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**Federal Constitutional Values and Citizen Attitudes to Government:
Explaining Federal System Viability and Reform Preferences in Eight Countries**

A J Brown,¹ Jacob Deem² & John Kincaid³

Abstract

This study presents a measure of federal constitutional values as a dimension of federal political culture derived from four key features of federal systems. Tested in six federal and two non-federal countries, we find the measure is stable and taps enduring values, including confirmation that citizens who support devolutionary reform have stronger federal constitutional values. Defining federalism success as a system where citizens have strong federal constitutional values and high satisfaction with their current polycentric system, our results find Switzerland and Canada being the most viable, followed by the United States, Australia, and Germany, while Belgium is not very successful. In the non-federal countries, substantial support for devolution and possibly federalism is found in France, but devolution is more contested in the United Kingdom. The results affirm the importance of public attitudes and political culture in understanding the performance of federal political systems and public support for federalist-type reforms.

Citizen support for a political system is fundamental to its viability, especially for democratic systems (e.g., Almond and Verba 1965; Easton 1975; Lipset 2004; Booth and Seligson 2009; Kincaid and Cole 2016; Cole et al. 2018; Stafford and Cole 2018). Most citizens must recognize and value the constitutional and operational principles that underlie their system and be willing to support them. Such support is particularly important for democratic federations (Burgess and Gagnon 2010) not only because democracies are less prevalent than non-democracies and susceptible to decline (Bermeo 2016; Freedom House 2020), but also because federal arrangements often hold the key to their endurance, involving delicate balances of power between diverse, constituent political communities (Moreno and Colino 2010). Questions also remain about why particular federations seem to struggle (e.g., Bruerton et al. 2017; Appleby, Aroney and John 2012; Vandamme 2012), and why, across federal and non-federal countries, devolutionary reforms consistent with federalism represent a common and apparently positive response to pressures on trust in government (Hooghe, Marks and Schakel 2010; Norris 1999).

Scholars have also long contended that federal systems require a federal political culture, especially because in democratic systems of voluntary shared rule and self-rule (Elazar 1987), the need for power-sharing between orders of government directly implies reliance on underlying norms of power-sharing and boundary respect (Bednar 2009) between the communities and governments involved in the federation--hence the importance of what Duchacek (1987: 346) described as the “blank space . . . tentatively called federal political culture.” As Elazar famously argued, “there is no federal system that is commonly viewed as successful . . . whose people do not think federal, that does not have a federal political culture and a strong will to use federal principles and

arrangements” (Elazar 1987: 192). The notion of citizen adherence to federal values, ideas and institutions is well rooted in the federalism literature (Livingston 1952; Wheare 1963; Brudmans 1969; Bednar 2009; Kincaid and Cole 2011; Fafard, Rocher and Côté 2010; Brown 2012a; Burgess 2012). Similarly, Watts (1998: 133) argued that “the effectiveness of a federal political system depends on the degree of public acceptance of the need to respect constitutional norms and structures, and on a spirit of compromise and tolerance.” The practice of federal values also is embodied in the German idea of *Bundestreue* (Villiers 1995).

Exploratory research has tested whether federal political culture is an empirical reality using data on citizen attitudes in Canada, Mexico and the United States (Cole, Kincaid and Rodriguez 2004; Fafard, Rocher and Côté 2010; Kincaid and Cole 2011). The results suggest that a federal political culture might be measurable, aligning with common observations about the character of federalism in the three federations, and suggesting “a viable concept” for understanding congruence between communities’ political culture and their institutions (Kincaid and Cole 2011: 72). However, these studies were limited in time and scope, and acknowledged a need for broader research.

At the same time, federal political culture is multi-faceted and contestable, making its measurement complex. While understandable at a broad level as “a set of orientations toward the federal political system and attitudes toward the role of self... in the system” (Duchacek 1987: 343-44), or the extent to which the political attitudes and beliefs of a population reflect attachment to key values and principles associated with federalism (Brown 2012a), tapping its content depends on how the values are defined and operationalized in research. As Burgess emphasized, the idea of a “federal spirit,” which the concept of federal political culture tends to connote, can be “as ambiguous as it is seductive” (2012: 3-4).

POLITICAL CULTURE AND FEDERAL SUCCESS

As a result, instead of attempting to measure all aspects of federal political culture, we sought to measure one major dimension of it, namely, citizen support for commonly found principles of federal constitutional and operational design. We call this a measure of ‘federal constitutional values’ as it measures the extent to which citizens value particular principles that are commonly regarded as defining federal systems. By *constitutional*, we mean fundamental legal structures and practices normally found in federal constitutions or their “frame of political society, organized through and by the law” (Sartori 1962: 860), whether the relevant principles are explicitly stipulated in a written constitution or accepted as operating in practice throughout its formal political institutions.

A comprehensive measure of federal political culture would include a wider range of features. Central, for many scholars, are the *sociological* and *psychological features* that influence how citizens perceive and relate to one another and to their decision-makers – as suggested by Elazar’s claim that citizens in a federal system must “think federal” (1987: 192) and Livingston’s argument that the value citizens place on societal diversity, generally, influences their culture and institutions (Livingston 1952). Others suggest that federal political culture is defined by not only civic responsibility and diversity but also efficiency and solidarity (Brugmans 1969). A comprehensive measure of federal political culture would need to recognize, as well, the diffuse ways in which fundamental attitudes about power-sharing manifest and are “transmitted from generation to generation through political socialization” and other means (Kincaid 1982: 6).

For these reasons, our study focuses on citizen attachment to *governmental arrangements* or *decision-making processes* which are definitional of federal systems,

where embedded in constitutional practices, with this attachment having been recognized as central to a federal political culture, even if not its entirety (Cole, Kincaid and Rodriguez 2004; Kincaid and Cole 2011). To reinforce our focus on just one key dimension, we also avoid the label “culture” and define our investigation as an examination of the value placed by citizens on certain constitutional and operational design principles of federalism, rather than attempting a total measure of federal political culture.

The focus on constitutional and operational design features is important because, while considerable attention has been paid to the successes and failures of federations, and to the political culture upon which success is ostensibly founded, Elazar’s statement that no federal system “commonly viewed as successful” lacks a federal political culture leaves open at least two important questions. First, whose view is the common one? Is the success of a federation to be judged on the expert opinions of scholars and practitioners of federalism, or do the views of citizens matter in deciding if federalism is successful in a given nation (e.g., Burgess 2007)? Second, is the extent of “thinking federal” important in unsuccessful federations (however defined) or in non-federations? What happens when the views and preferences of citizens do not match their polity’s institutional design? For example, recent evidence suggests that the logic of institutions matters to citizens in France (a multi-level but non-federal country), who place their trust in “those institutions able to embody a comprehensive legal order” (Cole et al 2018: 62), but it is unknown whether this means that French citizens think federally in any way about their multi-level system.

The answers to both questions rely on a deeper understanding of citizens’ attitudes toward the institutional features and dynamics of their systems as well as their satisfaction with those dynamics. Thus, we assess the ‘success’ of federations by measuring the

strength of federal constitutional values along with satisfaction with the current system in each federal country in our sample, and extend the examination to values, satisfaction and reform preferences in non-federal systems too. From these contexts, we can investigate links between citizen support and intergovernmental arrangements that might best satisfy citizen preferences – both to help explain existing support and to identify how particular changes might contribute to greater support, as well as help predict or explain the limits of reform.

