</sup>

On paper BAKAMLA is supposed to be the leading actor for Indonesian maritime security. In fact, its proponents consider BAKAMLA as the answer to the long-standing problems of ineffective maritime policing in Indonesian waters and jurisdiction due to the lack of coordination between the related agencies. Indeed, Presidential Regulation No. 178/2014 on the establishment of BAKAMLA mandates BAKAMLA to synergise and monitor patrols conducted by other maritime security-related agencies, formulate national maritime security and safety policy; operate early warning systems; carry out protection, surveillance, prevention and law enforcement; provide technical assistance to other maritime security-related agencies; search and rescue, and; assist in the national defence system. It is also envisioned to be the sole civilian maritime law enforcement agency to conduct coast guard tasks along with the TNI-AL which, as the vision goes, would focus more on the protection of sovereignty against military threats.<sup>7</sup>

A study endorsed by BAKAMLA in 2015, argues for shifting the paradigm from 'multiple agencies, single function' to 'single agency, multiple functions'. This would involve establishing a dedicated civilian maritime law enforcement agency and BAKAMLA, the authors conclude, is well-placed to take up that responsibility.<sup>8</sup> Today, however, it seems like the notion of BAKAMLA becoming the single agency with multiple functions has lost out to persisting

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<sup>3</sup> Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto and Siswanto Rusdi, "Maritime Security Agencies in Indonesia: More Not Merrier," RSIS Commentaries (Singapore, 2013).

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Sulistyningtyas, Susanto, and Munaf, *Sinergitas Paradigma Lintas Sektor Di Bidang Keamanan Dan Keselamatan Laut [Cross-Sectoral Synergy between Maritime Security and Safety Paradigms]* (Jakarta: PT. Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2015), 23–24.

<sup>7</sup> See Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> See Ibid.; Muhamad Arif, "Power Plays in Indonesian Waters," *APPS Policy Forum*, 2018, <https://www.policyforum.net/power-plays-indonesian-waters/>.

orthodoxy.<sup>9</sup> No one seems to be quite happy to be told what to do by a newly established agency, least of all established institutions such as the Navy or the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Affairs.<sup>10</sup> Consequently, there has been hardly any significant alteration in the legal framework, budgeting mechanism or operations.<sup>11</sup>

The establishment of BAKAMLA also took up the momentum of the call for greater coast guard cooperation in the region. The expansion of coast guards and the opportunities and challenges this poses to regional countries have indeed highlighted the necessity to strengthen cooperation in the areas such as capacity building and the designing of common operating principles.<sup>12</sup> In many previous instances, the absence of a single Indonesian coast guard had also complicated law enforcement especially when it involved foreign vessels or citizens as the governments in question often found it difficult to reach out to a designated contact point in Indonesia.<sup>13</sup> It is perhaps only in this domain of maritime diplomacy that BAKAMLA is able to exclusively claim the title as the Indonesian coast guard.

Moreover, the establishment of BAKAMLA took place amidst the ongoing deliberation for the establishment of the Sea and Coast Guard Indonesia (*Penjagaan Laut dan Pantai Indonesia/SCGI*) built upon the existing unit under the Ministry of Transportation. The proponents of this initiative argue that the 2008 law on shipping which mandates the establishment of the Sea and Coast Guard preceded the 2014 law on maritime affairs which rules the establishment of BAKAMLA.<sup>14</sup> It is more limited in terms of the scope of responsibilities as it would mainly deal with safety of navigation and search and rescue in the territorial sea. However, unlike BAKAMLA which is headed by a senior official under the coordination of the Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law, and Security, the Ministry of Transportation's sea and coast guard unit would be responsible directly to the president which could potentially make it superior. This has resulted in a tension between the two institutions, both claiming the right to bear the title of Indonesian coast guard.

Amidst the confusion regarding the rightful bearer of coast guard title, the TNI-AL retains its predominant role in not only safeguarding the country's territorial sovereignty against military threats but also enforcing laws against illegal activities at sea including in territorial and archipelagic waters. As one scholar notes, naval defence and maritime security, along with naval diplomacy, form a core task for the TNI-AL.<sup>15</sup> The 2004 Law on Armed Forces, for instance, rules that the missions of the TNI-AL include law and security enforcement in the national jurisdictions on the sea. The law enforcement roles are enshrined in the navy's doctrine and

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> See for instance Koh Swee Lean Collin, "The South China Sea's 'White-Hull' Warfare," *The National Interest*, 2016, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-south-china-seas-“white-hull”-warfare-15604>.

<sup>13</sup> "Interview with a Mid-Ranking BAKAMLA Officer" (Jakarta, 2017).

<sup>14</sup> The law mandates the government to establish the Sea and Coast Guard (*Penjagaan Laut dan Pantai*) in three years after the legalisation of the law. The initiative momentarily lost its traction after the establishment of BAKAMLA.

