

Balancing with Jokowi's Characteristics: A Neoclassical Realism Approach to Indonesia's Foreign and Security Policies in the South China Sea

Author

Arif, M

Published

2021

Journal Title

Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs

Version

Accepted Manuscript (AM)

DOI

[10.1177/23477970211041455](https://doi.org/10.1177/23477970211041455)

Rights statement

Arif, M, Balancing with Jokowi's Characteristics: A Neoclassical Realism Approach to Indonesia's Foreign and Security Policies in the South China Sea, Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2021, 8 (3), pp. 370-390. Copyright 2021 The Authors. Reprinted by permission of SAGE Publications.

Downloaded from

<http://hdl.handle.net/10072/417021>

Griffith Research Online

<https://research-repository.griffith.edu.au>

Balancing with Jokowi's characteristics: A neoclassical realism approach to Indonesia's foreign and security in the South China Sea

Muhamad Arif

Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia

The multi-layered problems in the South China Sea have for long been prime security concerns to Indonesia. Indonesia cannot afford to see its emerging economy disrupted by conflict in the South China Sea. Moreover, disputes over the rights to exploit natural resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) near the Natuna Islands have allowed numerous incursions by foreign maritime law enforcement and fishing vessels, especially China, challenging Indonesia's territorial integrity. In recent years, under President Joko Widodo (Jokowi), there appears to be a shift in Indonesia's approach to the problem. Its diplomacy has been more active. It continues to push for the conclusion of the South China Sea code of conduct, made its latest attempt to regulate great powers' behaviour in the region through an ASEAN Indo-Pacific outlook, and publicly demanded China respect the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). More notably, Jokowi's Indonesia has moved away from the previously cautious approach to safeguarding its territory from China's encroachment. Its armed forces have also been restructured and redeployed to match the increasing level of threats.

Has Indonesia finally embarked on a balancing act against the rising China, as dominant realist theories in International Relations would have predicted (Mearsheimer, 2003; Waltz, 1979)?

How distinct is the Indonesian approach to world politics under Jokowi compared to his

predecessors? How should we understand the nature of Indonesian foreign and security policy in the South China Sea under President Jokowi? These are the questions that guide this article.

The objectives of this article are twofold. First, it seeks to posit Jokowi's foreign and security policies in the broader historical context of Indonesian foreign and security policymaking. It argues that throughout history, Indonesia's responses to its external environment, as manifested in its foreign and security policies, have been significantly influenced by a range of domestic factors including, but not limited to, leaders' personality and his/her attitude to international politics. The domestic factors' dominant role has led different Indonesian leaders to respond differently -in terms of timing, approach, and substance- to relatively similar constraints and opportunities presented by their respective external environment. Indonesia's recent foreign and security policies in the South China Sea fits comfortably in this pattern.

Second, this article builds upon the historical observation to understand Indonesia's foreign and security policy under Jokowi using a neoclassical realism framework that places systemic factors as the independent variables with domestic-level factors as intervening variables. In achieving this objective, this article examines Indonesia's foreign and security policies in the South China Sea under Jokowi. It argues that there has been a shift in Indonesia's approach to the South China Sea problem, characterised by a more active diplomacy and a more assertive approach to territorial integrity. Both components, however, are not deterministic products of external threats as predicted by realist theories. Instead, they are influenced by Jokowi's personality, attitude towards foreign and security policy, and preoccupation of his administration with the domestic agenda.

Indonesia under Jokowi has not embarked on an effective and coherent balancing strategy against the rise of China's power in the South China Sea that poses to its territorial integrity and interests (E. A. Laksmana, 2016). However, it has not left the threat from China in the

South China Sea unanswered either (Schweller, 2004; Syailendra, 2017). In fact, what Indonesia has been doing is can perhaps be characterised as balancing with Jokowi's characteristics.

In building these arguments, this article will proceed as follows. The next section will provide a brief history of Indonesia's foreign and security policies since its independence, highlighting the role that domestic factors play in influencing Indonesian foreign and security policymaking in the way of systemic pressure. After a review of neoclassical realism literature, the third section will examine Indonesia's foreign and security policy in the South China Sea under Jokowi. This article will be closed with some concluding remarks.

Indonesian foreign policy: Between systemic and domestic factors

A closer look into the history of Indonesian international political behaviour, as manifested in its foreign and security policies, would likely raise International Relations scholars' eyebrows. Indonesia once embarked on a revisionist, aggressive foreign policy before switching to a more low-profile, pragmatist one almost overnight. Indonesia invaded and annexed Portuguese Timor, a foreign territory, when every systemic factor seemed to indicate that it would do otherwise (Arif, 2013). Its foreign policy has never really been Islamist despite Indonesia being the world's largest Muslim country (Sukma, 2003). On the other hand, efforts to incorporate maritime outlook into its foreign policy doctrine/grand strategy have never gained momentum.

It is always challenging to draw a pattern from the history of Indonesian foreign policy. Indeed, as one scholar notes, since attaining its recognised independence in 1949, many have considered Indonesia's foreign relations irrational and ambiguous (Karim, 2004 as cited in Novotny, 2010, p. 4). It is regarded as "irrelevant to the nation's real interests" (assuming there

is one) (Weinstein, 1972 as cited in Novotny, 2010, p. 4), has been criticised as having a "lack of policy substance," "haphazard" and "sporadic without clear direction, subject to regional and international events" (Anwar, 2005 as cited in Novotny, 2010, p. 4; Suryodiningrat, 2006).

Paradoxically, if there is anything consistent about Indonesia, it might be that its responses to its external environment have been mostly inconsistent due to the influence of a range of domestic factors. For instance, throughout the Cold War, facing relatively similar external pressures, Indonesian leaders came up with different sets of responses. The "*bebas dan aktif*" [independent and active] principle, which has later continued to serve as the conceptual framework on which Indonesian foreign policy is anchored, was first coined during the country's formative years when the Cold War international order was taking its shape. Mohammad Hatta, then prime minister who formulated the principle, argued that in the face of the developing rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union and the prospect of such rivalry would aggravate "the acute political differences within the country's political leadership" a foreign policy that aligned Indonesia with either bloc of great powers should be avoided (Sukma, 1995, p. 308). The "*bebas dan aktif*" principle, in other words, was very much about defining Indonesian position in the international community as it was for cultivating national unity amidst the fragile state-building.