We recognize that citizens' views on system performance and reform are also influenced by responses to particular policies and crises, including assessments of which order of government is, or should be, responsible for successes or failures. Such assessments may be arrived at with little or no awareness of federal “principles” (e.g., Jacobs 2017; Connolly et al. 2020; Gomez and Wilson 2018; Arceneaux 2006)—although this literature focuses mostly on the United States. Across federal and non-federal systems, there can be conflicting trends in citizens' views on the value of central or regional control over particular issues, giving rise at times to a ‘devolution paradox’ (Henderson et al 2013). However, by focusing on constitutional values irrespective of, and cutting across, specific distributions of responsibility, our inquiry provides a different lens on the relationship between perceived success and the nature of the political system, based not on immediate policy preferences but on longer-term compatibility between institutions, practices and values. Further, we measure federal constitutional values in most of our sample countries in two different years—2016 and 2018—as explained below.

MEASURING FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES

Our path to a measure of federal constitutional values began with previous discussions and studies of attitudes toward federalism, including survey items pertinent to institutional and operational features of federal political design, and experimentation with alternative items and wordings in Australia (Cole, Kincaid and Rodriguez 2004; Kincaid and Cole 2011; Brown 2012a; Brown 2012b; Brown et al 2016). A workshop at the 2014 World Congress of Political Science in Montreal also solicited critiques and ideas from a wide range of federalism scholars. Although we tested and achieved consistent results with a range of attributes readily found and valued in multi-level systems, for our present study conducted in 2016 and 2018, we settled on four values that are typical to or uniquely strong in federal systems, with the wordings set out in Table 1.

[Table 1 About Here]

Items A and B (divided power and capacity for legal diversity) are key constitutional features of nearly all federations, and were tested previously and fruitfully in Australia. Item C was developed (after testing alternate wordings) to capture the value of the geographic representation and participation in shared rule afforded by federal systems, while also connoting some degree of institutional pluralism. Item D was prompted by suggestions from participants in the Montreal workshop and seeks to capture the concepts of *Bundestreue* in Germany and *Rücksichtnahmepflicht* in Austria, which encompass such principles as comity, loyalty, fidelity, faithfulness, or duty of consideration in intergovernmental relations (Hrbek 2005; Taylor 2012). The U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized that preserving comity between dual sovereigns is a core value of the U.S. Constitution (*Younger v. Harris*, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45, 1971).

In developing these items, we chose not to use the word “federal”, so as to avoid complications arising from respondents’ lack of familiarity with the term and/or its frequently conflicting meanings. Even in federal countries, the meaning of “federal” or “federalism” may range from a centripetal integrationist connotation to a centrifugal disintegrationist one (Kincaid 1995; Burgess 2006).⁴ In either case, the concept may have positive or negative connotations or both, such as many Quebec citizens’ view of a “federal” position as favoring centralist integration, even while valuing the confederation as providing some defense against integration (Fafard, Rocher and Côté 2010; Herrera and Lachapelle 2010). Our decision to measure attachment to attributes of federalism independently of the term was reinforced by our desire to extend the study to two non-federal countries: the United Kingdom (where federalism is the “F” word for some) and France.

In order to develop the most useful measure, we considered whether it was optimum to combine items A-D in a raw, additive scale, or whether greater insight might be yielded by converting to an ordinal measure categorizing respondents by the degree of desirability of the items (an approach taken with a previous Australian measure: Brown 2012a; Brown 2012b). We tested both approaches using our 2016 results; each proved valid.⁵ Notwithstanding the diversity of items and inherent challenge of “reconciling principles that are, *prima facie*, contradictory” (Fafard, Rocher and Côté 2010: 21), unrotated factor analyses confirmed that, using either approach, all four items load onto one dimension, in all countries.⁶ Further, each approach correlated at .908 or above in all countries (see Table 4). Ultimately, we use the ordinal approach in the analyses that follow, using the 7-point scale outlined in Table 2, not only because it was otherwise no less suitable, but because it produced better effects sizes and more acceptable distributions

and degrees of skew (see Brown et al 2016), as well as consistent results for the five countries included in both surveys.

[Table 2 about here]

Our eight-country sample includes four federal countries commonly viewed in the literature as successful – Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and often the United States – and two federations regarded as challenged: Australia, marked by high fiscal centralization, low subsidiarity and conflictual intergovernmental relations (Evans 2014; Brown and Deem 2018), and Belgium, which has experienced government deadlocks, political turbulence, and elite-citizen disconnects (Vandamme 2012; Thijssen, Arras and Sinardet 2018; Roeder 2009). As already noted, we added two multi-level, but not formally federal countries: France and the United Kingdom. While no two federations are structurally the same, the six federal cases include all the developed, democratic, and classic federations of northern European heritage except Austria—which include presidential and parliamentary and civil-law and common-law federations--presenting a strong opportunity to examine the relationship between citizens' perceptions of their systems' success and their federal constitutional values, irrespective of other differences. The two non-federal cases provide opportunity to see if measurement of federal constitutional values is possible and relevant in these contexts, along with the relationship of those values with citizens' perceptions of system success. France, as the classic Jacobin state that defeated federalists in 1793 (Edmonds 1983), has undergone decentralization since the early 1980s (Bernier 1992; Dimitrova 2019). The United Kingdom has also undergone several important devolution waves (Jeffery 2009; Torrance 2020).

We used two rounds of an online survey designed for this study, the International Constitutional Values Survey, and collected data from nationally representative samples of residents in the above eight countries. The survey was translated from English into local languages (e.g., German, French) with assistance from native language speakers who were also federalism experts, to ensure words retained the same meaning across the translation. Country-specific terms (e.g., *Länder* in Germany, canton in Switzerland) were substituted as relevant (see Appendix 1, online). In May-June 2016, we engaged OmniPoll (Australia) and TNS Research (United Kingdom) to field our surveys using population-wide internet panels of adult citizens in five countries: Australia (LightSpeed Research, 4-10 May 2016), Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States (Ncompass omnibus survey, 2-6 June 2016). In 2017-2018, we repeated and extended the study to the three additional countries (France, Belgium and Switzerland), with the Australian data collected by OmniPoll/LightSpeed Research on 3-10 August 2017 (included under “2018” results below), and all seven remaining countries by KantarTNS/Ncompass on 19-24 April 2018.

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES OVER TIME AND COUNTRIES

Table 3 presents citizen responses from all countries regarding the desirability of each of the four items set out in Table 1 (A-D).⁷ The first important result is the degree of consistency in citizens’ perceptions between the 2016 and 2018 surveys, for the five countries surveyed in both years. This consistency indicates that the measure taps citizens’ deeper orientations toward governance rather than transient views in response to current political events. In Australia, Germany and the United States in particular, there is little if any difference in attitudes toward the four value items between the two surveys. There is a consistent small drop in attachment to each of the four items in the United

Kingdom, but the results are still broadly similar. The same is true in Canada on items A, C, and D. Overall, the findings give initial confidence that the measure captures fairly stable value attachments—as reinforced by analysis in the next section.

[Table 3 about here]

The second question is how do countries compare on these measures? Where are federal constitutional values strongest and weakest? Using the 2018 results for all eight countries, we see systematic variation between countries on the level of desirability of the values, viewed individually. Canada and Switzerland are always in the top four countries, in terms of desirability of all four items. Canadians are especially strongly attached to all four values, with more than three-quarters of Canadian respondents seeing A (dividing power), C (allowing different governments to get involved in national decision-making) and D (different levels being forced to respect each other) as very or somewhat desirable. The strength of federal constitutional values among U.S. respondents is only slightly weaker than those of Canadian and Swiss respondents.