<sup>15</sup> Evan A. Laksmana, "Rebalancing Indonesia's Naval Force: Trends, Nature, and Drivers," in *Naval Modernisation in South-East Asia: Nature, Causes and Consequences*, ed. Geoffrey Till and Jane Chan (New York: Routledge, 2014), 188.

institutionalised in its organisational structure and operational missions.<sup>16</sup> Maritime security task forces, in addition to combat task forces, are thus attached to the two fleets under the navy command.

The TNI-AL's prominence and influence is at such a level that other actors recognise its centrality.<sup>17</sup> The push to establish the aforementioned SCGI, for instance, only gained traction after it received favourable support from the TNI-AL leadership who felt that their institutional interests would not be hampered by the establishment of the new agency.<sup>18</sup> Similarly, it can also be argued that the ascendancy of the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries in recent years can be partly attributed to the favourable stance of the TNI-AL towards it. The task force to combat illegal fishing that was established under the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries in 2015, relied heavily on intelligence and logistical support from the navy. The Navy Deputy Chief of Staff also acts as the Chief Executive of the task force. In BAKAMLA itself, TNI-AL officers fill up most of the high-ranking positions. As the most capable maritime security agency compared to its mission-tailored counterparts, TNI-AL has succeeded in selling itself as the most multifunctional agency amidst changing domestic political priorities, budgetary constraints and inter-agency competition.<sup>19</sup>

## The Historical Development of Indonesian Maritime Security Governance

The difficulty Indonesia is facing in delineating the roles and responsibilities of its overlapping maritime security agencies and the predominant role of the navy in enforcing laws at sea is rooted in history. This section provides a brief overview of the historical development of Indonesian maritime security governance. As the following analysis shows, some of the major institutional developments in Indonesian maritime security governance took place during the so-called New Order (*Orde Baru*), the 32 years (1966-1998) regime led by Suharto. The following historical analysis is thus structured into three periods: pre-*Orde Baru*, *Orde Baru*, and post-*Orde Baru*.

### Pre-Orde Baru

Soon after Indonesia's self-declared independence in 1945, the country's founding fathers realised the necessity to secure vulnerable Indonesian waters. Prior to the Second World War, for instance, Japanese fishing boats were often found approaching the coasts of Indonesian islands in an effort to map the Indonesian coast as part of the preparation for the incoming war.<sup>20</sup> The

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ioannis Chapsos and James A. Malcolm, "Maritime Security in Indonesia: Towards a Comprehensive Agenda?," *Marine Policy* 76 (2017): 182.

<sup>18</sup> Honna, "Instrumentalizing Pressures, Reinventing Mission: Indonesian Navy Battles for Turf in the Age of Reformasi," 75.

<sup>19</sup> Jo Inge Bekkevold, Ian Bowers, and Michael Raska, "Conclusion: Security, Strategy and Military Change in the 21st Century," in *Security, Strategy and Military Change in the 21st Century: Cross Regional Perspectives*, ed. Jo Inge Bekkevold, Ian Bowers, and Michael Raska (London: Routledge, 2015). Cited in Jo Inge Bekkevold and Ian Bowers, "A Question of Balance: Warfighting and Naval Operations Other Than War," in *International Order at Sea: How It Is Challenged. How It Is Maintained.*, ed. Jo Inge Bekkevold and Geoffrey Till (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 243.

<sup>20</sup> Hasjim Djalal, *Indonesia and the Law of the Sea* (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 298.

territorial waters as determined by the colonial-era ordinance was considered insufficient in regards to national security as their three mile limit exposed Indonesia to threatening manoeuvres of foreign warships close to its coast. Moreover, effective control of the sea around and between Indonesian islands was necessary to protect resource extraction that had so far been undermined by extensive smuggling.<sup>21</sup> The military and diplomatic campaign to defend independence against the returning Dutch consumed all of the government's attention and resources and left hardly any space to seriously think about the peacetime administration of maritime security.

In response to those challenges, the People's Security Forces-Navy (*Tentara Keamanan Rakyat Angkatan Laut*/TKR-Laut) was established in October 1945.<sup>22</sup> Due to the lack of capacity this embryo of Indonesia's modern navy only played a minor role in the war of independence (1945-49), focusing on maintaining security around ports and naval facilities and supporting the land-based guerrilla campaign.<sup>23</sup> The lack of capacity and the nature of threat during this period also restricted the Indonesian government from moving beyond the minimal institutional arrangement required for law enforcement at sea. The colonial-era customs agency, for instance, was nationalised and put under the Department of Finance A Sea and Coast Guard unit was also established under the Department of Transportation and a water police unit (*Polisi Air/Polair*) under the National Police.

After Indonesia gained its full independence from the Dutch in 1949, the government started to think seriously about administering its waters in order to secure them from threats and exploit their full economic potential. The experience during the war of independence demonstrated the vulnerability of Indonesian archipelagic waterways being used by external powers and thus threatening Indonesian security. During the war Dutch naval forces imposed naval blockades at some of the most crucial Indonesian SLOC in the Java Sea and the Strait of Malacca. This complicated the Indonesian war effort as weapons and munitions had to be smuggled through the blockade.<sup>24</sup> Meanwhile, illegal activities on the archipelagic waterways continued to damage the Indonesian economy.