While facing a similar external environment and were generally bound by the "*bebas and aktif*" principle, two Indonesian presidents during the Cold War, Sukarno -especially in the later period of his administration- and Suharto, took diametrically different foreign policy directions. During the Guided Democracy period, roughly between 1959-1966, Sukarno led Indonesia to embark on confrontational foreign policy against the West.¹ As Bunnell (1966) argued, while

¹ He established a Jakarta-Phnom Penh-Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang axis, discarded cooperation with the Western countries and received a large amount of aid from the Soviet Union in its campaign to retake the West Irian from the Dutch. He also launched a Confrontation policy against the newly established Federation of Malaya, which Sukarno considered as a neo-colonialism project.

rooted in its particularly traumatic emancipation from Dutch colonialism, Indonesia's militant foreign policy under 'guided diplomacy' depended primarily on Sukarno's world views. An admirer of the idea of never-ending revolution and neo-Marxism-Leninism, Sukarno viewed contemporary history as a dialectic struggle between the old capitalist nations of the West and the emergent nations and the new socialist states (Bunnell, 1966, p. 38).

Sukarno also found foreign policy as an extension of his approach to internal politics. Sukarno's call for the so-called 'new emerging forces' to form a common front against the 'neo-imperialist' powers was parallel with the NASAKOM (*nasionalis, agama, komunis*/nationalist, religious, communist) philosophy that he used to consolidate power domestically (Bunnell, 1966).² In Sukma's words, what Sukarno did was the radicalisation of internal politics through the parallel radicalisation of foreign policy (Sukma, 1995, p. 309).

General Suharto, who replaced Sukarno, took a drastic turn. Albeit the relatively constant distribution of power at the international system (it was as 'Cold War' in 1968 as it was in 1965), he abandoned the left-leaning foreign policy, brought Indonesia closer to the Western bloc from which it sought much-needed foreign aid to rebuild the country's collapsing economy, and ended confrontation with Indonesia's neighbours. A normalised relationship with Malaysia and other neighbouring Southeast Asian countries were indeed crucial for Suharto to focus on Indonesia's domestic economic development from which he drew legitimacy for his authoritarian rule.

With Suharto at its apex, the military emerged as the most influential foreign policy actor during the *Orde Baru* (New Order). Suryadinata argues that during this period, political cultures, including Javanese culture (nominal Islam) and feudalism/authoritarianism that was

² Sukarno made clear of this attempt to extend his NASAKOM ideology into foreign policy during his speech at the celebration of the 45th anniversary of the PKI on May 24, 1965.

adhered widely across foreign policymaking structure but most importantly by Suharto himself, were among the most critical factors that shape Indonesian foreign policy (Suryadinata, 1996).³

Democratisation (*Reformasi*), started in the late 1990s, has not stopped the world views and personalities of the post-*Reformasi* Indonesian leaders to influence foreign and security policy. Thus, Indonesian foreign approaches under the three transitional presidents -Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Megawati- reflect to a certain degree their respective personalities.⁴

Amidst the changing world balance in the 21st century -where China has cemented its position as a contending hegemon, U.S. pivoting back to the region, and the rise of middle powers- and post-reform domestic politics had been largely consolidated, Indonesia was forced to reposition itself (Reid, 2012). Under two terms of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's presidency from 2004-2014, these attempts were very much influenced by the president's distinctive personality: his drive to be a high achiever, his non-conflictual approach to problem-solving, and his tendency to take both criticism and praise personally (Fitriani, 2015). As further argued by Fitriani, "the one characteristic of Yudhoyono's psyche that arguably left the deepest impact on Indonesia's foreign policy was his tendency to avoid conflict at all costs (Fitriani, 2015, p. 85). This

³ On how the *abangan*/Pancasila political cultures are reflected in Indonesian foreign policy, Suryadinata takes examples such as Indonesia's preference to lead the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) rather than Islamic movement and its stance to support Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) on the basis of national sovereignty rather than religion. See (Suryadinata, 1995, 1996).

⁴ Although half-Javanese, Habibie was born and raised in South Sulawesi where people are much more spontaneous and direct. Unlike Suharto who considered Western ideas and values such as democracy and human rights were alien concepts, Habibie was almost thoroughly Westernised and did not believe in a dichotomy between Western and Asian values. See (Anwar, 1999). Habibie's decision to grant referendum in East Timor in 1999 that led to its independence can be related to this background and personality. Habibie also seemed to be able to appreciate non-physical aspects of power in interstate relations compared to his predecessors. Habibie's 'theory of threat' viewed the contemporary world as a competition of non-physical powers and, as such, the key contest emerging in international relations would be for the supremacy in science and technology. See (Singh, 2000). Abdurrahman Wahid, known as Gus Dur, and his foreign minister, Alwi Shihab, have personal orientation and affiliation with the Middle East. This led to both actively trying to forge closer relations with the countries in the Middle East and sought to play a bigger role in the issues in the region including Israel-Palestine and Iraq. See (Smith, 2000).

accommodative approach to foreign relations was best exemplified by the "a thousand friends and zero enemies" vision.

Obviously, many details are missing in this brief summary of the history of Indonesian foreign policy. However, it suffices to say that Indonesian responses to external pressures have never been deterministic as realist theories would have predicted (Waltz, 1979). Nor has it been purely a projection of domestic politics. Instead, different leaders react differently to systemic pressures according to their respective personalities, world views, and the resulting foreign and security policymaking structure. Together, these domestic factors have significantly influenced Indonesia's responses to the threats and opportunities presented by the international system during the respective administrations.

A Neoclassical realism theory on Indonesian foreign and security policy

Given the pervasive role of domestic factors, especially leaders' personality and perception, in influencing Indonesian foreign and security policy throughout history, a purely systemic explanation ala structural realism/neorealism would be insufficient in explaining the Indonesian case. The overnight change in Indonesian foreign policy directions from Sukarno to Suharto, for instance, cannot be solely attributed to external pressures. Similarly, according to neorealist theories, in facing increasing threats in the South China Sea, Indonesia would have engaged in a full-blown balancing strategy internally by building up its military capabilities and externally through joining alliances. On the other hand, liberal theories that downplay systemic factors and put state's agency at the core of their analyses would have predicted that Jokowi would refrain from antagonising China as cordial relations between the two countries, especially in economic realms, is vital for Jokowi's domestic legitimacy as the next section would explain (Levy, 1988; Moravcsik, 1997). Therefore, Indonesia's distorted response

towards China and the South China Sea problem is best understood using a theoretical framework that incorporates both the systemic and domestic variables.