By contrast, Belgians perceive the lowest desirability for three of the four items, and the second lowest for the fourth (item B, allowing different laws in different parts of the country, where Germany is lowest). While the constitutional values are otherwise also widely supported in Germany, this result for item B, with fewer than half of the respondents regarding capacity for different laws in different parts of the country as desirable, is consistent with findings that Germans reject great differences among their *Länder* (Scheller 2018), even when some diversity does arise from these jurisdictions' cultural sovereignty (Arends 2017). Germany's Basic Law includes the valued principle of "uniformity of living conditions" (Art. 72, para. 2). As seen below, adherence to this

uniformity principle reduces Germans' aggregate strength of federal constitutional values despite them showing the highest support for item D (*Bundestreue* or comity), and second highest for item C (shared rule).

Australians also express a comparatively weaker attachment to federal constitutional values than do Americans, Canadians, Germans or the Swiss (second lowest desirability for item A and fourth lowest on items B-D). The Australian pattern is remarkably similar to that in the United Kingdom – despite it being a non-federation – which ranks third lowest on items A and B and second lowest on items C and D. It becomes intriguing whether this apparent level of federal values is despite, or due to, the United Kingdom's history as a union of nations, with also recently devolved parliaments in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Especially notable is the high support for federal constitutional values in France, given it has the least federal structure. At least two-thirds of French respondents found each value desirable, rising to 81 percent for item A (dividing power between different levels of government). However, while this placed France highest on item A, it drops to third highest on B, fourth on C and sixth on D. This surprising evidence from France is discussed below.

For clearer comparison, Table 4 and Figure 1 rank the countries from weakest to strongest federal constitutional values, using the results of the aggregated ordinal scale explained in Table 2 (with its range of 1-7). For simplicity and to include all eight countries, only the 2018 results are shown. Belgium is confirmed as having the lowest mean federal constitutional values on this scale, and Switzerland, the highest.

[Table 4 and Figure 1 about here]

Figure 1 confirms there is great diversity in the pattern of attachments to particular values within the countries with different federal traditions. Regardless, or indeed at least partially as a result, the mean aggregate strength of federal constitutional values does end up varying significantly across the range of countries, including the federations, as shown in both Table 4 and Figure 1. A Games-Howell post-hoc analysis of a one-way ANOVA, which is robust against the skewed results, confirmed the significance of the differences between the mean federal constitutional values of the countries in most cases – especially at the extremes (i.e. between Belgium and Switzerland) and between the center (Germany or France) and the extremes.⁸

Results also indicate that the measure can identify differences in federal constitutional values *within* countries, at the regional level – for example, which cities and regions see more or less desirability in federal principles, thereby helping explain tensions within federal systems. In Appendix 2 (online), we present the means for the major regions of each country, ranked from weakest to strongest federal constitutional values for both the 2016 (5 country) and 2018 (8 country) results. These results should be viewed as indicative because the survey samples are nationally representative (including all major regions) but not necessarily regionally representative, as reflected in the frequently small numbers of respondents. Nevertheless, the consistency in variations not only between but also within countries, in each study, suggests the measure is also reliable at the regional level.

What factors are associated with strong federal constitutional values?

To better understand why federal constitutional values may vary between countries and regions, and what questions they can help resolve, we examined the relationship between federal constitutional values and a range of potential predictors using a linear regression

model (Table 5). The variables fall into several categories: demographic, satisfaction, trust and confidence, subsidiarity, reform, and respect (see Appendix 1, online, for full questions and items used).

Demographic factors of gender, age, and level of education are often associated with attitudinal differences. We also included respondents' self-perceived political views on a scale from left- (1) to right- (10) wing, as left- and right-wing parties and civil-society organizations are known to vary across time and place in their attitudes to federalism (Detterbeck, Renzsch and Kincaid 2015). We asked respondents how satisfied they were with the way democracy is working in their country, and how well, overall, they considered their current multi-level system of government to be working. Given the importance of trust, we asked respondents "how much trust and confidence" they had in each order of government "to do a good job carrying out its responsibilities". To test its relation to federal values, we measured support for subsidiarity on three dimensions: decentralism (belief that decisions of government should be made as close to the people as possible), non-absorption (a higher level should not take over or absorb the functions of a lower level), and support (higher levels should support and empower lower levels to make decisions) (Deem 2018). We also measured respondents' reform preferences (explained below) to test our expectation that support for devolutionary reforms should correlate with support for federal values, and establish if extent of reform preference (whether devolutionary or centralist) might indicate the extent of perceived problems with the system's current functioning. Lastly, in light of the importance of citizens' views about how their own jurisdiction is treated within their system (Kincaid and Cole 2016), we asked whether respondents felt their state, province or region "is treated with the respect it deserves" in their system of government.

[Table 5 about here]

The regression results (Table 5) confirm that many factors might explain federal constitutional values. All the above variables together account for between 7 percent (Germany) and 19 percent (Switzerland) of the total variation between mean values. However, none of the demographic factors proved to be a significant, consistent predictor of values across countries, suggesting the values are shared remarkably evenly throughout the population. Satisfaction with how well democracy was working also played little or no significant role, nor did trust and confidence in the performance of any order of government (other than local governments in Australia, Belgium and the United Kingdom). These results indicate that citizens hold strong (or weak) federal constitutional values irrespective of how well they feel government is functioning. Further, they tend to confirm that the values measure taps fundamental orientations rather than transient views or current system satisfaction. More surprising is that satisfaction with the working of the system itself did not predict federal values, other than in the United States and Switzerland. This is further explored below.

The standout result is that in all eight countries, respondents who believed their state or region is treated with a deserved level of respect held stronger federal constitutional values. This was the most important predictor of federal constitutional values in five of the eight countries, and still a significant and important factor in Switzerland and the United States. Only Australia showed a weaker pattern. The reasons for perceived respect may be many and varied, including, for example, whether a respondent's preferred political party is in power federally; nevertheless, the result accords with expectations. Regardless of specific or immediate reasons, perceptions of deserved respect should align with federal constitutional values because those perceptions

would indicate the system's values are working, consistently with the importance of mutual respect in a federal covenant (Davis 1978). This result also reinforces the question: what happens when federal constitutional values are *not* met with a feeling of deserved respect, giving rise to criticism of the system – federal or otherwise – and to pressures for reform.

CITIZEN SATISFACTION AND REFORM PREFERENCES

In addition to perceptions about whether one's state is treated with deserved respect, respondents' reform preferences also emerged as important. As seen in Table 5, those who desired greater devolution showed stronger attachment to federal constitutional values. While this finding is intuitively logical, it warrants further examination because it goes to the heart of the utility of studying federal constitutional values. Do citizens in "successful" federal countries "think federal," not only in their values but also in their ideas about whether and how the system needs to be improved? Equally, are citizens in unsuccessful or non-federal countries content with their system, or do they desire a system more consistent with federal values?

Table 5 shows responses to a question testing the degree and direction of reform sentiments, based on a long-term measure from Spain (Creus 2018), with preferred scenarios ranging from having only a single national government with no constituent states or regions, through the status quo (states or regions with the "same powers" as currently, to states having the ability to entirely secede. The full question is set out in Table 6. The results rank the countries from the most to the least support for the status quo.