Indonesia then decided to revitalise the role of its navy. The TKR-Laut which had been renamed the Navy of the Republic of Indonesia (*Angkatan Laut Republik Indonesia*/ALRI) was given the responsibility to: (1) defend the country against enemy's offensive at and from the sea and secure inter-islands exchanges and access to ports, and (2) to carry out policing tasks to enforce the government's laws and pacify the regions.<sup>25</sup> The Indonesian government also started to give attention to multi-agency governance at sea. In what was perhaps the first attempt to organise

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 299.

<sup>22</sup> TKR was actually preceded by the People's Security Body (*Badan Keamanan Rakyat*/BKR) and the People's Security Body-Navy (BKR-Laut) which were established on August 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1945. As the name suggests, the BKR was not intended to be a state military. A military organisation, it was thought, would provoke the Japanese and the incoming Allied forces and undermine the objective of diplomatic campaign to secure international recognition of Indonesian independence. See Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi TNI, *Sejarah TNI Jilid I (1945-1949)* (Jakarta: Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi TNI, 2000), 1-9.

<sup>23</sup> Robert Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia* (Sidney: Allen & Unwin, 1996), 95.

<sup>24</sup> Alfred Daniel Matthews, "Indonesian Maritime Security Cooperation in the Malacca Straits" (Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), 12.

<sup>25</sup> Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi TNI, *Sejarah TNI Jilid II (1950-1959)* (Jakarta: Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi TNI, 2000), 11.

Indonesian maritime security agencies, an ordinance was then issued by the central government that identified the government agencies involved in maritime management. These agencies included the navy, the water police, customs, the Department of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, and the Directorate of Sea Communication in the Department of Transportation.<sup>26</sup> Maritime management during this period was, as one scholar notes, chaotic as competition among stakeholders encouraged a “go your own way” mentality which undermined efforts to coordinate missions and visions.<sup>27</sup>

Throughout much of the 1950s until early the 1960s, a series of armed movements, some of which evidently supported by foreign powers, emerged across the country and challenged the authority of the central government in Jakarta. These separatist movements included the Darul Islam/Islamic Armed Forces of Indonesia (Darul Islam/*Tentara Islam Indonesia* or DI/TII) in western and central Java, Aceh, southern Sulawesi, and southern Borneo; the Republic of South Moluccas (*Republik Maluku Selatan/RMS*) in the Moluccas islands, and the Revolutionary Government of Republic of Indonesia/People’s Total Struggle (*Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia/Perjuangan Rakyat Semesta* or PRRI/Permesta) in some parts of Sumatera and Sulawesi. Marine forces and a number of warships were deployed to thwart the DI/TII resistance.<sup>28</sup> In the more distant Moluccas islands, the Indonesian navy played a bigger role with the deployment of a number of corvettes to control the seas surrounding the islands, provide fire support, and land ground forces. The Netherlands were believed to have provided political support for the RMS. In countering PRRI/Permesta, which was believed to have been provided with extensive military aid by the United States military, the TNI-AL deployed quite a substantial fleet consisting of 17 warships and 19 transport ships in what was its first experience operating in a large formation. Despite the overall limited capacity, these internal security operations had nevertheless allowed the Indonesian navy to secure its presence in many parts of the archipelago. Moreover, the potential re-emergence of separatist movements which, given the geographical nature of Indonesia, could get clandestine support from external powers, continued to form a major part of the navy’s strategic narrative.<sup>29</sup>

The radical change in domestic political structure and foreign policy direction in the early 1960s enabled the navy to significantly increase its capacity. Despite an economic crisis, President Sukarno, who had secured his position as nominally the sole political authority in the country, mobilised the national resources to support his vision of anti-colonialism. Consequently, the country began to lean towards the Eastern Bloc. Indonesia received a large amount of aid from the Soviet Union with the navy, along with the air force, among the biggest beneficiaries. Between 1959-1965 Indonesia received 12 submarines, 7 destroyers, 1 cruiser, 7 frigates, 26 fast attack craft, 7 minesweepers, 26 patrol craft, and 2 support ships.<sup>30</sup> The much-improved

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<sup>26</sup> Honna, “Instrumentalizing Pressures, Reinventing Mission: Indonesian Navy Battles for Turf in the Age of Reformasi,” 65.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 65–66.

<sup>28</sup> See Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi TNI, *Sejarah TNI Jilid II (1950-1959)* (Jakarta: Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi TNI, 2000), 81–110.

<sup>29</sup> Hasjim Djalal, *Indonesia and the Law of the Sea* (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 299. For the role of the interpretation of the historically-shaped strategic culture, and subjective interpretation of its geographical nature, on the contemporary behaviour of the navy see Arif and Kurniawan, “Strategic Culture and Indonesian Maritime Security”.