Unlike neorealists who argue that states placed in a similar position in the international system would behave similarly despite their different domestic structure, neoclassical realists "seek to explain variation in the foreign policies of the same state over time or across different states facing similar external constraints" (Ripsman et al., 2016; Taliaferro et al., 2009, p. 21). Being aware that states frequently defy systemic imperatives, neoclassical realists seek to explain why, how, and under what conditions do the internal characteristics of states intervene between the leaders' assessment of international threats and opportunities and the actual diplomatic, military and foreign economic policies those leaders pursue (Ripsman et al., 2016; Taliaferro et al., 2009, p. 4). The term 'neoclassical realism' itself was first coined by Gideon Rose in his 1998 review article to refer to several works that:

"... explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables, updating and systemising certain insights drawn from classical realist thoughts. Its adherents argue that the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. This is why they are realist. They argue further, however, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressure must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical" (Rose, 1998, p. 146).⁵

⁵ Neoclassical realist research projects have developed considerably since the publication of Rose's article. In addition to the works reviewed by Rose, a number of important works employing neoclassical realism have been published (Brown et al., 1995; Christensen, 1996; Schweller, 1998; Wohlforth, 1993; Zakaria, 1998). The neoclassical realism framework had been applied to explain cases ranging from the US expansion in the post-Cold War era (Onea, 2012), Iranian foreign policy (Juneau, 2015), EU and NATO relations with Russia (Diesen, 2016), Taiwan's cross-strait relations (Chen, 2015), the North Korean nuclear test (Nakato, 2012), Japan's security policy (Saltzman, 2015), Japan and South Korea's security policy (Yoo, 2012), US-China relations (He, 2017), Australian foreign policy (McLean, 2016), and small states' behaviour (Gvalia et al., 2019). (Ripsman et

Neoclassical realists, in other words, admit the idea that systemic factors and states' relative power primarily drive states' behaviour. They do not reject the old formula of Thucydides that "the strong do what they can while the weak suffer what they must." These systemic factors, neoclassical realists argue, set the limits or parameters of states' behaviour. Nevertheless, as further argued by Rose, "the influence of systemic factors may often be more apparent from a distance than from up close, for example, in significantly limiting the menu of foreign policy choices considered by a state's leaders at a particular time, rather than in forcing the selection of one particular item on that menu over another" (Rose, 1998, p. 147). In other words, neoclassical realists consider the systemic factors as the independent variables of the states' foreign policy and domestic factors as the intervening variables (Taliaferro et al., 2009).

In what perhaps is the most comprehensive and ambitious neoclassical realist project to date, Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell grouped domestic level variables that are employed by neoclassical realist theories: leader images, strategic culture, state-society relations, and domestic institutions (Ripsman et al., 2016, pp. 58–79). Leader images are particularly important for neoclassical realist theories as argued by Rose, "foreign policy choices are made by actual political leaders and elites, and so it is their perceptions of relative power that matter, not simply relative quantities of physical resources or forces in being" (Rose, 1998, p. 147). Consequently, "to understand a state's foreign policy choices it is useful to investigate the character and psychological make-up of its political leaders, which are critical intervening

al., 2016) was probably the most ambitious neoclassical realism project so far. It provided a theoretical construction of the so-called Type III neoclassical realism. Unlike Type I neoclassical realism analyses which seek to explain 'anomalous cases for structural realism' and Type IIs which seek to explain broader range of foreign policy choices and grand strategic adjustment', Type III neoclassical realism analyses blend 'both the nature of systemic stimuli that have causal importance (the independent variable) and the domestic political factors' into a coherent theory of international politics' that is utilised to explain international outcomes and structural change caused by states' foreign policy choices.

variables that can influence the way they respond to systemic pressures” (Ripsman et al., 2016, p. 63). Furthermore, Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell explained that,

“These "images" are highly personalised, as they are informed by the individual's prior experiences and values. Moreover, to the extent that they represent core beliefs, they are not easily altered. Once formed, they act cognitive filters that inform how leaders process information -what they pay attention to; what they ignore; and how they understand signals, information, and events. All incoming information about the outside world passes through these cognitive filters, which personalise and bias the leader's perception of the external stimuli. As a result, leaders will react differently to international challenges and opportunities depending on the content of their images” (Ripsman et al., 2016, p. 62).

With such a line of inquiry, neoclassical realism could potentially enhance the ability of IR theorists, especially those of the realist tradition, to more accurately understand and explain Indonesian foreign and security policy.⁶

This article takes Jokowi's inward-looking personality and his disinterested attitude towards foreign and security policy as the intervening variables that influence Indonesia's distorted and

⁶ The theoretical development of neoclassical realism itself has not gone unnoticed by scholars working on Indonesian foreign policy. Syailendra (Syailendra, 2017) wrote that the conflicting interests of Indonesian domestic political actors and their divergent perceptions of the China threat result in the lack of consensus regarding how to respond to China. Employing Schweller's neoclassical realist framework, Syailendra argues that in the absence of elite consensus, Indonesia will likely maintain the status quo and refrain from balancing against China. By employing a neoclassical realist framework derived from the work of Dueck (Dueck, 2009) to 49 instances of Indonesia's stance towards Muslim separatists in non-Muslim host countries, Sari (Sari, 2019) tested the theory of ethnic ties in order to explain the likelihood of states supporting secessionist movements in which they share cultural ties. Sari found out that the likelihood of Indonesia support Muslim separatist groups in non-Muslim countries is determined by the perception of the leading policymakers as well as domestic public demands.

domestic-oriented responses (dependent variable) to external stimuli (independent variable) in the form of security challenges in the South China Sea.

South China Sea, incursions in Natuna, and security threats to Jokowi's Indonesia

For long, the South China Sea has been one of the key strategic challenges for successive Indonesian governments (McRae, 2019). Although Indonesia has not been directly involved as a claimant in the Spratly or Paracel Islands, these territorial disputes impinge upon various of Indonesia's interests (McRae, 2019, p. 762). Stability in the South China Sea is deemed crucial for Indonesia to pursue its development agenda. Rising tension and armed conflicts in the South China Sea, especially the one that involves major powers, would also put much-needed foreign investments in Indonesia at risk.⁷ To have the conflict managed and regional peace and stability maintained are thus the major interests of Indonesia in the South China Sea.

The threats from the South China Sea are also perceived in the context of Indonesia's territorial integrity. Although Indonesia maintains the diplomatic position as a non-claimant state, its officials are fully aware that there is a problem regarding Indonesian territorial integrity in the South China Sea. After all, China's nine-dashed line overlaps with a portion of Indonesian EEZ derived from the Natuna Islands. It is important to note that historically the prospect of foreign incursion into Indonesia's vast and open maritime jurisdiction has always been part of its threat perception (Arif & Kurniawan, 2018).