[Table 6 about here]

Support for the status quo is highest in Switzerland (44.6 percent) and Canada (36.2 percent). These federations are commonly viewed as successful in the academic literature. Conversely, support for the status quo is lowest in Belgium, France and the United Kingdom. Belgium is federal, but citizen support for the system and for giving the regions more power is lowest there. Instead, Belgian support for a single national government (22.9 percent) is very substantially higher than in any of the other countries and was the most frequent Belgian response. This aligns with our finding that Belgians do not, comparatively, hold strong federal constitutional values. Australia scored next highest (17.2 percent) after Belgium for support for abolition of its states, consistently with longstanding reform debate; while the United States scored the lowest (4.5 percent) for this option. By contrast, giving more power to the constituent states was the single most frequent reform response in every country except Belgium.

The British and French results are again notable. They align in low support for the status quo and more support for reform, particularly devolution (especially in France where more than one-third of respondents wanted the regions to have more power). The strength of support for devolution and federal constitutional values in these countries raises important questions about possible public support for some type of federalism in these countries, irrespective of attitudes towards the term ‘federalism’ itself, and deserves considerable further exploration.

These variations in reform preferences confirm the association between devolutionary preferences and federal constitutional values. Table 6 explores this further by showing, in parentheses for each cell, the mean federal constitutional values of each group of respondents holding that reform preference for that country. Again, preference for centralization is most often associated with lower federal constitutional values. In all cases except Switzerland, the values mean increases from the group favouring the status-quo, to

those citizens favouring more powers for the states, although in all countries except Germany and the United Kingdom, the mean values then decrease among those favouring their states becoming an independent nation. This decrease accords with Freeman's observation that, while federalism must allow for subnational autonomy, too much autonomy means the system can no longer be called federal (Freeman 1893). Similarly, the mean federal constitutional values decrease from the status-quo option to the fewer-state-powers option and again to the abolish-the-states option, other than in France and the United States where paradoxically, the relatively small proportions of state abolitionists also score as quite federalist.

Satisfaction and federal constitutional values

Finally, to better understand the relationship between federal values and devolution preferences, we placed respondents in one of four groups determined by both strength of their federal constitutional values and satisfaction with their current multi-level system (see Figure 2). As shown earlier, we expected higher satisfaction with the current system to be associated with stronger federal constitutional values, but these associations are not strong across the whole sample. However, by categorizing respondents we can clarify the interplay between diffuse support for enduring federal constitutional values and more specific, but transient satisfaction with the current system (Easton 1975). At one end are respondents who overall were satisfied with the current multi-level system, and had strong federal constitutional values (high satisfaction, high federal values). Presumably, these respondents believe the current system meets their federal values to a reasonable degree or at least does not conflict with them. At the other end are respondents who were neither satisfied with the current system nor strongly attached to federal constitutional values (low satisfaction, low federal values). This might be due to perceptions of failures of their

federal system, breeding disenchantment with federalism, or because a respondent never liked federalism and is unhappy with their federal system even if others with high federal values believe it is functioning well.

Between these poles lie respondents with strong federal constitutional values who are unhappy with the current system (low satisfaction, high federal values) or who are satisfied with the current system but less attached to federalism (high satisfaction, low federal values). The former might be unhappy with their system because it does not align with their federal values (i.e., it is not federal enough); the latter are likely to encompass respondents for whom federalism is not an important feature of governance. Figure 2 presents the percentage of respondents who fell into each category in each country, ordered from lowest to highest number of high satisfaction/high federal values respondents.

[Figure 2 about here]

Belgians are the most dissatisfied, while French respondents scored a little less dissatisfied. Between 40 percent and 50 percent of Germans, Australians and Americans were satisfied and had strong federal constitutional values. This high satisfaction/high federal values group rises to about two-thirds of respondents in Canada and Switzerland—two federations usually deemed successful. At the other end, the countries with the lowest proportion of respondents attached to federal values *and* satisfied with the system were the two non-federations—France and the United Kingdom--and the comparatively new and turbulent federation, Belgium.

France and the United Kingdom have almost identical proportions of high satisfaction/high federal values (38.5 percent and 39.9 percent) and low satisfaction/low

federal values (14.3 percent and 15.9 percent) respondents. Being non-federal, both countries have similar proportions of people who expressed federal constitutional values and felt the current system works well enough and similar proportions of people who were unhappy with the current system but presumably would not embrace federalist reforms. However, the countries differed substantially on the other two groups. Some 37.8 percent of French respondents were not satisfied with the current system but reported strong federal constitutional values. Many of these respondents might be unhappy with the current system because it does not meet their federal constitutional values, including their devolutionary preferences (see Table 6 earlier). This also seems consistent with a recent study of trust in France, where for many specific policies, citizens were most trusting of a lower order of government they believed more suited to responsibility for that task (Cole et al. 2018).

In the United Kingdom, a quarter of respondents were dissatisfied with the current system and had strong federal values, but compared to the French, twice as many respondents were satisfied with the current system but not overly attached to federal values (18.6 percent compared to 9.4 percent in France). Hence, while only 22 percent of UK respondents would retain the status quo, the question of whether to move closer to or farther from federal principles is more contested than in France.

These issues also are contested in Belgium where respondents were fairly evenly split among the four groups. The tension between those who are content with the current system, those who ostensibly desire a more federal approach, and those who want a less federal approach (the single largest group) poses many quandaries. Our survey also found Belgians having comparatively low satisfaction with democracy. If Belgians feel excluded from government, perhaps they are skeptical that federalism serves their interests.

At the other end of the scale, the results confirm the reputations of Canada and Switzerland as successful federations where high proportions of citizens strongly hold federal constitutional values and are happy with their system. These are also the countries with least demand for reform. New questions arise, however, as to why another federation commonly regarded as successful (Germany) does not rank more highly in this group, and instead compares in many respects with Australia in terms of dissatisfaction and reform pressure – albeit with Figure 2 indicating that for Germans, compared with Australians, the answer lies in more federalism rather than less.

CONCLUSION: THE UTILITY OF MEASURING FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES

Our results illustrate the value and utility of measuring federal constitutional values alongside citizens' perceptions of the workability of their current system. Our primary measure of federal constitutional values taps four major attributes of federalism: divided power, legal diversity, shared rule, and comity. Our findings suggest the measure is stable and taps enduring underlying values, and that there are important differences in the strengths of federal constitutional values among and within our sample's six federations. Equally important, federal constitutional values are present in two non-federal countries that have experienced political pressures for devolution. Generally, supporters of devolution reforms in all countries held stronger federal values. Our measure, therefore, appears to tap important components of a more multifaceted federal political culture, and our findings substantiate its relevance for better understanding the success and viability of different political systems.

Ranked according to strength of federal constitutional values, Belgians scored lowest, followed by Australians, UK respondents, Germans, French respondents,

Americans, Canadians, and the Swiss. The latter three reported significantly stronger values than respondents in the other five countries. Overall, in terms of our measure of success, we found Canada and Switzerland to be most federally robust (i.e., strong federal constitutional values and high satisfaction with their current system) followed by the United States, but with German, Australian and especially Belgian federalism showing greater internal tensions.