<sup>30</sup> Data generated from the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database. See also Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi TNI, *Sejarah TNI*



capabilities allowed the Indonesian navy to contest the command of the sea during the campaign to retake Papua from the Dutch.<sup>31</sup>

The nature of maritime security challenges and certain domestic political priorities during the pre-*Orde Baru* period forced the Indonesian government to come up with a particular response in which the navy, exploiting the country's sense of maritime vulnerability, was able to lay the groundwork for its future dominance of the country's maritime security architecture. As noted by Liow and Shekhar,

*Acutely aware of how the Dutch sought to reimpose colonialism after the Second World War by using Indonesia's vast waterways, how Sumatran rebels engaged in seaborne political subversion during the 1957 PRRI/Permesta Rebellion, and the deployment of a Dutch aircraft carrier in the vicinity during the 1960 crisis over Irian Jaya, Indonesian leaders have struggled to come to terms with the insecurity of its proximate waterways.*<sup>32</sup>

The aforementioned military campaigns had thus allowed the navy to gain ascendancy over other maritime security agencies to dominate maritime administration in the territorial waters.<sup>33</sup> This dominant position has not been relinquished by the navy since.

### *Orde Baru*

The rise to power of Suharto and his New Order (*Orde Baru*) regime brought a further momentum for the militarisation of Indonesian security governance as the blurred distinction between "defence" or the protection of sovereignty against military threats and "security" which mostly covered law enforcement tasks was institutionalised. A regime founded by the Army, *Orde Baru* basically turned Indonesia into a "national security state" in which the military played an extensive role.<sup>34</sup> Under the banner of Dual Function (*Dwi Fungsi*) doctrine, the military considered itself as not only a "military power" but also a "political power" which enabled the Army to engage in non-military areas.<sup>35</sup>

The blurred distinction between defence and internal security roles of the military, which consequently gave more flexibility for the navy to engage in law enforcement tasks, was also codified in their operational doctrines. The "*Tjatur Darma Eka Karma*" doctrine that was released in the early days of *Orde Baru* defined "total people warfare" (*Perang Rakyat Semesta/Perata*), operationalised in defence as well as internal security operations, as the core

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1960 Jilid III (1960-1965) (Jakarta: Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi TNI, 2000).

<sup>31</sup> The Netherlands retained its control over Papua or Western New Guinea after the official recognition of Indonesia's independence in 1949. Since mid 1950s Indonesian government, considering itself as the rightful authority over Papua, had launched a diplomatic campaign to retake the region. In 1962, after protracted negotiations, the region was placed under United Nations administration, and in 1963 it was transferred to Indonesia.

<sup>32</sup> Vibhanshu Shekhar and Joseph Chinyong Liow, "Indonesia as a Maritime Power: Jokowi's Vision, Strategies, and Obstacles Ahead," *The Brookings Institution*, 2014, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2014/11/indonesia-maritime-liow-shekhar>.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> See Salim Said, *Tumbuh Dan Kembangnya Dwifungsi: Perkembangan Pemikiran Politik Militer Indonesia 1958-2002* (Jakarta: Aksara Karunia, 2002); Leonard C. Sebastian, *Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia's Use of Military Force* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2006).

<sup>35</sup> As quoted in Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), 345.

concept of national defence.<sup>36</sup>

Despite its rather awkward position during the transitional period, the navy still managed to take up the momentum and expand its influence vis-à-vis other maritime security agencies.<sup>37</sup> *Dwi Fungsi*, for instance, enabled the military to expand its roles and responsibilities to areas beyond defence against military threats. Military officers, including from the navy, were seconded to high-ranking posts in civilian maritime security-related agencies.<sup>38</sup> By 1977, for instance, there were 926 navy officers seconded to such posts.<sup>39</sup> The policy had allowed the navy leadership to control the respective agencies and promote the navy's institutional interests within the broader maritime security governance structure.

In 1982, a new law on national defence and security was signed by the government. The law codified the “national defence and security” (*Pertahanan dan Keamanan Negara/Hankamneg*) which mandated military professionalism in the management of internal security. At the service level, the navy leadership developed the concept of “*Hankamneg at Sea*” (*Hankamneg di Laut*) and started to conduct routine maritime policing under the flag of Operasi Keamanan Laut (Kamla), or Maritime Security Operations.<sup>40</sup> Furthermore, in 1991 the Department of Defence and Security released a new military operational doctrine. The new doctrine contained the concept of “defence zones preparation” in which defence zones were divided into three layers: a buffer zone outside of the EEZ and air space above it; a main defence zone covering the EEZ and the territorial seas and the air space above it, and finally a resistance zone covering strategic land compartments, archipelagic waters and the air space above them.<sup>41</sup> The doctrine underlines the land-based defence strategy which had been adopted by the military, and was based on a worst-case scenario where an invading force managed to land on Indonesian shores. Nevertheless, the doctrine also provided further justification for the navy to maintain its presence in the territorial and archipelagic waters as part of the missions to prepare the defence zones.

Suharto's choice to base his political legitimacy on economic development, which was left untouched by his predecessor, as well as internal stability and order also drove the military to focus most of its attention and resources on internal security tasks. In this regard, the intervention of the military in guarding internal security and order was deemed necessary for the uninterrupted implementation of economic development programs. The TNI assumed the title of the “stabiliser” and “dynamist” of national development.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Andi Widjajanto, “Evolusi Doktrin Pertahanan Indonesia,” *Prisma* 29, no. 1 (2010): 12.