The unresolved disputes have also seen many incidents involving Chinese fishers and China Coast Guard (CCG) on one side and Indonesian authority on the other side. Indonesian authority is fully aware that the illegal fishing activities carried out by the Chinese (and the

⁷ This view was corroborated by a senior officer from the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs interviewed by the author.

Vietnamese) have caused the nation a significant loss. It is recorded that the illegal fishing activities cost Indonesia, the world's second-largest fishing industry, around US\$20 billion annually. Therefore, there is a strong linkage between securing sovereignty and territorial integrity and combat illegal fishing activities in its maritime jurisdiction.

Table 1 Incidents involving China's fishing vessels and Indonesian security forces in Natuna 2010-2016 (source: compiled by the author from an interview with an Indonesian scholar)

Date	Vessel(s) Captured	Captured by	Coordinate	Status
15 May 2010	Unidentified	Hiu-04 (MFMA)	05°38''N110°19''E	Forcibly released
22 June 2010	Unidentified	Hiu-05 (MFMA)	05°00''N109°00''E	Forcibly released
26 March 2013	Guibei Yu 58081	Hiu-001 (MFMA)	04°59''N109°57''E	Forcibly released
19 March 2016	Kway Fey 10078	Hiu-11 (MFMA)	05°05''N109°07''E	Forcibly released, crews detained
20 March 2016	Guibei Yu 17088	Hiu-001 (MFMA)	05°07''N109°11''E	Forcibly released
28 May 2016	Guibei Yu 27088	KRI OSA-354 (TNI AL)	05°16''N110°14''E	Detained
16 June 2016	Quiongdanzhou 19038	KRI IBL-383 (TNI AL)	06°48''N109°05''E	Detained

South China Sea is also vital for Indonesia in the context of its leadership in ASEAN. The South China Sea is not only a litmus test for China's incoming hegemony and how it manages its relations with its smaller neighbours but also for Indonesia in terms of its ability to set norms and govern great powers relations in the region. Therefore, for Indonesia, ensuring ASEAN's cohesion and centrality in dealing with the South China Sea problems is pertinent for its leadership credentials (E. Laksmana, 2018, pp. 160–161).

Jokowi's personality, attitude towards foreign policy, and domestic agenda

Jokowi's lack of interest in foreign and security policy and its detrimental effect on Indonesia's responses to critical challenges, including in the South China Sea, have been well-noted by literature. Connelly noted that Jokowi was new to the practice of diplomacy when he came to the presidency without any strong views about the abstract concepts such as the regional security architecture or balance of power (Connelly, 2015, p. 6). Laksmana argued that Jokowi's lack of personal interest and grasp of foreign policy is the more proximate condition behind Indonesia's inconsistent response in the South China Sea (E. A. Laksmana, 2016). This author agrees with these convictions. However, as stated in the introduction, this article seeks to posit this phenomenon in the broader historical context of Indonesian foreign and security policy and understand how the distinct leaders' personality and attitude towards foreign policy distorts Indonesia's responses to external pressures.

Jokowi is undoubtedly not the first Indonesian president who had humble origins, although he is the first without a political elite or military background. His rise to prominence was rapid. After building a successful furniture business in Solo, Jokowi successfully ran for mayor in 2005. His *blusukan* visits (unannounced spot checks) were widely popular when he was in Solo. When he got re-elected in 2010, he won 90 per cent of the vote. After a short tenure as the governor of Jakarta from 2012, during which his popularity continued to spike, he was picked by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle's senior leadership (PDI-P) to run for the presidency in 2014.

According to his biography, it is Jokowi's experience as a businessman that largely explains his approach to politics and governance (Bland, 2020).

"He needs electricity for his factory, roads and ports to move his goods, and ships to transport them to their overseas customers. He wants lower taxes and simpler

regulations to make business easier, and better healthcare and education to ensure a happier and more productive workforce" (Bland, 2020).

Having such a background, it has always been the domestic reforms and economic policy that preoccupies Jokowi's agenda. Among a myriad of domestic challenges, physical infrastructure development is exceptionally high in Jokowi's priority. Under President Yudhoyono, infrastructure development suffered from under-investment and poor asset management (Salim & Dharma Negara, 2018). Jokowi administration has been trying to tackle this challenge by taking a more pragmatic approach, primarily by shifting budget allocations from fuel subsidies towards infrastructure development and bureaucratic and regulatory reforms (Salim & Dharma Negara, 2018; Warburton, 2018). Building and modernising Indonesia's physical infrastructure to reduce business logistical costs have been the most critical feature of Jokowi's industrialisation plan and economic growth (Warburton, 2018, p. 359). For his second term of presidency, Jokowi aims to invest around \$430 billion in infrastructure from 2020 to 2024, a 20 per cent increase compared with the \$359.2 billion invested from 2015-2019 (Kim, 2020). Warburton argued that under Jokowi, a new developmentalism in Indonesia's economic policy has become a defining feature of Indonesia's political economy (Warburton, 2016, 2018). In this regard, Jokowi shares something in common with Suharto: they both rely on economic growth and development as the main sources of political legitimacy.

Jokowi's enthusiasm for domestic economic policy and infrastructure development is matched by his disinterestedness in international politics. Unlike his predecessor President Yudhoyono, who has keen interests in foreign and strategic affairs, Jokowi "disliked the formalities of diplomacy and public speaking" (Bland, 2020). In Jokowi's own words, he had minimal interest in the world of politics before he became mayor of Solo (Bland, 2020; Endah, 2019). Foreign policy for Jokowi "should be put to work to boost his overriding obsessions: the economy, infrastructure, and his personal bank of political capital" (Bland, 2020).

As far as foreign relations are concerned, Jokowi tries to direct it to meet Indonesia's domestic needs. In a meeting with over a hundred Indonesian ambassadors gathered in Jakarta in January 2020, only a couple of months after his second inauguration, Jokowi made his priority clear. He said,

"All ambassadors are peace ambassadors. This is a constitutional mandate. However, I want everyone to focus on economic diplomacy. I want 70-80 per cent [of our resources] to focus on economic diplomacy because that is what our country needs ... the rest you can fill with other activities related to tourism, peace diplomacy, sovereignty."

Speaking fluently and mostly off-script on finance and trade issues, in contrast to his often staged and scripted speeches on foreign and strategic affairs, Jokowi urged all envoys to play the role of "investment ambassadors" and "export ambassadors." The goal is to reverse the current account and trade balance into surpluses because only then, Jokowi insisted, that Indonesia can be truly independent (Gorbiano, 2020).