Future research could refine, extend and replicate these measures, including by investigating different aspects of unity and diversity – for example, differentiating between support for fiscal diversity, given that virtually every federal system has a fiscal equalization policy aimed at promoting solidarity (Shah 2007), and cultural diversity, given the role of federations in protecting diverse territorially based cultural, linguistic, religious and national communities. Methodological caveats also apply, which should continue to be addressed by future research, especially sample-size limits in measuring federal values in subnational regions and the limits of Internet surveys (especially their production of high proportions of “can’t say” responses). Nevertheless, the consistency of our results across time and places supports the utility of the measure of federal constitutional values for helping compare and interpret federal governance dynamics, including pressures and directions for reform. Repeated surveys over a longer period can confirm the extent to which changes of government or other major developments affect these values, but as it stands, our surveys in two different years separated by a one-year interval – a longer time frame than most research in this field – give initial confidence that the measure captures fairly stable value attachments.

The results not only show that public satisfaction with federalism fits with common views of success in federal systems, but give new departure points for better understanding why a federation is seen as successful or not. The unexpected result for

Germany points to the important role of different components of federal values, with Germans' overall score for federal constitutional values being lower than the French, but explained by one item (B, diversity of laws) that rubs against the revered "uniformity of living conditions" provision in Germany's Basic Law. Notwithstanding, the extent of German dissatisfaction with the current system for the apparent reason that it is not federal enough, provides new insights into debate over which federations are successful, at least as seen by their own citizens, just as the results from the United Kingdom and especially France point to federal values having a role to play in contexts presumed to have been quite opposed to federalism.

Our finding that respondents who believed their region is treated with the respect it deserves held stronger federal constitutional values deserves further investigation, especially in light of previous research showing connections between trust in governments, especially the federation government, and citizens' beliefs that their region is treated equitably (Kincaid and Cole 2016). The interplay of federal constitutional values, trust in the various orders of government, and regional respect and equity is reinforced as important for viable federalism. Finally, our results make it more viable to measure federal constitutional values in a wider range of federal and non-federal systems, in order to establish the true role that federal values play, or could play, in the evolution of different systems – especially Latin American federations, all of which have centralist orientations and histories of periodic authoritarianism but where citizens' underlying federal values are unknown; non-Western federations such as Ethiopia, Nigeria, India and Pakistan; new federations such as Iraq and Nepal; and quasi-federations such as South Africa and Spain, all of which experience ongoing debates about the most viable directions of reform.

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ENDNOTES

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⁴ We draw on Kincaid’s claim that “at times... decentralization and subsidiarity are acceptable terms in political discourse, but not federalism”; “in some unitary states, decentralization may be embraced as acceptable reform while federalism is rejected as a radical departure from the possible and desirable” (Kincaid 1995: 30).

⁵ Notwithstanding the diversity of the four items, Cronbach’s alphas approached or exceeded the accepted .70 standard in all cases, with Germany producing the lowest alpha in both surveys (consistently with some of our conclusions):

- 2016: USA .713; UK .688; Australia .681; Canada .654; Germany .574.
- 2018: Belgium .770; France .735; USA .728; UK = .710; Australia .683; Canada .667; Switzerland .646; Germany .613.

⁶ In 2018, the Eigenvalues for the first component in each country were: Australia 2.059; Belgium 2.370; Canada 2.011; France 2.232; Germany 1.864; Switzerland 1.962; UK 2.150; USA 2.201. The second component had an Eigenvalue of less than 1.0 in every case.

⁷ As noted in Table 3, “can’t say” responses are not shown but were often substantial percentage -- generally lower in Australia (8.7-10.8 percent), but ranging from 9.8 percent to 20.6 percent in the other seven countries. We attribute the primary reason for this to the relative ease of selecting that (offered) option in online survey formats, rather than thinking about an answer, by comparison with telephone or in-person surveys where ‘can’t say’ or ‘don’t know’ responses are not usually initially offered. We also analysed the ‘can’t say’ responses to gauge the impact on our conclusions, and found that across the countries, ‘can’t say’ respondents were significantly more likely to be: ‘not at all interested’ in politics, or unable to say if they were interested; female; less educated; and 35-44 years old (arguably the most ‘time poor’ age bracket in most developed countries). Consistently with other research, ultimately we are therefore not surprised by these results and consider our conclusions to hold for the large majority of the

citizenry in each country, notwithstanding need for ongoing care to track the implications of ‘can’t say’ percentages for the political culture of any country.

⁸ $F(7, 22345) = 59.718, p < .001$.

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TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1. Federal constitutional values items

- A Having power divided up between different levels of government
- B Allowing different laws in response to varying needs and conditions in different parts of the country
- C Allowing the governments of the different part of [country] to get involved in decision-making on national issues
- D Different levels of government being forced to respect each other's roles and responsibilities when dealing with a problem

Question for Respondents

Please say if you think each of these is a **desirable** feature, or an **undesirable** feature of **having** different levels of government. (*Select one answer*).

Very desirable. Somewhat desirable. Somewhat undesirable. Very undesirable. Can't say.

Table 2. Federal constitutional values scale

| Code | Desirability of federal constitutional/operational features listed in Table 1 |
|------|---|
| 1 | Highly undesirable (all 4 features) |
| 2 | More features undesirable than not (3 undesirable, 1 desirable) |
| 3 | Equally undesirable and desirable (2 features undesirable, 2 desirable) |
| 4 | More features desirable than not (3 desirable, 1 undesirable) |
| 5 | All 4 features somewhat desirable, or 3 somewhat desirable and 1 very desirable |
| 6 | All 4 features desirable, with 2-3 being very desirable |
| 7 | All 4 features very desirable |

Table 3. Responses to federal constitutional values items (%)

| | Australia | | Canada | | Germany | | United States | | United Kingdom | | Belgium | France | Switzerland |
|--|-----------|------|--------|------|---------|------|---------------|------|----------------|------|---------|--------|-------------|
| | 2016 | 2018 | 2016 | 2018 | 2016 | 2018 | 2016 | 2018 | 2016 | 2018 | 2018 | 2018 | 2018 |
| A. Having power divided up between different levels of government | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Very desirable | 14.8 | 13.7 | 22.9 | 28.6 | 23.2 | 25.4 | 32.0 | 36.6 | 14.0 | 18.4 | 16.1 | 28.2 | 30.3 |
| Desirable | 43.9 | 50.3 | 47.9 | 51.8 | 39.0 | 48.5 | 38.3 | 42.9 | 47.1 | 51.4 | 41.0 | 52.7 | 48.4 |
| Undesirable | 19.6 | 25.9 | 11.1 | 15.4 | 15.4 | 17.3 | 10.3 | 15.0 | 16.7 | 20.5 | 26.2 | 13.9 | 15.4 |
| Very undesirable | 10.9 | 10.1 | 3.3 | 4.2 | 6.5 | 8.8 | 4.4 | 5.5 | 5.9 | 9.6 | 16.8 | 5.2 | 5.9 |
| B. Allowing different laws in response to varying needs and conditions in different parts of [country] | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Very desirable | 16.0 | 16.3 | 21.4 | 25.1 | 10.9 | 14.6 | 22.9 | 27.0 | 15.9 | 17.4 | 15.5 | 22.1 | 22.7 |
| Desirable | 36.1 | 41.6 | 38.2 | 45.6 | 28.8 | 32.4 | 37.6 | 41.7 | 33.9 | 38.3 | 38.3 | 44.2 | 41.5 |
| Undesirable | 19.4 | 24.4 | 17.0 | 19.6 | 20.9 | 27.6 | 15.1 | 20.9 | 19.4 | 23.0 | 22.5 | 20.3 | 22.3 |
| Very undesirable | 18.8 | 17.7 | 9.7 | 9.7 | 23.5 | 25.4 | 9.2 | 10.4 | 16.6 | 21.2 | 23.7 | 13.3 | 13.5 |
| C. Allowing the governments of different parts of [country] to get involved in decision-making on national issues | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Very desirable | 23.7 | 22.2 | 29.3 | 29.9 | 23.3 | 31.1 | 21.1 | 28.4 | 21.1 | 27.2 | 18.3 | 27.5 | 37.4 |
| Desirable | 43.6 | 52.4 | 43.4 | 48.4 | 45.9 | 49.7 | 36.8 | 45.8 | 44.1 | 45.1 | 35.3 | 51.3 | 50.6 |
| Undesirable | 14.8 | 18.8 | 10.8 | 16.5 | 10.5 | 14.2 | 17.4 | 16.5 | 13.5 | 17.6 | 25.1 | 15.2 | 9.4 |
| Very undesirable | 9.0 | 6.6 | 2.9 | 5.2 | 4.2 | 5.1 | 7.2 | 9.2 | 6.0 | 10.2 | 21.3 | 6.0 | 2.7 |
| D. Different levels of government being forced to respect each other's roles and responsibilities when dealing with a problem | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Very desirable | 35.0 | 30.2 | 33.7 | 41.9 | 31.8 | 36.0 | 39.5 | 45.3 | 28.4 | 32.2 | 22.9 | 25.8 | 38.5 |
| Desirable | 40.3 | 53.9 | 42.5 | 43.4 | 45.1 | 53.4 | 33.6 | 38.8 | 43.0 | 47.2 | 42.1 | 54.8 | 50.6 |
| Undesirable | 11.0 | 12.2 | 9.2 | 12.1 | 7.4 | 7.9 | 9.2 | 11.8 | 10.1 | 15.2 | 21.0 | 14.0 | 8.4 |
| Very undesirable | 4.9 | 3.7 | 2.2 | 2.6 | 1.7 | 2.7 | 3.5 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 5.4 | 14.0 | 5.3 | 2.6 |