<sup>37</sup> The navy, and the air force, was not considered as the main supporters of Suharto when he rose to power in the middle of 1960s. This was famously captured in the relations between *Orde Baru* and Lieutenant General Hartono, then Marine Corps Commandant. Hartono was well-known as a strong loyalist of Sukarno, Indonesia's founding father and Suharto's predecessor. Hartono was immediately sidelined after the rise of *Orde Baru* and later was found dead in his house in 1971.

<sup>38</sup> Honna, “Instrumentalizing Pressures, Reinventing Mission: Indonesian Navy Battles for Turf in the Age of Reformasi,” 67.

<sup>39</sup> Nugroho Notosusanto, ed., *Pejuang Dan Prajurit: Konsepsi Dan Implementasi Dwifungsi ABRI* (Jakarta: Penerbit Sinar Harapan, 1984), 379. As cited in Honna, “Instrumentalizing Pressures, Reinventing Mission: Indonesian Navy Battles for Turf in the Age of Reformasi,” 67.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 67.

<sup>41</sup> Widjajanto, “Evolusi Doktrin Pertahanan Indonesia,” 17–18.

<sup>42</sup> Ahmad Yani Basuki, *Reformasi TNI: Pola, Profesionalitas Dan Refungsionalisasi Militer Dalam Masyarakat* (Jakarta: Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia, 2013), 71.

In 1972 a joint decision letter was signed by the then Minister of Defence and Security/Commander of the Armed Forces, the Minister of Transportation, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Justice, and the Attorney General to establish the Maritime Security Coordinating Agency (*Badan Koordinasi Keamanan Laut/BAKORKAMLA*). As the name suggests BAKORKAMLA was meant to be the national body responsible to coordinate policies and activities of different maritime-related agencies.<sup>43</sup> The signatories of the letter, however, reflected the then rather narrow concerns of Indonesian maritime security; it hardly went beyond defence, safety of navigation and customs enforcement. Thus, in terms of the actual patrol operations, the TNI-AL carried out most of the maritime law enforcement tasks under the rubric of the navy's constabulary functions.<sup>44</sup> In fact, in terms of the institutional arrangement BAKORKAMLA was operating directly under the supervision of the commander of the armed forces with its regional divisions were headed by the navy's Eastern and Western fleet commanders.<sup>45</sup>

The expansion of the maritime security landscape, with increased attention given to issues previously considered marginal to national security, has resulted in the subsequent proliferation of maritime security agencies both horizontally in terms of the number of the agencies as well as vertically in terms of the perceived responsibilities and capabilities of some, if not all of the agencies. In the last couple of decades, for instance, issues like illegal fishing and environmental protection have come to the fore. As a result, though it remained the most capable organisation, the TNI-AL's dominance in Indonesian maritime security governance started to come under pressure.

Moreover, there was a substantial expansion of international regulation and corresponding domestic laws with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which contains provisions on legal principles and regime of archipelagic state which came into force in 1994 and the new law concerning Indonesian waters signed in 1996. UNCLOS therefore extended Indonesia's marine resources base to the extent that it is now larger than the land resources base.<sup>46</sup>

*The application of the archipelagic principles in Indonesia requires substantial expansion of law enforcement at sea which could no be easily or quickly met because of the emphasis given in the national development plan on economic sectors especially on agriculture. Moreover, cooperation and more effective coordination between the various enforcement agencies at sea need a lot of improvement and constant attention. The problems of enforcement and coordination of the various enforcement agencies would be greater and much more complicated if the establishment of Exclusive Economic Zone there added to the already extensive problems of enforcing and implementing the*

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<sup>43</sup> Evan A. Laksmana, "Rebalancing Indonesia's Naval Force: Trends, Nature, and Drivers," in *Naval Modernisation in South-East Asia: Nature, Causes and Consequences*, ed. Geoffrey Till and Jane Chan (New York: Routledge, 2014), 181.

<sup>44</sup> Sulistyningtyas, Susanto, and Munaf, *Sinergitas Paradigma Lintas Sektor Di Bidang Keamanan Dan Keselamatan Laut*, 22.

<sup>45</sup> Honna, "Instrumentalizing Pressures, Reinventing Mission: Indonesian Navy Battles for Turf in the Age of Reformasi," 67.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 207.