After his presidential inauguration in 2014, Jokowi introduced the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) vision. With this vision, Jokowi's administration sought to transform the country into a maritime power. Underlying this vision was the renewed realisation of Indonesia's geographical destiny: that Indonesia resides in between two large and increasingly strategic oceans, the Indian and the Pacific, and as the world's geoeconomic and geopolitical centre of gravity shifts to Asia, Indonesia is compelled to build its maritime capabilities in order to play an active role in regional and global dynamics (Shekhar & Liow, 2014). As argued by one of its key architects, the GMF vision "...emphasises Indonesia's geographic, geostrategic and geoeconomic realities upon which its future will depend, and simultaneously influences the dynamics in the Indian and Pacific Oceans" (Willis, 2016).

The original hope has turned out failing to be a reality as the GMF vision has been driven inward by Jokowi's imbalanced emphasis on the domestic agenda. In its original form, the vision rested on five pillars: maritime culture, maintenance and management of marine resources, development of maritime infrastructure and connectivity, promotion of maritime diplomacy, and modernisation of maritime defence capabilities (Witular, 2014).⁸ As noted by Connelly, of these five pillars, only two -maritime diplomacy and maritime defence- that are "truly foreign policy issues." However, even on these supposedly outward-looking issues, Jokowi's inward-looking personality and views have left their marks as the next sections will explore.

The strategy to implement the GMF vision was also pragmatic, highlighting Jokowi's transactional and domestic-oriented approach. The Indonesian Ocean Policy document, published in 2017 and intended to be the general guideline for attaining the GMF agenda, advocates synergy between the GMF vision and other regional initiatives only if they are in line with Indonesia's national interests (Anwar, 2020, p. 121). Indonesia's participation in China's Belt and Road Initiative primarily to secure funding for infrastructure development can be seen in this regard (Anwar, 2020, p. 121).

It is important to note here that in his first political speech after his reelection in 2019, the GMF vision was no longer found. In contrast to his 2014 speech when he famously invoked the Indonesian Navy's old slogan to underscore his GMF vision, the word "maritime" was hardly mentioned in his post-reelection speech. Looking back, the supposedly outward-looking vision based on a realist assessment of Indonesia's strategic environment never stood any chance under a very inward-looking president.

⁸ Later, the pillars were expanded into seven: maritime and human resources; maritime defence, security and law enforcement, and safety at sea; maritime governance, maritime economy and infrastructure; maritime spatial management and environmental protection; maritime culture, and; maritime diplomacy.

Indonesia's responses to South China Sea challenges

Indonesia's responses to the South China Sea threats consist of at least two elements: a more active and pragmatically domestic-driven diplomacy and a more assertive security approach to territorial integrity. The following paragraphs will elaborate on these topics by highlighting the extent that they are influenced by Jokowi's personality and attitude towards foreign and security policies.

Active diplomacy

In responding to the rising tensions and prospect of instability in the South China Sea, Indonesian diplomacy during the Jokowi administration has been generally proactive. For sure, Indonesian recent diplomatic activism is built upon the previous administration's achievements under President Yudhoyono, especially when it comes to norms-setting and asserting Indonesia's regional leadership amidst the rising security challenges in the region. Given Jokowi's lack of interest in external affairs, Indonesian diplomacy's conceptualisation and implementation have been left mainly to his advisers and ministers, including Minister Retno Marsudi and her experienced senior officers at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the substance of Indonesian diplomacy is partly driven by a set of domestic agenda preferred by the president when it comes to the actual substance.

There seems to be a consensus among Indonesian officials that, being a non-claimant state, Indonesia cannot, and is not willing, to touch the 'core issue' in the South China Sea.⁹ Indonesia believes that the claimant states themselves can only resolve territorial disputes. Therefore, as far as diplomatic initiatives are concerned, the short-term goal is to ensure that the status quo

⁹ (Interview with a Senior Officer from the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017)

is maintained and parties to the disputes conduct themselves according to the mutually agreed rules and norms. Therefore, the early conclusion of the South China Sea Code of Conduct (COC) is a priority.

After years of negotiation, ASEAN has made some progress concerning the COC. In August 2018, ASEAN member states announced the 'single draft negotiating text' on the COC. Indonesia actively pushed for several points to be included in the final draft (Thayer, 2018). These points reflect the domestic priorities of Jokowi's administration. For instance, Indonesia has been actively pushing for cooperation on combating illegal fishing, an item high in President Jokowi's list of domestic priorities, to be included in the areas of cooperation covered by the COC (Thayer, 2018).

For Indonesia, as an archipelagic state, internal rules and laws, especially UNCLOS, have strategic importance. After all, UNCLOS, and its ratification by other countries, is the backbone of international recognition of Indonesian territorial integrity. Thus, when it comes to multilateral diplomacy on the South China Sea, promotion and respect for UNCLOS have been general themes. For instance, in negotiating the COC, Indonesia proposed to insert a provision that obliges all parties "to respect the Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf of the coastal states as provided for in the 1982 UNCLOS" (Thayer, 2018).

In May 2020, the Indonesia mission to the United Nations circulated a note in which it reiterated Indonesia's position as a non-party to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the incompatibility of China's nine-dash line. What really set this move apart was the invocation of the international tribunal award between the Philippines and China in 2016. The award concluded, among others, that there was no legal basis for China's historic claims within the 'nine-dash line' while none of the maritime features claimed by China was capable of generating an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. In the past, the Indonesian

government had been reluctant to alluding to the tribunal results when talking about the South China Sea disputes (E. A. Laksmna, 2016). Vietnam and the Philippines also circulated similar notes of protest.

Indonesia's note further solidified ASEAN unity in its collective action of undertaking a stronger stance against China's territorial expansion in the South China Sea. While stopping short from explicitly mentioning the award, ASEAN post-summit statement in June "reaffirmed that the 1982 UNCLOS is the basis for determining maritime entitlements, sovereign rights, jurisdiction, and legitimate interests over maritime zones, and the 1982 UNCLOS sets out the legal framework within which all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out", an apparent reference to the substance of the 2016 arbitration (Arif, 2020).