'Can't say' not shown.

Table 4. Federal constitutional values – eight countries compared (2018)

| | Belgium | Australia | United Kingdom | Germany | France | United States | Canada | Switzerland |
|---|-------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|
| Strength of federal constitutional values (mean) (range 1-7) (see Table 2) | 3.49 | 4.01 | 4.03 | 4.13 | 4.37 | 4.50 | 4.51 | 4.54 |
| Sample Size | 1021 | 1526 | 1019 | 1011 | 1021 | 1041 | 1034 | 1000 |
| N* | 819 | 1382 | 821 | 853 | 824 | 844 | 916 | 893 |
| Standard Deviation (mean) | 1.75 | 1.47 | 1.61 | 1.38 | 1.57 | 1.64 | 1.47 | 1.41 |
| Skewness [†] | .167 | -.138 | -.123 | -.030 | -.444 | -.340 | -.331 | -.348 |
| Kurtosis ^{††} | -.901 | -.425 | -.634 | .067 | -.199 | -.498 | -.186 | .023 |
| Correlation between raw additive and ordinal scales | .937** | .933** | .939** | .908** | .935** | .945** | .928** | .919** |

* Excluding ‘can’t say’ responses for 2 or more of the four items (Table 1). To maximise valid responses for analysis, where respondents provided ‘Can’t say’ for 1 out of the four items, this response was replaced with an imputed value calculated as the average of the responses on the other three items (e.g., a respondent who saw items A-C as ‘desirable’ but ‘Couldn’t say’ for item D was coded as having selected ‘desirable’ for item D).

† Skewness refers to the asymmetry of the probability distribution (i.e. how far removed a distribution is from a ‘normal’ or ‘bell curve’ distribution). In all countries, the measure of skewness fell within an acceptable range, indicating the data is reasonably normally distributed in each case.

†† Kurtosis refers to the height of the tails in the distribution (i.e. how sharply peaked or flat the bell curve distribution is). In all countries, the results for kurtosis fell within an acceptable range, indicating that the data is reasonably normally distributed in each case.

**Significant at $p < .001$.

Figure 1. Federal constitutional values – eight countries compared (2018)




Table 5. Log-linear Regression – Predictors of federal constitutional values

| | | BEL | AUS | UK | GER | FRA | US | CAN | SWI |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------|------------|-----------|------------|------------|-----------|------------|------------|
| | | β | β | β | β | β | β | β | β |
| DEMOGRAPHIC | Gender | .055 | .035 | .128** | .019 | .078* | .074 | .093* | -.021 |
| | Age | .000 | -.093** | .033 | -.019 | .073 | .026 | -.048 | -.022 |
| | Education^{ix} | .014 | .056 | .062 | .005 | -.018 | .036 | -.025 | -.026 |
| | Income | -.017 | -.019 | .038 | -.033 | .011 | -.062 | -.011 | -.046 |
| | Political L>R | -.032 | .000 | -.051 | .021 | .000 | -.042 | .054 | .013 |
| SATIS-FACTION | with Democracy | -.125* | .017 | -.038 | -.040 | -.008 | .001 | .033 | -.012 |
| | with Current System | .109 | .057 | .007 | .034 | .017 | .182** | .058 | .151** |
| TRUST & CONFIDENCE | Federal Level | -.112 | -.011 | -.021 | -.028 | .065 | -.060 | .006 | .115* |
| | State Level | .074 | .074 | .036 | .117 | .046 | .008 | .034 | -.024 |
| | Local Level | .124* | .142*** | .141* | -.017 | .035 | .073 | .071 | -.053 |
| SUBSIDIARITY | Decentralism | .051 | .061* | .110** | .038 | .128** | .050 | .065 | .190*** |
| | Non-absorp | .036 | .037 | -.009 | .082* | .096* | .093* | .024 | .085* |
| | Support | .052 | .068* | .086 | -.070 | .073 | .082* | .057 | .054 |
| REFORM | Direction (devolve) | .058 | .157*** | .149*** | .155*** | .102* | .044 | .162*** | .094* |
| | Extent | -.069 | .062 | .056 | .054 | .114** | .053 | -.034 | -.032 |
| STATE RESPECT | | .200*** | .074* | .250*** | .196*** | .162*** | .181*** | .209*** | .162*** |
| N | | 819 | 1382 | 821 | 853 | 824 | 844 | 916 | 893 |
| Adj. R² | | .105 | .142 | .147 | .070 | .080 | .102 | .155 | .188 |
| F | | 5.715*** | 12.488*** | 7.821*** | 4.441*** | 4.619*** | 5.409*** | 6.138*** | 6.894*** |

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

^{ix} Varied between countries.