*archipelagic principles and continental shelf.*<sup>47</sup>

All of these factors have contributed to shape the Indonesian contemporary strategic environment and thus the need to rethink Indonesian maritime security governance.<sup>48</sup>

*Post-Orde Baru*

The collapse of *Orde Baru* in 1998 was a turning point for the Indonesian military. The *Dwi Fungsi* doctrine was scrapped and a number of organisational adjustments were implemented. The military, for instance, decided to reduce the practice of seconding active personnel to civilian posts.<sup>49</sup> This led to the gradual withdrawal of uniformed navy personnel from other maritime security agencies, and it contributed to the process of civilianising and demilitarising Indonesia's maritime security administration.<sup>50</sup> In 1999, the police was separated from the armed forces with a subsequent delineation of responsibilities between the two institutions. The TNI was assigned responsibility for national "defence", and the police was given the role of maintaining domestic "security" and "order".<sup>51</sup>

The separation of the police from the military and the delineation of responsibilities between the two institutions have arguably had the greatest impact on the Army. While law enforcement and domestic security were almost entirely omitted from the list of tasks of the Army, the TNI-AL, under the banner of navy constabulary roles, still retained such missions.<sup>52</sup> Although there is nothing unique in itself about the TNI-AL being tasked with law and security enforcement, it is worth noting that the reaffirmation of this task in the 2004 Law on Armed Forces stands in contrast with the omission of such task from the Army. The 2004 Law on Armed Forces was indeed formulated in the political context of military reform during which the Army, which had previously played extensive role in internal security matters during the *Orde Baru* period, faced enormous pressure to relinquish its roles and responsibilities in internal security. Nevertheless, with the maintenance of domestic security no longer to be used as justification, the Navy has now more limited space in terms of non-defence-related roles. Moreover, the separation of the police from the armed forces has also allowed the *Polair* to expand its presence and capabilities vis-à-vis the Navy.

The TNI-AL leadership, however, did not stand idle in facing the unfavourable post-*Dwi Fungsi*

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<sup>47</sup> Djalal, *Indonesia and the Law of the Sea*, 19–20.

<sup>48</sup> On the role of law on maritime strategy and operations see Steven Haines, "The Influence of Law on Maritime Strategy," in *Maritime Strategy and Global Order: Markets, Resources, Security*, ed. Daniel Moran and James A. Russell (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2016), 239–60.

<sup>49</sup> Honna, "Instrumentalizing Pressures, Reinventing Mission: Indonesian Navy Battles for Turf in the Age of Reformasi," 2008, 69. The 2004 law on armed forces rules that active military personnel may only be posted in civilian posts in the following government agencies: Coordinating Ministry for Politics and Security, Ministry of Defence, Military Secretary to the President, State Intelligence Agency, State Cryptography Agency, National Resilience Institute, National Defence Council, National Search and Rescue Agency, National Narcotics Agency, and the Supreme Court.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> The 2004 Law on Armed Forces stipulates that the Army is responsible for carrying out the following functions: defence, security of the land border areas, capability building-up and development, and land defence areas empowerment. In addition to the corresponding functions on the sea and air space, respectively, the Navy and Air Force are also tasked with carrying out law enforcement duties on the sea and national air space.

institutional environment. As it began to be clear that the TNI-AL was losing its ground, the navy leadership immediately invoked the old mantra: Indonesian geostrategic vulnerabilities against the interference of external powers. In a TNI seminar in 1999, navy leadership presented their vision for strengthening the navy's role and presence in maritime administration.<sup>53</sup> The vision stressed that, given its geographical strategic position, Indonesia is expected by the international community to improve security and safety in Indonesian waters and jurisdiction, a task that only the navy was able to execute. Failure to do so, the navy leadership argued, would provide foreign governments a pretext to intervene in the sovereign territory of Indonesia.<sup>54</sup>

Realising the need to streamline the maritime security governance, a presidential regulation was signed in 2005 to revitalise the BAKORKAMLA. According to the regulation it was now headed by the Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law, and Security who was responsible directly to the president. Twelve ministerial level officials whose agencies' tasks and responsibilities include maritime security sit in the BAKORKAMLA as members. These agencies are the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Home Affairs, the Minister of Transportation, the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, the Minister of Law and Human Rights, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Defence, the Attorney General, the military (TNI) commander, the Chief of Police, the Navy Chief of Staff (TNI-AL) and the Head of the State Intelligence Agency.

The idea of having effective maritime policing through BAKORKAMLA, however, has proven to be unrealistic<sup>55</sup> Problems such as parochial institutional interests, competition for resource, slow legal enforcement as well as a lack of firm leadership continued to hinder inter-agency coordination.<sup>56</sup> In October 2014, the unprecedented law on maritime affairs was signed. The law, among others, mandates the government to establish the Maritime Security Agency (*Badan Keamanan Laut/BAKAMLA*) to carry out law enforcement activities in Indonesian waters and jurisdiction, particularly to conduct maritime security and safety patrol. With the signing of the Presidential Regulation No. 178/2014 BAKORKAMLA was officially transformed into BAKAMLA.

From this historical overview of Indonesian maritime security governance development, a number of observations can be made regarding the nature of Indonesian maritime security governance and how it approaches military and civilian roles at sea. First, Indonesian maritime security governance is generally typified by the blurred distinction between "defence" or protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity against military threat and "security" which in the case of Indonesia is understood in terms of internal security or law enforcement tasks. The embodiment of this paradigm has allowed the navy to sustain its dominance in the country's maritime security governance, making clear delineation of roles more difficult. Second, it has been proven that throughout its history, Indonesian maritime security governance is susceptible to the ever-changing domestic political priorities. The institutional arrangement and the balance of power among various maritime security-related agencies are to a significant extent shaped by the nature of maritime security challenges, as understood by the political leaders, as well as the development agenda's priority.