Indonesia's role was also instrumental in developing the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). Announced during the ASEAN summit in Bangkok in 2019, the AOIP outlines the regional grouping's approach to geopolitical and geostrategic shifts in the region. Within this Outlook, ASEAN members seek to maintain the regional organisation's relevance as the primary driver of regional architecture. ASEAN member states, especially Indonesia, had been uncomfortable with the approaches taken by major powers. While they acknowledge the strategic implications of China's rise, ASEAN members also felt that the United States' approach to the Indo-Pacific region was exclusionary and aimed at counterproductively isolating China (Acharya, 2019). Unlike the U.S. and its allies who use the terms "free" and "open," Indonesia and ASEAN opt for "open" and "inclusive," implying that the AOIP is not designed to exclude any single player in the region.

The final document was released just after eighteen months of negotiation, a credit for ASEAN that is well-known for its tendency to drag its feet, especially on sensitive matters (Arif, 2019). The role of several senior negotiators from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including Mr Damos

Agusman (Director General for International Law and Treaties), Mr Jose Tavares (then Director-General for ASEAN Cooperation), and Dr Siswo Pramono (Head of the Policy Analysis and Development Agency), were instrumental in the drafting and negotiation process.

As an Indonesia's initiative, Indonesia's diplomacy towards adopting the AOIP reflected Indonesia's domestic interests. The AOIP, for instance, lists the enhancement of cooperation for sustainable management of marine resources as one of the issues under the rubric of 'areas of cooperation,' a welcoming result of Indonesia's diplomacy. Under the rubric of cooperation on connectivity, the AOIP calls for greater investments and efforts to build connectivity infrastructure, including physical, institutional, and people-to-people linkages. In fact, judging from its content and the proactiveness of Indonesia in pushing for its conclusion, the AOIP can be considered closely related to the general principles of the GMF vision (Anwar, 2020).

Assertive and forceful approach to territorial integrity

Indonesian activism at the diplomatic front is backed up by similarly bold moves on the ground. In responding to illegal fishing in the Natuna waters, Jokowi had departed from the previous administration's cautious approach. As Table 1 above shows, there were numerous incidents involving Chinese maritime law enforcement and fishing vessels with Indonesian authority in Natuna waters from 2010 to 2016. On 15 May 2010, an Indonesian Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries' patrol ship, Hiu-04, approached two Chinese fishing vessels it suspected illegally fishing within the Indonesian EEZ. As Hiu-04 approaching, a CCG patrol vessel came to the rescue and forced Hiu-04 to release the two Chinese fishing trawlers. One month later, two CCG patrol vessels threatened to shoot Indonesian Hiu-05 that just captured a Chinese fishing vessel. The fishing vessel was reluctantly released. On 26 March 2013, a Chinese

trawler, Guibei Yu 58081, was captured by Hiu-001. Again it was forcibly released when a CCG ship entered the scene.

Following the series of forced release incidents and realising the imbalance of power between Indonesian maritime patrol capability and the Chinese, Jakarta strengthened patrol capability in the Natuna waters. Indonesian Navy's warships were deployed to support civilian maritime law enforcement agencies. As a result, on 28 May 2016, an Indonesian Navy's frigate KRI Oswald Siahaan-354 captured Guibei Yu 27088 and blocked a CCG vessel from rescuing the fishing vessel. On 18 June 2016, an Indonesian Navy's corvette, KRI Imam Bonjol-383, opened fire after a group of fishing vessels found illegally fishing in the Indonesian water failed to respond to instructions. The warship then detained a vessel identified as Qiongdanzhou 19038 with its crew of six men and a woman on the TNI AL's base at Ranai, Natuna.

A year after the standoffs, the Indonesian government took another bold, albeit symbolic gesture. In July 2017, Deputy Coordinating Minister of Maritime Affairs Arif Havas Oegroseno officially launched a new map of Indonesia in which the South China Sea's portion of Natuna's EEZ was renamed *Laut Natuna Utara* (North Natuna Sea).¹⁰ In addition to sending a signal to China that Indonesia is serious about its concerns over Natuna, the renaming can be seen as an attempt by Jokowi to foster nationalism, which is strategically important for his regime's legitimacy (Suryadinata, 2017).

In December 2019, only a couple of weeks after Jokowi was sworn in for the second term, China tested Indonesia again. For weeks, at least 30 Chinese fishing boats, accompanied by CCG vessels, were fishing inside the Indonesian maritime zone in the Natuna waters. Both

¹⁰ During his tenure as Deputy Minister, Ambassador Arif Havas Oegroseno, a seasoned diplomat with a long portfolio in maritime law, was instrumental in the formulation of Indonesia's maritime policies, including the 2017 Ocean Policy. Ambassador Oegroseno was later appointed as Ambassador of Indonesia to Germany.

countries were engaged in a standoff after the Indonesian military deployed warships to drive away Chinese fishing boats and CCG vessels.

It is interesting to note that the charge was led by the new joint regional command, establishment of which also highlights an increasing awareness of external security threats among the Indonesian defence establishment (Fadli, 2019). In fact, the latest General Guidelines on State Defence Policy released by the president's office explicitly states that Indonesian armed forces shall increase their presence in vulnerable outermost islands and establish integrated military commands in those places, which include Natuna, under the newly established joint regional commands.¹¹

The latest incident occurred in September 2020, when a CCG vessel was identified sailing within Indonesia's EEZ near Natuna. This time the response was more calculated. The intruding vessel was handled by a Bakamla (*Badan Keamanan Laut/Indonesian Maritime Security Agency*) vessel, the designated Indonesian coast guard with Navy's warship shadowing behind. Nevertheless, the incident further highlights Indonesia's preparedness to counter-challenge China's growing assertiveness in Natuna (Tiola & Dinarto, 2020).

From a theoretical point of view, the developments mentioned above prompt an important question: given the relatively similar systemic pressures in the forms of growing tension in the South China Sea and incursions into its territory in the South China Sea, why did Indonesia under Jokowi opt for distinctively forceful responses?

While the policies appear to be in line with neorealist prediction, a closer look into Indonesia's foreign and security policymaking reveals that they are influenced by domestic factors. In this regard, Jokowi's inward-looking orientation means that the president concerns about how his

¹¹ (*Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 8 Tahun 2021 Tentang Kebijakan Umum Pertahanan Negara 2020-2024 (Presidential Regulations No. 8/2021 on General Policy Guidelines on State Defence Policy 2020-2024)*, 2021)

foreign and security policy can be used to bolster his domestic political legitimacy. After all, in the lead up to the presidential election of 2014, Jokowi made it clear that safeguarding Indonesia's territorial integrity from foreign intrusion would be a major priority of his administration. Jokowi had also declared war against illegal fishing, in line with his focus on domestic economic development (Widhiarto, 2014). Thus, when Chinese fishing vessels were found operating within Indonesia's EEZ, he can only afford to appear strong. In the aftermath of the June 2016 incident, President Jokowi flew to Natuna to lead a limited cabinet meeting on board the same warship that chased and seized the Chinese fishing boats. Observers argue that through this strong gesture, Jokowi intended to send a signal to the Chinese leadership that Indonesia would protect its sovereign rights in its EEZ, by force if necessary (Connelly, 2016). The message, however, was also intended for his domestic constituents, that he was going to fulfil his campaign promise of adopting a tough stance in the protection of Indonesia's sovereignty. Jokowi's motivation to ensure his political legitimacy, in other words, shaped Indonesia's responses.