Table 6. Reform preferences (%) and federal constitutional values (means), ordered by most to least support for status quo

Question: Now a question about [COUNTRY]’s system of government in the **future** – say, 20 years from now. Thinking about the structure of [COUNTRY]’s system of government, which **one** of the following systems do **you** personally think would be the **best** system in the future?

| | BEL % (FCV mean) | FRA % (FCV mean) | UK % (FCV mean) | GER % (FCV mean) | AUS % (FCV mean) | USA % (FCV mean) | CAN % (FCV mean) | SWI % (FCV mean) |
|---|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| A system... | | | | | | | | |
| with a single national government but no state* governments | 22.9% (3.06) | 8.9% (4.36) | 9.0% (3.66) | 9.1% (3.70) | 17.2% (3.59) | 4.5% (4.79) | 6.1% (3.68) | 7.5% (3.94) |
| in which state* govts have fewer powers than they do now | 11.8% (3.50) | 9.3% (4.04) | 12.4% (3.87) | 14.1% (3.87) | 14.6% (3.86) | 10.8% (3.87) | 14.7% (4.27) | 15.2% (4.17) |
| where the state* govts have same powers as they do now | 17.1% (3.73) | 20.0% (4.08) | 22.0% (4.06) | 29.9% (4.19) | 30.5% (4.05) | 32.0% (4.58) | 36.2% (4.57) | 44.6% (4.75) |
| in which state* govts have more powers than they do now | 17.4% (4.04) | 34.2% (4.75) | 25.3% (4.25) | 21.7% (4.33) | 21.3% (4.42) | 22.6% (4.80) | 16.5% (4.73) | 15.7% (4.71) |
| that allows a state* to become an independent nation | 5.5% (3.10) | 3.9% (4.11) | 6.5% (4.53) | 6.0% (4.55) | 3.3% (4.37) | 4.5% (4.29) | 5.4% (4.52) | 3.7% (4.48) |
| Don’t know / can’t say | 25.3% | 23.7% | 24.8% | 19.2% | 13.1% | 25.6% | 21.1% | 13.3% |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| <i>Correlation between devolution preference & federal constitutional values</i> | | | | | | | | |
| <i>r</i> | .151 | .102 | .153 | .174 | .193 | .076 | .152 | .152 |
| <i>p</i> | <.001 | .006 | <.001 | <.001 | <.001 | .039 | <.001 | <.001 |

*In Canada, ‘province/provincial’; Germany, ‘Land’; UK, ‘region/regional’

Figure 2. Satisfaction with current system of government, by strength of federal constitutional values



**Federal Constitutional Values and Citizen Attitudes to Government:
Explaining Federal System Viability and Reform Preferences in Eight Countries**

Appendix 1 (Online)

**Select Questions – International Constitutional Values Survey
September 2017 (Australia) May-June 2018 (USA, Canada, Germany, UK, Belgium, Switzerland, France)**

B3 As you probably know, **INSERT COUNTRY [OR UK: INSERT SCOTLAND/WALES/NORTHERN IRELAND/ENGLAND]** has a system of government with

| [1] Australia | [2] USA | [3] Canada | [4] Germany | [5] Belgium | [6] Switzerland | [7] France |
|---|--|--|---|---|--|------------|
| three main levels – | | | | | | |
| the federal government, state government and local government (local councils) | the federal government, provincial government, and local government (local councils). | the federal government, lander government, and local government (local councils). | the federal government, regional government, local government (including provinces and municipalities) | the federal government, canton government, and municipal government (local councils) | the national government, regional government, and local government. | |

| UK | | | |
|---|---|---|--|
| [8] Scotland | [9] Wales | [10] Northern Ireland | [11] England |
| three main levels – the <i>national UK</i> government (run from Westminster), | | | two main levels – the <i>national</i> government (run from Westminster) and local government – split between <i>county</i> and <i>district</i> councils and/or <i>Unitary Authorities</i> . |
| the Scottish Government and local government (local councils). | the Welsh Government and local government (county/ local councils). | the Northern Irish Government and local government (district councils). | |

How well would you say this system of government works in **INSERT COUNTRY [OR UK: INSERT ENGLAND / SCOTLAND / WALES / NORTHERN IRELAND]**? *(Select one answer)*

| | |
|---|-----------------|
| 1 | Very well |
| 2 | Quite well |
| 3 | Not very well |
| 4 | Not at all well |
| 5 | Can't say |

B4 Overall, how much **trust and confidence** do you have in each level of government **to do a good job** carrying out its responsibilities?
(Select one answer per row)

| | | A great deal of trust and confidence | A fair amount | Not very much | None at all | Can't say |
|----------|-----------|---|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-----------|
| A | See below | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 5 |
| B | See below | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 5 |
| C | See below | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 5 |

| | Australia & USA | Canada | Germany | Belgium | Switzerland | France |
|----------|---------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|--------------------|----------------------------------|
| A | The Federal level of government | | | | | The National level of government |
| B | The State | The provincial | The lander | The region | The canton | The region |
| | level of government | | | | | |
| C | The Local | | | | The municipal | The local |
| | level of government | | | | | |

| UK | | | |
|---|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Scotland | Wales | Northern Ireland | England |
| The National (UK) level of government/ Westminster Parliament | | | The National level of government |
| The country - Scottish government | The country - Welsh government | The country - the Northern Irish | The local - county council - |
| The local - local council - | The local - county council - | The local - district council | The local -district council - |
| level of government | | | |

C2 Please say if you think each of these is a **desirable** feature, or an **undesirable** feature of **having** different levels of government
(Select one answer per row)

| | | Very desirable | Somewhat desirable | Somewhat undesirable | Very undesirable | Can't say |
|---|--|----------------|--------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|-----------|
| A | Having power divided up between different levels of government | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 99 |
| B | Allowing different laws in response to varying needs and conditions in different parts of INSERT COUNTRY | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 99 |
| C | Allowing the governments of different parts of INSERT COUNTRY to get involved in decision-making on national issues | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 99 |
| D | Different levels of government being forced to respect each other's roles and responsibilities when dealing with a problem | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 99 |
| E | Different levels of government having power to hold each other to account for problems | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 99 |
| F | Different governments arguing over the best way to solve a particular problem | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 99 |
| G | Allowing people who don't like a policy to lobby more than one level of government to change it | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 99 |
| H | Being able to elect different political parties at different levels of government [AUSTRALIA ONLY] | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 99 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
| I | Different governments arguing over who is responsible for a particular problem [AUSTRALIA ONLY] | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 99 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|

C3 To what extent do you **agree** or **disagree** with each of these statements? *(Select one answer per row)*

| | | | | | | |
|---|--|----------------|----------------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------|
| | | Strongly agree | Somewhat agree | Somewhat disagree | Strongly disagree | Can't say |
| A | The different levels of government in INSERT COUNTRY are working well together | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 99 |
| C | Your Q is treated with the respect it deserves in INSERT COUNTRY 's system of government | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 99 |

| | | | | | | | |
|----------|----------------------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|--------------------|---------------|-----------|
| | Australia & USA | Canada | Germany | Belgium | Switzerland | France | UK |
| Q | state | province | land | region | canton | region | region |

D4 **Australia:** Thinking about the structure of Australia's system of government, what do **you** personally think would be the **best** system in the future – say, 20 years from now. ...