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 70.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Supriyanto and Rusdi, "Maritime Security Agencies in Indonesia: More Not Merrier."

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

## The Global Maritime Fulcrum and Maritime Security Governance

The election as president of Joko Widodo, in 2014 gained wide domestic and international attention. In a country where foreign and security policy had never really taken part in public discussion, Jokowi came to power with a vision to transform Indonesia into a maritime power capable to “assert itself as a force between the two oceans: the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean”. The Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) vision rests on five pillars: rebuild maritime culture, maintain and manage maritime resources, develop maritime infrastructure and connectivity, promote maritime diplomacy, and develop maritime capabilities.<sup>57</sup> Underlying this vision is the renewed realisation of the natural dictate of Indonesian geography; it is an archipelagic state with abundant marine resources and other maritime economic potentials residing in between two increasingly strategic oceans, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Jokowi, in other words, had arguably managed to come up with a grand strategy that places Indonesian domestic economic development within the broader context of changing geostrategic circumstances.

In order to operationalise the aforementioned vision, Jokowi’s administration prepared a five-year development programme, the 2015-2019 National Mid Term Development Plan (*Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah/RPJMN*). The missions included achieving a national security system capable of protecting territorial sovereignty, sustaining economic independence through maritime resources security, and reflecting the Indonesian identity as an archipelagic state; realising a free and active foreign policy and Indonesian identity as a maritime nation, and; realising Indonesia as an independent, developed, strong, and national interests-based maritime nation. Nine-point development priorities, called *Nawa Cita*, were also devised covering issues such as maritime border areas security; elimination of illegal fishing, illegal logging, human trafficking, and other illegal activities at sea; security of maritime resources and EEZ; infrastructure, coverage, and institutional arrangement of maritime law enforcement, and; maritime law enforcement coordination. Thus, in terms of policy and development planning, the Jokowi administration’s focus on maritime security, primarily to protect Indonesian territorial integrity and sustain economic development, was clear. The interlinked objectives of safeguarding Indonesian territorial integrity and increasing the utilisation of Indonesian marine resources potential, largely governed these domestic political priorities.

Indonesia’s domestic priority on maritime security under Jokowi and how it shaped the structure of the maritime security governance was perhaps most visible through its approach to illegal fishing. The presence of over 5,000 fishing vessels operating illegally in its waters, violating Indonesian territorial integrity and food sovereignty has resulted in annual losses of over \$20 billion.<sup>58</sup> A series of policies had been taken by the widely popular Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries Susi Pudjiastuti in order to free up Indonesian waters and jurisdictions from illegal foreign fishing vessels and increase the utilisation of Indonesian marine resources by Indonesian fishermen. Along with the moratorium on fishing licenses and law enforcement efforts against

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<sup>57</sup> Rendi A. Witular, “Presenting Maritime Doctrine,” *The Jakarta Post*, 2014, [m.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/14/presenting-maritime-doctrine.htm](http://m.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/14/presenting-maritime-doctrine.htm).

<sup>58</sup> Prashanth Parameswaran, “Explaining Indonesia’s ‘Sink the Vessels’ Policy Under Jokowi,” *The Diplomat*, 2015, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/01/explaining-indonesias-sink-the-vessels-policy-under-jokowi/>.

transshipment, Susi was publicly heralded for her harsh policy to sink vessels seized on allegations of conducting illegal activities in Indonesian waters. During the period of 2014-2016, 236 fishing vessels, 229 of which were foreign vessels, were sunk by the Indonesian authority.<sup>59</sup> In addition to that, a presidential regulation was also signed which gave a mandate to the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries to head a new task force to combat illegal fishing. This task force, known as Task Force 115 (*Satuan Tugas 115/Satgas 115*) is an ad hoc team comprised of assets from the Navy, BAKAMLA and Polair. The priority the Indonesian government under Jokowi gave to the issue of illegal fishing had significantly increased the visibility of the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries in the domain of maritime security governance when compared to other civilian maritime law enforcement agencies.

As far as maritime security governance is concerned, the renewed focus on the maritime domain had given a new momentum for further reorganisation of Indonesian maritime security agencies. This is best exemplified by the establishment of BAKAMLA in 2014. With more authority compared to its predecessor, BAKORKAMLA, BAKAMLA was thought to be the answer to the complicated management of Indonesian maritime security. This should mean that BAKAMLA would have a centralised authority which would enable it to assign and define the roles and tasks of other agencies.<sup>60</sup>

The vision, however, appears to have faltered due to long-standing sectoral egoism and inter-agency competition for resources. As mentioned before, no one seems to be quite happy to be told what to do by a newly established agency, least of all established institutions such as the Navy or the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Affairs.<sup>61</sup> BAKAMLA itself, due to the lack of its organic capabilities, still needs to rely on the capabilities and capacities of other agencies in conducting joint operations. In some instances, these joint operations are compromised by the conflicting schedules and operational plans of the participating agencies.