Conclusion

The key takeaway from this paper is that nothing can be taken for granted regarding Indonesian foreign and security policy. Living in an anarchic, self-help international system, Indonesia has to respond to external systemic pressures in one form or another. The responses, however, have not always been clear cut. A closer look at the history of Indonesian foreign and security policymaking reveals the significant role of domestic factors in shaping the actual policies, including Indonesia's leaders' idiosyncratic factors, their attitude to foreign and security policies, and the resulting policymaking institutional arrangements.

The development of Indonesia's foreign and security policies under President Jokowi can be understood within such a broader historical pattern. In facing China's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, Indonesia has come up with a set of responses. It has been more active diplomatically and assertive when it comes to protecting its territory and resources. These responses, however, cannot be overstated. While they certainly show that Indonesia is not interested in merely maintaining the status quo, an all-out balancing response, as predicted by the neorealist theories of IR, has been distorted by the president's lack of interest in foreign and security policy and his administration's imbalanced focus on domestic agenda.

References

- Acharya, A. (2019, August 12). *Why ASEAN's Indo-Pacific outlook matters*. The Strategist. <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-aseans-indo-pacific-outlook-matters/>
- Anwar, D. F. (1999). The Habibie Presidency. In G. Forrester (Ed.), *Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos?* Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Anwar, D. F. (2005). *Indonesia at Large: Collected Writings on ASEAN, Foreign Policy, Security and Democratization*. The Habibie Center.
- Anwar, D. F. (2020). Indonesia and the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific. *International Affairs*, 96(1), 111–129. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz223>
- Arif, M. (2013). Intervensi Militer Indonesia Di Timor Portugis 7 Desember 1975: Analisa Kebijakan Luar Negeri Pada Level Sistem Internasional, Politik Domestik Dan Individu. *GLOBAL: Jurnal Politik Internasional*, 15(2).
- Arif, M. (2019). *ASEAN and Indo-Pacific: Beyond the Outlook* (Vol. 6 (3); ASEAN Briefs). The Habibie Center. <http://www.habibiecenter.or.id/img/publication/e6046e0b1b2a3b367653955508bd71f7.pdf>
- Arif, M. (2020). ASEAN, UNCLOS, and the South China Sea: A New Momentum? *The Habibie Center*, 20. <https://habibiecenter.or.id/img/publication/96929e7487beafe3fc9c291460588c21.pdf>
- Arif, M., & Kurniawan, Y. (2018). Strategic Culture and Indonesian Maritime Security. *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies*, 5(1), 77–89. <https://doi.org/10.1002/app5.203>

- Bland, B. (2020). *Man of Contradictions: Jokowi and the struggle to remake Indonesia*. Lowy Institute for International Policy.
- Brown, M. E., Lynn-Jones, S. M., & Miller, S. E. (Eds.). (1995). *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security*. MIT Press.
- Bunnell, F. P. (1966). Guided Democracy Foreign Policy: 1960-1965 President Sukarno Moves from Non-Alignment to Confrontation. *Indonesia*, 2, 37–76. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3350755>
- Chen, D. P. (2015). Security, domestic divisions, and the KMT's Post-2008 "One China" policy: A neoclassical realist analysis. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 15(2), 319–365. <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcv001>
- Christensen, T. J. (1996). *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958*. Princeton University Press.
- Connelly, A. L. (2015). Sovereignty and the Sea: President Joko Widodo's Foreign Policy Challenges. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 37(1), 1–28. <https://doi.org/10.1355/cs37-1a>
- Connelly, A. L. (2016). Indonesia in the South China Sea: Going it alone. *Lowy Institute for International Policy*.
- Diesen, G. (2016). *EU and NATO Relations with Russia: After the Collapse of the Soviet Union*. Routledge.
- Dueck, C. (2009). Neoclassical realism and the national interest: Presidents, domestic politics, and major military interventions. In *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy* (pp. 139–169). Cambridge University Press.
- Endah, A. (2019). *Jokowi: Menuju Cahaya*. Tiga Serangkai.
- Fadli. (2019, November 20). *Indonesia to build frontier military HQ near South China Sea*. The Jakarta Post. <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/11/19/indonesia-to-build-frontier-military-base-near-south-china-sea.html>
- Fitriani, E. (2015). Yudhoyono's foreign policy: Is Indonesia a rising power? In E. Aspinall, M. Mietzner, & D. Tomsa (Eds.), *The Yudhoyono Presidency: Indonesia's Decade of Stability and Stagnation* (pp. 73–90). ISEAS Publishing.
- Gorbiano, M. I. (2020, January 9). "We all should focus on economic diplomacy," Jokowi tells Indonesian envoys. The Jakarta Post. <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/01/09/we-all-should-focus-on-economic-diplomacy-jokowi-tells-indonesian-envoys.html>
- Gvalia, G., Lebanidze, B., & Siroky, D. S. (2019). Neoclassical realism and small states: Systemic constraints and domestic filters in Georgia's foreign policy. *East European Politics*, 35(1), 21–51. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2019.1581066>

He, K. (2017). Explaining United States–China relations: Neoclassical realism and the nexus of threat–interest perceptions. *The Pacific Review*, 30(2), 133–151. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2016.1201130>

Interview with a senior officer from the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2017).

Juneau, T. (2015). *Squandered Opportunity: Neoclassical Realism and Iranian Foreign Policy*. Stanford University Press.

Karim, N. (2004). *Australian Policy towards Indonesia 1965-72: An Archival Study* [PhD thesis]. University of Western Sydney.

Kim, J. H. (2020, July 23). *Indonesia plans \$430bn infra spend by 2024*. Infrastructure Investor. <https://www.infrastructureinvestor.com/indonesia-plans-430bn-infra-spend-by-2024/>

Laksmiana, E. (2018). Drifting towards Dynamic Equilibrium: Indonesia's South China Sea Policy under Yudhoyono. In U. Fionna, S. D. Negara, & D. Simandjuntak (Eds.), *Aspirations with Limitations: Indonesia's Foreign Affairs under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono* (pp. 153–175). ISEAS Publishing.