D6 **Australia:** This next question is about some other slightly **different** alternatives for our system of government. Which **one** of the following systems you would **most** prefer? *(Select one answer)*

USA, Canada, Germany, UK: Now a question about [INSERT COUNTRY]'s system of government in the **future** – say, 20 years from now. Thinking about the structure of [INSERT COUNTRY]'s system of government, which **one** of the following systems do **you** personally think would be the **best** system in the future?

| | |
|----|--|
| 1 | A system with a single national government but no Q governments |
| 2 | A system in which Q governments have fewer powers than they do now |
| 3 | A system where the Q governments have the same powers as they do now |
| 4 | A system in which Q governments have more powers than they do now |
| 5 | A system that allows a Q to become an independent nation |
| 99 | Can't say |

| | | | | | | | |
|----------|----------------------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|--------------------|---------------|-----------|
| | Australia & USA | Canada | Germany | Belgium | Switzerland | France | UK |
| Q | state | province | land | region | canton | region | region |

Appendix 2 (Online). Federal constitutional values by region

| 2016 | | | FCV Mean (Range 1-7) (see Table 2) | 2018 | | | |
|----------------------|-----------|-----|---------------------------------------|------|----------------------|---------------------|-----------|
| Region | Country | N | | N | Region | Country | |
| | | | 2.90 | | | | |
| | | | 2.92 | 98 | Oost-Vlaanderen | Belgium | |
| | | | 2.95 | | | | |
| | | | 3.00 | 125 | Antwerpen | Belgium | |
| | | | 3.05 | | | | |
| | | | 3.10 | | | | |
| | | | 3.15 | | | | |
| | | | 3.19 | 86 | West-Vlaanderen | Belgium | |
| | | | 3.20 | | | | |
| | | | 3.25 | | | | |
| | | | 3.30 | | | | |
| | | | 3.35 | 72 | Limburg | Belgium | |
| | | | 3.40 | | | | |
| | | | 3.45 | | | | |
| | | | 3.46 | 80 | Vlaams-Brabant | Belgium | |
| | | | 3.50 | | | | |
| | | | 3.52 | 59 | Tas | Australia | |
| | | | 3.55 | | | | |
| | | | 3.60 | | | | |
| | | | 3.65 | | | | |
| | | | 3.68 | 31 | ACT and NT | Australia | |
| | | | 3.70 | 95 | Bruxelles-Capitale | Belgium | |
| | | | 3.75 | | | | |
| ACT & NT Territory | Australia | 23 | 3.78 | | | | |
| | | | 3.80 | | | | |
| | | | 3.81 | 154 | South Australia | Australia | |
| | | | 3.85 | | | | |
| | | | 3.86 | 207 | England Midlands & E | Britain | |
| | | | 3.87 | 43 | Wales | Britain | |
| | | | 3.88 | 81 | Liege | Belgium | |
| | | | 3.90 | 19 | Nth Ireland | Britain | |
| | | | 3.93 | 41 | Namur | Belgium | |
| | | | 3.95 | | | | |
| South Australia | Australia | 127 | 3.95 | 3.96 | 227 | Queensland | Australia |
| Queensland | Australia | 188 | 3.96 | 3.96 | 44 | Brabant wallon | Belgium |
| England South | Britain | 179 | 3.97 | 3.98 | 188 | England Sth | Britain |
| Victoria | Australia | 284 | 3.99 | 3.98 | 81 | Hainaut | Belgium |
| | | | 4.00 | 4.00 | 178 | West Australia | Australia |
| | | | 4.02 | 355 | Victoria | Australia | |
| | | | 4.05 | | | | |
| | | | 4.08 | 192 | England Nth | Britain | |
| | | | 4.08 | 192 | East Germany | Germany | |
| England North | Britain | 199 | 4.09 | 4.09 | 135 | Bavaria | Germany |
| Greater London | Britain | 116 | 4.10 | 4.10 | 93 | Baden Wuertt | Germany |
| Western Australia | Australia | 131 | 4.10 | 4.10 | 188 | Nordrhein-Westfalen | Germany |
| England Midlands & E | Britain | 244 | 4.11 | 4.11 | 109 | SW Germany | Germany |
| North Rheinland etc | Germany | 256 | 4.13 | 4.13 | 378 | New South Wales | Australia |

| | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|-----------|-----|------|------|------|-----|-----------------------|-------------|
| Hessen & Thuringen | Germany | 65 | 4.14 | 4.15 | | | | |
| Bremen, Hamburg, Nth | Germany | 159 | 4.16 | | | | | |
| Berlin, Brand, Saxony | Germany | 155 | 4.17 | | 4.17 | 99 | Greater London | Britain |
| | | | | 4.20 | 4.20 | 52 | Pays de la Loire | France |
| | | | | | 4.22 | 61 | Alsace Champagne | France |
| | | | | | 4.23 | 73 | Scotland | United K |
| | | | | 4.25 | 4.25 | 34 | Centre val de Loire | France |
| | | | | | 4.25 | 40 | Normandie | France |
| | | | | | 4.28 | 136 | North West Germany | Germany |
| | | | | | 4.28 | 102 | Auvergne Rhone-Alps | France |
| | | | | | 4.28 | 136 | NW Switzerland | Switzerland |
| Wales | Britain | 52 | 4.29 | | 4.29 | 87 | Nord Pas de Calais | France |
| Bavaria | Germany | 126 | 4.29 | 4.30 | | | | |
| | | | | | 4.31 | 71 | Aquitaine Limousin | France |
| | | | | | | | | |
| South Central E US | USA | 50 | 4.34 | | | | | |
| Tasmania | Australia | 44 | 4.34 | 4.35 | 4.35 | 107 | Pacific US | USA |
| | | | | | 4.35 | 73 | Provence Alps Cote D' | France |
| | | | | | 4.37 | 171 | South Atlantic US | USA |
| Mid-Atlantic (NE-US) | USA | 116 | 4.38 | | | | | |
| Pacific US | USA | 126 | 4.38 | | | | | |
| Midwest WNC US | USA | 60 | 4.38 | 4.40 | 4.40 | 72 | Central Switzerland | Switzerland |
| | | | | | 4.41 | 128 | Mid Atlantic US | USA |
| Atlantic (CAN) | Canada | 62 | 4.42 | | 4.44 | 199 | Quebec | Canada |
| Scotland | Britain | 69 | 4.42 | | 4.44 | 39 | Bourgogne | France |
| Midwest ENC US | USA | 138 | 4.44 | 4.45 | | | | |
| | | | | | 4.47 | 144 | Ile de France | France |
| New England (NE-US) | USA | 37 | 4.46 | | 4.48 | 353 | Ontario | Canada |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | 4.50 | 4.50 | 66 | Atlantic (CAN) | Canada |
| South Atlantic US | USA | 195 | 4.51 | | 4.51 | 59 | Sth Central E US | USA |
| British Columbia | Canada | 101 | 4.53 | | 4.52 | 180 | Lake Geneva | Switzerland |
| | | | | | 4.54 | 144 | Midwest ENC US | USA |
| Quebec | Canada | 214 | 4.57 | 4.55 | 4.57 | 106 | Alberta | Canada |
| Alberta | Canada | 103 | 4.57 | | 4.58 | 213 | Espace Mittelland | Switzerland |
| | | | | | 4.59 | 130 | British Columbia | Canada |
| Ontario | Canada | 342 | 4.59 | | 4.59 | 70 | Languedoc-Roussillon | France |
| | | | | 4.60 | 4.61 | 83 | Sth Central W US | USA |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | 4.64 | 51 | Bretagne | France |
| | | | | | 4.64 | 128 | Eastern Switzerland | Switzerland |
| | | | | 4.65 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| Mountain US | USA | 63 | 4.67 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | 4.70 | 4.70 | 164 | Zurich | Switzerland |
| | | | | | 4.70 | 57 | Midwest WNC | USA |
| | | | | | 4.71 | 61 | Mountain US | USA |
| | | | | | 4.71 | 62 | Manitoba & Sask | Canada |
| | | | | 4.75 | | | | |
| | | | | | 4.76 | 34 | New England (NE-US) | USA |
| | | | | 4.80 | | | | |
| South Central West US | USA | 81 | 4.82 | 4.85 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| Northern Ireland | Britain | 21 | 4.91 | 4.90 | | | | |
| Manitoba + Sask | Canada | 57 | 4.93 | | | | | |
| | | | | 4.95 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | 5.00 | 5.00 | 16 | Luxembourg | Belgium |