The tension between BAKAMLA and the Ministry of Transportation's Directorate of Sea and Coast Guard also continues to hinder optimal implementation of BAKAMLA's mandate. Throughout 2017, for instance, the Ministry of Transportation's Directorate of Sea and Coast Guard only contributed one vessel to the BAKAMLA's joint operations, compared to 92 and 29 vessels from the TNI-AL and the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries respectively.

The substantial increase in terms of data, information and intelligence that needs to be gathered to create and maintain maritime domain awareness has resulted in the realisation that the comprehensive and effective understanding of maritime environment with its security, safety, economic and ecological implication is crucially needed. Despite continued discussion on the topic among security planners and policy-makers, the lack of coordination and inter-agency competition has so far hindered the realisation of maritime domain awareness. The various maritime security agencies described above continue to maintain and develop their own intelligence gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance system and infrastructure without a clear

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<sup>59</sup> See Biro Perencanaan Sekretariat Jenderal KKP RI, "Laporan Tahunan Kementerian Kelautan Dan Perikanan 2016" (Jakarta, 2017).

<sup>60</sup> Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, "Naval Counter-Piracy in Indonesia," in *Piracy in Southeast Asia: Trends, Hot Spots and Responses*, ed. Carolin Liss and Ted Biggs (New York: Routledge, 2017), 101.

<sup>61</sup> Arif, "Power Plays in Indonesian Waters."

mechanism of information sharing and centralised command and control. While such separated development might be justified by different needs and technical requirements of the respective agencies, it is fair to say that better coordination and a clear mechanism of information sharing would minimise the risk of redundancy and duplication of the scattered capabilities as well as information and intelligence collected.

Indonesian maritime security governance development under the Jokowi administration also continued to be characterised by the dominance of the TNI-AL. In the post-*Orde Baru* environment, where the military was pressured to focus on defence roles, the Indonesian navy managed to find its way around and maintain its primacy and influence vis-à-vis other maritime security agencies. As noted before, the TNI-AL's institutional interests are guaranteed with the presence of its officers in other civilian agencies that are emerging including the BAKAMLA and the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries' Task Force 115. Moreover, the TNI-AL's support for the establishment of Sea and Coast Guard within the Ministry of Transportation has also not been withdrawn. In other words, the TNI-AL has managed to retain its relevance in Indonesian maritime security governance and ensure its dominance is not compromised by the rise of any single civilian maritime law enforcement agency by expanding the landscape of the governance itself. With more players and capabilities remaining scattered, the TNI-AL will most likely retain its position as the major player in Indonesian maritime security governance.

The aforementioned post-*Orde Baru* military reform notwithstanding, the navy leadership appears to be persistent in defending its role in maritime law enforcement. In a discussion concerning the role of the TNI-AL in law enforcement, a senior naval officer once said, "Do not consider sovereignty merely about external borders as it also entails security threats in the (internal) waters. The difference is that the navy uses warships instead of civilian ships. When dealing with illegal practices, we cannot separate defence and civilian maritime (law enforcement)".<sup>62</sup>

## Conclusion

Indonesia has never been familiar with the concept of a coast guard as a dedicated civilian maritime law enforcement institution with a clear delineation of responsibilities vis-à-vis other agencies. To be fair, the geographical nature of the country makes it challenging to delineate the roles and responsibilities as well as to divide the areas of operation of the various maritime security agencies. The navy leadership, for instance, could argue that the presence of warships in territorial and archipelagic waters is necessary to protect Indonesian UNCLOS-designated archipelagic sea lanes through which not only commercial ships but also foreign warships pass. On the other hand, it is not easy for civilian agencies to call for the greater allocation of resources and expand their presence in the natural habitat of the navy in the EEZ and high seas.

Moreover, the long experience of the blurred distinction between "defence" and "security" has made it almost impossible to make the military focus solely on defence roles and relinquish internal security or law enforcement tasks. If there is any lesson learned from the Indonesian

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<sup>62</sup> "Dicky Munaf, Sestama Badan Keamanan Laut: Pengamanan Dan Keselamatan Laut Seimbang," *Republika Online*, 2016, <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/koran/wawasan/16/01/27/o11t0h5-dicky-munaf-sestama-badan-keamanan-laut-pengamanan-dan-keselamatan-laut-seimbang>.



case, therefore, is that the approach country takes with regards to its maritime security governance is very much a result of its unique geostrategic circumstances as well as its strategic history.

Meanwhile, the susceptibility of Indonesian maritime security governance to ever-changing domestic political priorities means that nothing can be taken for granted when it comes to Indonesia's structural approach towards administering its seas. Succession in the government and shift in threat assessment and development agenda could result in changes in the structure of Indonesian maritime security governance. In fact, at the time of writing, Indonesia was preparing for the presidential election with Jokowi's bid for a second-term was still highly contested.

It is safe to argue, however, that the current approach that Indonesia takes with regard to maritime security governance is not ideal. Duplication of roles and responsibilities could or have undermined effective governance of Indonesian waters and jurisdictions. With capabilities scattered, it is also difficult for Indonesia to achieve maritime domain awareness which is extremely necessary to ensure the safety and security of its waters and jurisdictions.