Laksmiana, E. A. (2016). The Domestic Politics of Indonesia's Approach to the Tribunal Ruling and the South China Sea. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 38(3), 382–388.

Levy, J. S. (1988). Domestic Politics and War. *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18(4), 653–673. <https://doi.org/10.2307/204819>

McLean, W. (2016). Neoclassical realism and Australian foreign policy: Understanding how security elites frame domestic discourses. *Global Change, Peace & Security*, 28(1), 1–15. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2015.1112774>

McRae, D. (2019). Indonesia's South China Sea Diplomacy: A Foreign Policy Illiberal Turn? *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 759–779. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2019.1601240>

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2003). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (Updated Edition). W. W. Norton & Company.

Moravcsik, A. (1997). Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. *International Organization*, 51(4), 513–553. <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081897550447>

Nakato, S. (2012). North Korea's Second Nuclear Test: Neoclassical Realism Perspectives. *Pacific Focus*, 27(1), 10–35. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1976-5118.2012.01074.x>

Novotny, D. (2010). *Torn between America and China: Elite Perceptions and Indonesian Foreign Policy*. ISEAS Publishing.

Onea, T. (2012). Putting the 'Classical' in Neoclassical Realism: Neoclassical Realist Theories and US Expansion in the Post-Cold War. *International Relations*, 26(2), 139–164. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117811430674>

Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 8 Tahun 2021 Tentang Kebijakan Umum Pertahanan Negara 2020-2024 (Presidential Regulations No. 8/2021 on General Policy Guidelines on State Defence Policy 2020-2024). (2021).

Reid, A. (Ed.). (2012). *Indonesia's Rising: The Repositioning of Asia's Third Giant*. ISEAS Publishing.

Ripsman, N. M., Taliaferro, J. W., & Lobell, S. E. (2016). *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics*. Oxford University Press.

Rose, G. (1998). Review Article: Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. *World Politics*, 51, 144–172.

Salim, W., & Dharma Negara, S. (2018). Infrastructure Development under the Jokowi Administration: Progress, Challenges and Policies. *Southeast Asian Economies*, 35(3), 386–401. <https://doi.org/10.1355/ae35-3e>

Saltzman, I. Z. (2015). Growing Pains: Neoclassical Realism and Japan's Security Policy Emancipation. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 36(3), 498–527. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2015.1091574>

Sari, A. C. (2019). A neoclassical realist explanation of Indonesia's involvement in Muslim-related secessions in non-Muslim countries. *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, 4(3), 213–241. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2057891118787930>

Schweller, R. L. (1998). *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest*. Columbia University Press.

Schweller, R. L. (2004). Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing. *International Security*, 29(2), 159–201. <https://doi.org/10.1162/0162288042879913>

Shekhar, V., & Liow, J. C. (2014). *Indonesia as a Maritime Power: Jokowi's Vision, Strategies, and Obstacles Ahead*. The Brookings Institution. <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2014/11/indonesia-maritime-liow-shekhar>

Singh, B. (2000). *Succession Politics in Indonesia: The 1998 Presidential Elections and the Fall of Suharto*. Macmillan.

Smith, A. L. (2000). Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Abdurrahman Wahid: Radical or Status Quo State? *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 22(3), 498–526.

Sukma, R. (1995). The Evolution of Indonesia's Foreign Policy: An Indonesian View. *Asian Survey*, 35(3), 304–315.

- Sukma, R. (2003). *Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy*. Routledge.
- Suryadinata, L. (1995). Islam and Suharto's Foreign Policy: Indonesia, the Middle East, and Bosnia. *Asian Survey*, 35(3), 291–303.
- Suryadinata, L. (1996). *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Soeharto: Aspiring to International Leadership*. Times Academic Press.
- Suryadinata, L. (2017). *What Does Indonesia's Renaming of Part of the South China Sea Signify?* 64, 6.
- Suryodiningrat, M. (2006, September 9). *RI Foreign Policy Faulted as Haphazard, Lacking Priorities*. The Jakarta Post. <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2006/09/09/ri-foreign-policy-faulted-haphazard-lacking-priorities.html>
- Syailendra, E. A. (2017). A Nonbalancing Act: Explaining Indonesia's Failure to Balance Against the Chinese Threat. *Asian Security*, 13(3), 237–255. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2017.1365489>
- Taliaferro, J. W., Lobell, S. E., & Ripsman, N. M. (2009). Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy. In S. E. Lobell, N. M. Ripsman, & J. W. Taliaferro (Eds.), *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy* (pp. 1–41). Cambridge University Press.
- Thayer, C. (2018, August 3). *A Closer Look at the ASEAN-China Single Draft South China Sea Code of Conduct*. The Diplomat. <https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/a-closer-look-at-the-asean-china-single-draft-south-china-sea-code-of-conduct/>
- Tiola, & Dinarto, D. (2020, November 5). *The Natuna Standoff: Transcending Fisheries Issues?* The Diplomat. <https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/the-natuna-standoff-transcending-fisheries-issues/>
- Waltz, K. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. McGraw-Hill.
- Warburton, E. (2016). Jokowi and the New Developmentalism. *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 52(3), 297–320. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2016.1249262>
- Warburton, E. (2018). A New Developmentalism in Indonesia? *Southeast Asian Economies*, 35(3), 355–368. <https://doi.org/10.1355/ae35-3c>
- Weinstein, F. B. (1972). The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia An Approach to the Analysis of Foreign Policy in the Less Developed Countries. *World Politics*, 24(3), 356–381. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2009754>
- Widhiarto, H. (2014, November 19). *Jokowi declares war on illegal fishing*. The Jakarta Post. <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/19/jokowi-declares-war-illegal-fishing.html>

Willis, D. (2016, November 7). *Jokowi and the Indo–Pacific: Two years on*. The Strategist — The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Blog. <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/jokowi-indo-pacific-two-years/>

Witular, R. A. (2014). *Jokowi Launches Maritime Doctrine to the World*. The Jakarta Post. <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/13/jokowi-launches-maritime-doctrine-world.html>

Wohlforth, W. C. (1993). *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War*. Cornell University Press.

Yoo, H. J. (2012). Domestic hurdles for system-driven behavior: Neoclassical realism and missile defense policies in Japan and South Korea. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 12(2), 317–348. <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcs001>

Zakaria, F. (1998). *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*. Princeton University Press.

DRAFT